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Abstract 
German guarantee banks provide guarantees for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that apply for bank loans but cannot provide their own valuable collateral; 
this lack of collateral would normally lead to credit restrictions. Consequently, the 
central aim of guarantee banks is to enable SMEs to be eligible for loans. In 
Germany, the state provides counter-guarantees in the range of 65-80 per cent of the 
guarantee bank’s guarantee. To justify the governmental intervention and the risk-
taking of the state, guarantee banks need to be evaluated regularly. The literature 
review has revealed that additional research about German guarantee banks is 
needed. Some interesting literature exists about the ability of guarantee schemes to 
alter the lending behaviour of banks and reduce information asymmetries between 
the lenders and the borrowers. However, the literature review has demonstrated that 
these mechanisms have not yet been tested empirically. The present research 
provided a unique research approach for bridging this gap. Following the conceptual 
literature, the research aim was to test the ability of German guarantee banks to 
compensate collateral shortfalls and make available loans to SMEs, reduce 
information asymmetries, create lending relationships and mitigate credit restrictions 
immediately as well as in a sustainable way. This was done by carrying out a web 
survey with firms that have received a guarantee from guarantee bank Hesse as well 
as conducting semi-structured research interviews with bank managers. The results 
have demonstrated that the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank provides 
the missing collateral to banks and makes available loans to otherwise credit 
restricted SMEs. Evidence has been found for a reduction of information 
asymmetries and a creation of lending relationships between the borrower and the 
lending bank. Moreover, connections between an application for a guarantee and the 
support of the region and cross-selling aspects of commercial banks have been 
revealed.  
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1 Introduction 
The present PhD thesis applies an innovative approach to measure the efficacy of the 
German Credit Guarantee Scheme to mitigate credit restrictions for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Since the research is concentrated on the German 
guarantee banks, the following sections provide some background information about 
SME financing in Germany and the German guarantee banks. This is intended to 
allow a better understanding of the overall subject. Section 1.1 starts with providing 
established definitions of SMEs. Section 1.2 highlights the importance of SMEs for 
the German economy. Since the research is concentrated on SME financing in 
Germany, Section 1.3 provides some crucial information about the German banking 
system and particular characteristics important for understanding this research. 
Essential information about SME financing in Germany is provided in Section 1.4. 
Section 1.5 provides a detailed overview about the characteristics and aims of 
German guarantee banks. Section 1.6 shows the research aim and objectives, and 
Section 1.7 outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Definition of small and medium-sized enterprises  
The present research is about funding small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Therefore, the natural starting point is to explain how these firms can be defined. 
Usually, the literature distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative criteria to 
classify SMEs.  
Qualitative criteria are used to define the term ‘Mittelstand’ in Germany. Mittelstand 
is an old German term with no French or English equivalents (De, 2005; Goeke, 
2008). Thus, it is not used in the rest of the world (Goeke, 2008).  To be defined as 
Mittelstand in qualitative terms, ownership and leadership have to be in the hands of 
one person or family (De, 2005; Becker and Ulrich, 2009a). In that case, the owner 
mostly is engaged in the operative business (Becker and Ulrich, 2009a; Krämer, 
2003), bears the entrepreneurial risk, is personally liable and makes the strategic 
decisions (De, 2005). Table 1.1 illustrates the qualitative delimitation of the term 
Mittelstand. 
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Table 1.1: Qualitative delimitation of the German Mittelstand 
 Mittelstand Non-Mittelstand 
Characteristic Owner bears/undertakes Leadership/management 
bears/undertakes 
Risk X -- 
Liability X -- 
Operational assistance X -- 
Leadership X -- 
Description 
Ownership:                                       
Risk: 
Liability: 
Operational assistance: 
Leadership 
 
Controlling majority (alone or as family)  
Bears the entrepreneurial risk 
Personal liability 
Involved in all relevant operative decisions 
Gives instructions and makes all strategic decisions  
Source: De (2005), p. 173 
The combination of ownership and leadership indeed suggests characteristics of the 
Mittelstand enterprise. Nevertheless, it makes no statement about the size of a firm. 
This is one of the disadvantages of the qualitative criteria. Therefore, the 
overwhelming majority of available statistics of SMEs uses countable, quantitative 
criteria. This also applies for the present research. According to the definition of the 
European Commission (see Table 1.2), three criteria are considered to define SMEs. 
Table 1.2: European Commission SME definition 
Enterprise category Headcount and Turnover (in €) or Total assets (in €) 
Micro < 10  ≤ 2 million  ≤ 2 million 
Small < 50  ≤ 10 million  ≤ 10 million 
Medium-sized < 250  ≤ 50 million  ≤ 43 million 
Source: (European Commission, 2006) 
 
Following this definition SMEs are micro, small or medium-sized enterprises which 
− have  fewer than 250 employees and 
− have an annual turnover of not more than 50 Mio. € or 
− show total assets of not more than 43 Mio. €. 
Moreover, they have to be autonomous. That means that they either have to be 
completely independent or have one or more investments in other businesses of less 
than 25 per cent each (minority partnerships) (European Commission, 2006). 
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1.2 Economic significance of SMEs 
SMEs are an integral part of the German economy as is visible in Figure 1.1 below. 
In 2013 there were an estimated 3.72 million enterprises in Germany. Based on the 
definition of the European Commission 99.6 per cent of all enterprises were SMEs. 
In 2011, they accounted for 78.9 per cent of employment, 35.9 per cent of turnover 
and 54.8 per cent of net added value (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, 2013).  
Figure 1.1: Economic significance of SMEs in Germany 
 
Source: Institut für Mittelstandsforschung [Institute for SME Research] (2013) 
These figures clearly illustrate the significance of SMEs for the German economy. 
Their prevalence ensures a high competitiveness. SMEs are recognized as key 
sources of innovation, dynamism and flexibility (OECD, 2006; Geisen and 
Hebestreit, 2009; Arend and Zimmermann, 2009). They are deeply involved in the 
competition for the best ideas and products. A certain comparative advantage of 
SMEs is the rapid transformation of ideas in marketable products. Moreover, they 
often show a high degree of specialisation and ability to fill the smallest market 
niches (Geisen and Hebestreit, 2009). They are the engine of economic growth and 
employment (OECD, 2009; Geisen and Hebestreit, 2009). In 2012, 84.2 per cent of 
all apprenticeship positions were offered by SMEs (Institut für 
Mittelstandsforschung, 2013). Furthermore, they tend to hold on to their employees 
even in economic downturns. For that reason, they are an important buffer for the job 
market (Geisen and Hebestreit, 2009).   
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1.3 The German banking system 
Since the present research is about financing SMEs in Germany, this section provides 
basic overview of the banking system in Germany. The German banking system is a 
typical universal bank-system. This means that, in general, all banks having a 
banking license are allowed to engage in all lines of banking business like 
commercial banking or investment banking. A special characteristic for the German 
universal banks is the fact that it consists of three pillars: commercial banks, co-
operative banks and savings banks. Nevertheless there are also some special banks 
like mortgage banks or investment companies which operate in a limited banking 
sector (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007). This is not due to legal restrictions but a 
voluntarily taken strategic management decision. Figure 1.2 provides a more detailed 
overview about the German banking system. 
Figure 1.2: The German banking system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, derived from German Bundesbank (2014), p. 106 
The pillar of private commercial banks includes the big banks (Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank, Unicredit Bank, Postbank) as well as regional and other private 
banks (e.g. Sal. Oppenheim & Cie. as private bank) and branches of foreign banks 
(Stiele, 2008; Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005; Detzer et al., 2013; German 
Bundesbank, 2014). Whereas big banks operate within the whole country of 
Germany as well as abroad, regional banks typically operate inside a restricted 
geographical region within Germany (Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005; Hartmann-
Universal banks 
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banks 
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banks 
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banks 
17 real-estate credit 
institutions 
22 building societies 
20 specialized banks  
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Wendels et al., 2007). However, these banks can also be specialized to provide 
certain services such as loans for cars like Volkswagen Bank or Mercedes-Benz 
Bank for example (Koetter, 2013; Detzer et al., 2013). The largest big bank is 
Deutsche Bank followed by Commerzbank, Unicredit Bank and Postbank of which 
Deutsche Bank holds 93.7 per cent. Big banks traditionally act as house banks for the 
large industrial groups in Germany. Within the last decades, the big banks also 
strongly engaged in investment banking.  
The second pillar consists of the co-operative banks. The co-operative sector 
includes the DZ Bank and the WGZ Bank. These two institutions act as central banks 
for the primary co-operative banks. The basic principle of co-operative banks in the 
years after their foundation was the principle of self-aid. The aim was to support 
farmers and artisans by transferring the savings of members to other members with 
financial needs. Profits were distributed among the members once a year (Hackethal 
and Schmidt, 2005). Nowadays, the principle of self-aid has lost importance. Co-
operative banks no longer provide loans solely to members. Today, they rather act as 
regional banks that are limited to a certain region and do not compete with other co-
operative banks from other regions (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007). Regional co-
operative banks are typically concentrated on providing financial services to SMEs 
and private customers (Koetter, 2013).  
The third pillar is built by the savings banks of which the vast majority are public 
banks which are held by the public sector like the federal government, states or even 
cities. They are owned by their communities, counties, administration unions or 
federal states. Savings banks are bound to the special savings bank laws of their 
federal state. They only operate within their local area to avoid competition with the 
savings banks in other regions. The aim of savings banks is to foster individual 
savings and to grant loans to members of the local communities. Profit maximization 
is not their primary business aim. The primary objective is to foster the economy 
within their region (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007; Hackethal, 2003; Hackethal and 
Schmidt, 2005; Stiele, 2008; Detzer et al., 2013). Like co-operative banks, savings 
banks are mainly focused on SMEs and private customers (Koetter, 2013). The 
sector of savings banks also contains the regional Landesbanken as well as the Deka 
Bank. The regional Landebanken act as central banks for the regional savings banks. 
Moreover, the Landesbanken typically act as banks for the regional states. Besides 
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this, they are also engaged in investment banking and corporate banking. The Deka 
Bank is the investment company of the savings banks and responsible for the asset 
management of all savings banks (Detzer et al., 2013).  
Related to the research aim of the present study, the market shares of the German 
universal banks shall be demonstrated by highlighting the loans provided to domestic 
firms in year 2013. Figure 1.3 illustrates that regional savings banks as well as 
regional co-operatives provided the majority of the corporate loans in Germany.  
Figure 1.3: Loans provided to firms in 2013 (in million €) 
 
Source: Own illustration, derived from German Bundesbank (2014), p. 46 
There is a strong competition among the institutions, especially in retail banking and 
corporate finance. This is mainly due to the comparably high number of banks in 
Germany which has already decreased within the last years due to the strong 
competition which causes pressure to consolidate and negatively affects the overall 
profits (Koetter, 2013; Tiwari and Buse, 2006; German Bundesbank, 2013). In 
Figure 1.4 the numbers of banks and bank branches in Germany are illustrated by a 
time series starting in year 1957. 
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Figure 1.4: Number of banks and bank branches in Germany since 1957 
Source: Own illustration, derived from German Bundesbank (2014), p. 104 
*including Postbank; **excluding investment companies 
Since consolidation among the three pillars is not allowed in Germany, the reduction 
has been caused by mergers and acquisitions within each of the pillars (Koetter, 
2013). Table 1.3 demonstrates the consolidation process between 1993 and 2013.  
Table 1.3: Decline of banks between 1993 and 2013 by banking sector 
    Year 1993 Year 2013 Change 
Commercial banks 
Big banks 4 4  -  
Regional banks 199 164 -18% 
Savings banks 
Central banks 13 9 -31% 
Regional banks 703 421 -40% 
Co-operative banks 
Central banks 4 2 -50% 
Regional banks 2,761 1,080 -61% 
Source: Own illustration, derived from German Bundesbank (2014), p. 104 and Koetter (2013), p. 9 
The figures illustrate that the consolidation process was strongest for regional co-
operatives and regional savings banks. Between 1993 and 2013, the number of 
regional co-operative banks was reduced by 61 per cent and the number of regional 
savings banks was reduced by 40 per cent. 
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The German lending system is traditionally bank-based (Stiele, 2008; Behr and 
Guettler, 2007; Hummel, 2011). The predominant sources of external financing in 
Germany are bank loans. Bank lending in Germany is characterized by close and 
long-term relationships between customers and their banks. The primary bank which 
provides almost all services to a customer is called their house bank in Germany 
(Behr and Guettler, 2007; Hummel, 2011). According to a recent study, 88 per cent 
of all SMEs indicated to have a house bank. For 63 per cent of them, the house bank 
is the most important provider of financial services. However, 52% intend to become 
more independent from the house bank (Becker et al., 2013). Another study 
evaluated how many house banks German SMEs have. This study found out that 
only one third of all SMEs have solely one house bank whereas around 60 per cent 
have two or three house banks. The number of house banks is positively correlated 
with the size of a firm (Hummel, 2011). This is in line with an elderly study about 
the number of house banks in Germany (Hackethal and Gleisner, 2006). These 
figures illustrate a close relationship between the house bank and the SMEs in 
Germany. However, they also indicate an increasing openness to expand the contacts 
to several house banks and an increasing competition between house banks.  
The financial markets and therefore the corporate finance sector have undergone 
deep modifications within recent years. These modifications strongly affected the 
financing conditions for SMEs in Germany. Increased competition from 
globalization in the financial world, the introduction of Basel II and advanced 
information and communication technologies resulted in a higher risk-orientation 
when loan applications are assessed (Zimmermann, 2008; Schmidt and van Elkan, 
2006; Reize, 2005). Moreover, banks have to be aware of their own ranking. To 
obtain a high grade they need to fulfill the requirements of the rating agencies 
(Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). Hence, evaluation and management of potential risks 
have become increasingly important in assessing loan applications (Zimmermann, 
2006). Consequently, banks have enhanced requirements regarding creditworthiness, 
transparency and contents of reporting systems (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; 
Zimmermann, 2006). To enable banks to more accurately measure the 
creditworthiness and the probability of default of a potential borrower, credit scoring 
systems in banks have become more important (Reize, 2005).   
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1.4  SME financing in Germany  
Besides internal financing, bank lending is by far the most important source of 
external finance for SMEs (Cressy, 2002; Hussain et al., 2006; Zimmermann, 2009; 
Tchouvakhina and Zimmermann, 2009; Le and Nguyen, 2009; Behr and Guettler, 
2007; Reize, 2011). As Behr and Guettler (2007) stated, the relative importance of 
bank loans is negatively correlated with the size of the firms. Whereas larger, 
publicly listed firms have access to other external sources, smaller companies rely 
more on bank finance. Following the pecking order theory, owners or managers of 
SMEs give preference to financial options that will not affect their business control 
(Hussain et al., 2006; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  
In the German financial system, the bank orientation is quite distinct. Bank loans 
traditionally play a key role in financing businesses (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; 
Reize, 2011). Due to close relations between customers and their house banks in 
Germany bank managers often made credit decisions out of subjective appraisals of 
the borrower´s creditworthiness and business ideas. This increased debt finance in 
Germany (Fischl, 2006). Due to Basel II and the growing importance of using credit 
scoring systems to evaluate creditworthiness and risk credit decisions rely more on 
objective assessments. Considering the reliance on bank finance of SMEs it becomes 
obvious that SMEs are particularly affected by these changes (Schmidt and van 
Elkan, 2006).  
This is demonstrated by the latest enterprise survey of reconstruction loan 
corporation (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)1 which shows, that small enterprises 
perceive difficulties in obtaining bank loans. Around 54 per cent of all interviewed 
firms with an annual turnover below 1 million € stated to have suffered from credit 
rationing (Schwarz and Zimmermann, 2012). The main reasons for credit restrictions 
mentioned by those firms are shown in Figure 1.2 below:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1The annual survey contains enterprises of all sizes, sectors, legal forms, and regions and covers 
questions about banking relationship, financial conditions and financial practices. It is conducted in 
cooperation with 21 trade associations. 3,402 firms attended in 2012. 
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Figure 1.5: Main reasons for difficulties in obtaining bank loans 
(multiple selection allowed) 
 
Source: Own illustration, adopted from Schwarz and Zimmermann (2012), p. 17 
Around 20 per cent of those firms indicated credit restrictions as main reasons for 
cancelling already planned investment projects (Schwarz and Zimmermann, 2012). 
This illustrates how credit restrictions might have impeded economic growth.2 
Recent literature has shown that especially small firms are affected by credit 
rationing. SMEs report greater financing obstacles than larger firms. Moreover, the 
effect of financial constraints is more extensive than for large firms (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 2010). SMEs face special structural disadvantages 
when financing which will be explained in the following (Stefanovic, 2009).  
Equity 
Equity acts as an indicator for creditworthiness, financial stability and the ability to 
hedge risks. Due to Basel II, these qualities have gained more and more importance. 
Therefore the equity ratio (total equity/total assets) is of particular concern in credit 
assessments (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). A high equity ratio positively influences 
creditworthiness (Stefanovic, 2009) as it indicates to the bank that the borrow will be 
able to repay the loan (Coco, 2000). However, as Table 1.3 shows, the equity ratios 
of German SMEs are rather low (Creditreform, 2013) 
Table 1.4: Equity ratios of German SMEs in spring 2013 
Equity ratios Share of all German SMEs 
Up to 10% 28.3% 
Up to 20% 22.5% 
Up to 30% 16.5% 
More than 30% 32.8% 
Source: Creditreform (2013) 
                                                 
2 At this stage it is important to mention that the results of the survey reflect subjective estimations. It 
is no sufficient evidence for the existence of credit rationing as the actual reasons are not shown. 
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Smaller SMEs are more likely to show lower equity ratios. Figure 1.3 demonstrates 
this by presenting how many firms of each size have an equity ratio of up to 10 per 
cent. 
Figure 1.6: Lowest equity ratio measured by headcount 
 
Source: Creditreform (2012) 
 The use of external finance is fostered by the close relation between customer and 
house bank, taxes and bankruptcy law. The effect of Germany’s financial structure 
on the fiscal health of SMEs is even more distinct than on bigger firms (Schmidt and 
van Elkan, 2006). This leads to relatively lower equity bases and comparatively 
higher debt ratios of SMEs (Zimmermann, 2009). Over the course of the 
implementation of Basel II, banks comprehensively adopted rating systems to value 
the risk and creditworthiness of their clients. In this context, the equity ratio is 
essential for the rating of a potential borrower. The rating itself is crucial for the 
decision about whether a loan is provided or not and which interest rate is 
established. Comparably low equity ratios of SMEs result in low credit scoring 
grades (Stefanovic, 2009). Therefore, a low equity ratio can be a reason for credit 
restriction. 
Financial reporting 
Typical for SMEs is their informational opacity (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ortiz-
Molina and Penas, 2008). Following Berger and Udell (1998, p. 616), this is “…the 
most important characteristic defining small business finance”. Attributable to their 
relatively small business size, SMEs often do not have the human and technical 
resources to allocate and govern their own reporting systems (Stefanovic, 2009). 
Many SMEs have no audited financial statements (Beck et al., 2010). For that reason 
they can hardly be monitored by rating agencies (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; 
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Berger and Udell, 1998; Behr and Guettler, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). As 
opposed to bigger firms which can show their soundness on the basis of an external 
rating, SMEs have fewer options to credibly prove their quality (Zimmermann, 2006; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Moreover, the relevance of key financial figures has 
grown rapidly with Basel II and the increased use of own credit scoring systems in 
banks (Stefanovic, 2009; Zimmermann, 2007). Banks increasingly require the 
disclosure of financial figures (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). The difficulty for 
SMEs to convey their creditworthiness can lead to severe problems in obtaining bank 
loans.  
Collateral 
Collateral is often cited as an effective means to mitigate information problems 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1985; Berger and 
Udell, 1990). As mentioned earlier, SMEs are informationally opaque. For this 
reason, banks face serious challenges evaluating and assessing the potential risk 
related to a SME loan. Therefore, banks increasingly insist on the provision of 
collateral when granting loans to SMEs (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; 
Zimmermann, 2007). Although collateral cannot reduce the risk of default, it limits 
the loss for the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Berger and Udell, 1990; Stefanovic, 
2009). To efficiently mitigate the potential loss of a lender the intrinsic value of 
pledged collateral is of particular importance. Furthermore, it must be sufficiently 
tradable. Especially in the early years, SMEs often do not have enough tangible 
assets to pledge as collateral (Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Columba et al., 2010). Collateral is considered to be a substitute for information 
(Berger and Udell, 1990; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Boocock and Shariff, 2005). It is 
widely regarded to be an effective means to signal the quality of a borrower 
(Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Coco, 2000; Colombo and Grilli, 2007). SMEs 
that cannot provide collateral in the right amount or quality are more often affected 
by credit restrictions (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2006; Berger and Udell, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
Start-ups and young firms 
In 2011 an estimated 401,500 new firms were established (Günterberg, 2012). 
Considering that around 20% of all founders need external finance to establish their 
businesses the share of start-ups and young firms applying for bank loans is 
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considerably high (Stefanovic, 2009). Figure 1.4 below gives an overview about the 
number of foundations and liquidations in Germany between 2002 and 2011. 
Figure 1.7: Foundations and liquidations 2002 - 2011 in Germany 
(in thousands) 
 
Source: Own illustration; adopted from Günterberg (2012) 
Start-ups or young firms have no or only little credit history (Craig et al., 2008; 
Berger and Udell, 1998; Columba et al., 2010). As they often have no or only little 
track record, it is difficult to assess the trustworthiness and the competence of an 
SME´s management (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Furthermore, investment projects of 
start-ups can hardly be monitored and evaluated by banks (Levenson and Willard, 
2000). In that case, credit assessment can only depend on budget figures or 
subjective opinions (Zimmermann, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009). Under these conditions 
the future prospectus of the SME can hardly be validated. However, the future 
prospectus is an important basis for a profound credit assessment. Typically credit 
scoring systems heavily rely on key figures related to a business’s past performance 
(Stefanovic, 2009). When this information is lacking, as it is for new businesses, 
banks tend to assess the riskiness of a borrower on a higher level than it actually is 
(Reize, 2005). Due to the increased risk sensitivity, start-ups and young firms face 
serious difficulties in obtaining bank loans until they have substantial tangible assets 
to pledge as collateral (Berger and Udell, 1998) to limit the risk undertaken by the 
bank (Boocock and Shariff, 2005). 
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Insolvency risk 
Figure 1.4 above has demonstrated that the number of foundations of German SMEs 
experienced a high number of liquidations during the last decade. As Figure 1.5 
illustrates, the insolvency risk is the most severe for small firms. 
Figure 1.8: Insolvencies measured by headcount 
(in per cent; first half of 2012)  
 
Source: Own illustration, adopted from Creditreform (2012) 
Measured by firm size, it becomes clear that smaller firms show a higher insolvency 
risk than bigger firms. Figure 1.6 illustrates the percentage of insolvencies of 
German firms during the first half year 2012. 
Figure 1.9: Share of insolvencies measured by firm size  
(in Mio. €) 
 
Source: Own illustration, adopted from Creditreform (2009a) 
These figures are seen in multiple sources (Waschbusch and Straub, 2008; Gudger, 
1998; Beck et al., 2010). SMEs are more vulnerable to economic distress and market 
changes. Many owners of SMEs are relatively inexperienced and often have no 
sufficient resources to survive an economic downturn (Gudger, 1998). Figure 1.7 
below demonstrates that for the first ten years the age of a firm is negatively 
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correlated with its inherent risk and many firms cease trading at an early stage (Leeth 
and Scott, 1989; Cressy, 2006). 
Figure 1.10: Share of insolvencies measured by firm age 
(first half year 2012) 
 
Source: Own illustration, adopted from Creditreform (2012) 
These figures demonstrate the high default risk which can lead to certain reluctance 
in providing bank debt to SMEs. 
Costs 
The communication and information costs which arise before, during and after a 
credit agreement are so-called transaction costs (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). 
Credit assessments are characterized by a relatively high share of overhead costs. 
Compared with loans to large firms the average amount of SME loans is rather low. 
High costs in relation to low loan sizes will reduce the profitability of the lending 
banks (Bosse, 2009; Levitsky, 1997a; Riding et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2010). Due to 
the informational opaqueness of SMEs the costs for collecting information about the 
past and a SME´s future prospectus is relatively high and more difficult to obtain 
(Berger and Udell, 1995; Cressy, 2002; Parker, 2002; Zimmermann, 2007).  Banks 
often perceive the acquisition of information about an potential borrower as 
unworthy investment when the loan size is relatively low (Zimmermann, 2007; Beck 
et al., 2010).  
1.5  German guarantee banks 
The structural disadvantages of SMEs described in Section 1.4 above can lead to 
credit rationing. According to Reize (2005), credit rationing describes the situation 
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interest rate exceeds the supply of loans. Under this definition, SMEs suffer credit 
rationing when at least one loan application (no matter for what reason) is denied 
(Reize, 2005). Some SMEs will get a bank loan while others will not. Even the 
interest charged does not ensure a complete balance of demand and supply (Schmidt 
and van Elkan, 2006; Cowling, 2010; Bester, 1985).   
The existence of credit rationing for SMEs is the key justification for the 
establishment of Credit Guarantee Schemes worldwide (Cowling, 2010; Vogel and 
Adams, 1997; Craig et al., 2008; Craig et al., 2009). Credit Guarantee Schemes take 
on a certain amount of the risk of a SME loan and therefore make the loan possible 
for the firm. Although the central aim of these schemes is more or less the same in 
every country, the design and the mode of operation can differ. A more detailed 
overview about general characteristics of Credit Guarantee Schemes is presented in 
Section 2.1 below. Section 1.5 concentrates on the Credit Guarantee Scheme in 
Germany. Since the present research is focused on the Credit Guarantee Scheme in 
Germany which consists of the German guarantee banks, this section provides some 
background information which are considered to be important for a better 
understanding of the research and its outcomes. 
Formation and development 
The establishment of guarantee banks in Germany is strongly related to the 
emergency situation after World War II. Due to enormous reconstruction activities in 
the beginning of the 1950s the need for funding by the manufacturing industry was 
tremendous. The German Mittelstand in particular suffered from destroyed 
production facilities and commercial properties. Since most banks required a lien on 
property as a rule during that time, SMEs widely could not obtain bank finance. To 
facilitate the access to finance, so-called credit guarantee societies were established 
(Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009; Schiereck, 2002). The first credit 
guarantee society was founded in Lower Saxony in 1953. It solely supported trade 
businesses. Following this example other credit guarantee societies were established 
in every federal state. Over the course of time, credit guarantee societies for 
commerce, gardening, manufacture, hotel and hospitality businesses were founded. 
As demand for sureties and guarantees steadily increased the specialization in certain 
manufacturing sectors were abandoned in most federal states during the 1990s. The 
different credit guarantee societies were merged. During the same time, due to the 
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German reunification, SMEs in Eastern Germany (the new federal states) were in a 
similar situation as the western federal states had been after World War II. As a 
consequence of the economic transformation process (change from a planning 
economy into a market economy) the demand for bank loans increased. However, 
SMEs did not have enough valuable assets to provide for collateral. This situation 
fostered the rapid establishment of a credit guarantee system in the new federal 
states. Today, every federal state in Germany has one institution to provide sureties 
and guarantees to SMEs3 which generally trades under the term guarantee bank 
(Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006).  
Objectives and target group 
From the beginning, the main objective of guarantee banks was to undertake 
securities to collateralize bank loans to SMEs. Guarantee banks do not provide loans 
to SMEs. They provide guarantees or sureties. They take on the default liability for 
small firms with no or insufficient collateral that otherwise would not have obtained 
bank finance (Langer and Schiereck, 2002; Schiereck, 2002). The first requirements 
a firm has to fulfill to obtain a guarantee from a guarantee bank are the classification 
for SMEs corresponding to the definition of the European Union and the actual need 
for support to receive a bank loan. An actual need can arise for healthy firms with 
established business structures and given creditworthiness but without valuable 
securities or for start-ups and young firms without enough valuable assets to pledge 
for collateral. Moreover, the firm has to be engaged in one of the following business 
sectors: craft, trade, manufacturing, hotel industry, hospitality business or transport 
industry. Additionally, freelancer and provider of miscellaneous services and in some 
federal states farmer, gardener and fishermen fulfill the requirements to obtain a 
guarantee. The last prerequisite for obtaining a guarantee which should be mentioned 
is a viable investment project which is economically sound and promising. Guarantee 
banks make their own assessment about the borrower´s technical, personal and 
entrepreneurial qualifications. Furthermore they analyse the financial situation as 
well as the prospects concerning turnover and profit. They cooperate with chambers 
and organizations and voluntary employees from enterprises and the banking 
industry. These parties contribute mostly free evaluative reports to support the 
decision-making of the guarantee banks. This helps the guarantee bank make 
                                                 
3An exception is the federal state Bavaria which still has sector specific institutions whereby mergers 
are already aspired (Schmidt and van Elkan 2006). 
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decisions with up-to-date knowledge about sectors and markets. The additional 
assessment of an independent third party amounts to an advanced and detailed credit 
analysis (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006).  
The German guarantee banks mainly support SMEs in special situations. Guarantee 
banks concentrate their business on:  
− start-ups, 
− SMEs that grow faster than their equity, 
− viable SMEs in high growth/high technology sector (dynamic firms), 
− SMEs in new industrial sectors, and 
− SMEs in turn-around situations which are only survivable with a risk-
sharing partner. 
These characteristics are interpreted as enhanced risk factors by the bank´s rating 
systems. This leads to credit refusal or very high loan interest rates. Firms in a 
situation mentioned above would probably fail without the risk adaption of the 
guarantee banks which enables them to obtain a bank loan with reasonable 
conditions (Verband Deutscher Bürgschaftsbanken, 2009).  
Guarantee banks make no direct cash payments. The default liability of the guarantee 
bank reduces the default risk for the lender. To the lender, sureties and guarantees of 
guarantee banks are securities of first rank. This raises the creditworthiness of the 
borrower (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006).  
Sureties and guarantees 
German guarantee banks mainly support SMEs by financing credit and equity. 
Therefore they provide SMEs with sureties and guarantees.  
They provide guarantees for dormant equity holdings by venture capital companies. 
To make those investments possible, they overtake the principal part of the default 
risk. A guarantee is an intangible security for SMEs. It is an abstract liability which 
is not conditional to the primary debt (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006).  
Guarantee banks provide sureties to SMEs with no or insufficient collateral that 
otherwise cannot obtain bank loans. They take on the default liability for a certain 
percentage of the total loan amount. The maximum rate of a surety adds up to 80 per 
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cent of the overall loan amount and is limited to 1 million Euros (Verband Deutscher 
Bürgschaftsbanken, 2009). Sureties from the guarantee bank have a high security for 
the lenders. They reduce the bank´s risk by raising the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. Sureties of guarantee banks are modified-deficiency suretyships. They 
combine characteristics of an absolute and a deficiency suretyship. This means that 
guarantee banks abandon the benefit of discussion and settle their liabilities without 
waiting for legal enforcement. However, they only pay for proven defaults. The 
occurrence of a default is explicitly defined in the surety contract.  
Sureties can be provided for start-ups and acquisitions, to finance growth and 
investments and working capital credits, whereas guarantees for redevelopment 
financing are excluded (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). 
In 2011, German guarantee banks provided 7,282 sureties and guarantees with a 
volume of about 1,150 million Euros (Verband Deutscher Bürgschaftsbanken, 2012). 
These figures illustrate the tremendous importance of sureties.4 
Characteristics and organization of German guarantee banks 
German guarantee banks are special banks. Their business activity is limited to the 
provision of guarantees to SMEs. This means that German guarantee banks are no 
universal banks. According to section 1 of the Banking Act, guarantee banks are 
credit institutions. The Credit Guarantee Scheme in Germany is federally organized. 
Every one of the sixteen federal states in Germany has an autonomous guarantee 
bank. The organizational structure of different guarantee banks can slightly vary. 
These variations are politically as well as historically motivated. To prevent 
competition with each other, their activities are limited to their particular states 
(Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009). They are organized in the 
Association of German Guarantee Banks. The association represents the interests of 
all guarantee banks in Germany and ensures a viable exchange of experiences 
(Stefanovic, 2009).  
                                                 
4In the following, sureties and guarantees of the German guarantee banks will be considered as one. In 
the international context there is no differentiation between sureties and guarantees. Credit Guarantee 
Schemes in other countries mostly solely provide what is known as surety in Germany. However, this 
is commonly termed guarantee. Henceforth, the unique indication guarantee will be used in this work 
as well.  
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All German guarantee banks are Limited Liability Companies. Following the 
Limited Liability Company Act they all have a general assembly and an executive 
board. The sponsors of the guarantee banks (professional economic organizations, 
financial institutions and insurance corporations) determine the company policy. The 
executive board is responsible for the operatiing side of the business. According to 
their constitution, all guarantee banks have a Bürgschaftsausschuss (loosely 
translated: guarantee committee). The most important task of this board is the 
approval of all guarantees proposed by the executive board. This means that no 
guarantee will be  granted without the agreement of the guarantee board (Kramer, 
2008; Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). 
Clearing and settlement 
Before a SME applies for a guarantee, it commonly has asked a commercial bank for 
a loan. When the bank assessed the application and found out that the firm could not 
provide sufficient own collateral, the loan normally was not provided. To enable the 
firm to get access to finance in spite of this, commercial banks can initiate the 
contact to the guarantee bank in their region to bridge this gap by the provision of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank. Together with the commercial bank, the 
borrower then applies for a guarantee. The bank forwards the application to the 
guarantee bank and adds its own comment concerning the project. 
Besides this, it is also possible that a SME applies directly at the guarantee bank for a 
so-called ‘guarantee without bank’. This is mostly the case when the firm knows that 
it cannot provide sufficient valuable collateral in advance. In these cases the SME 
applies for a guarantee before asking a bank for a loan.  
In each instance, the guarantee bank intensively assesses all applications by bringing 
in external consultants as mentioned above (Langer and Schiereck, 2002; Schmidt 
and van Elkan, 2006). Given that they approve the enquiry, they forward the 
application to the guarantee board. Once the guarantee board approves to the 
application the executive board makes their final decision.  
Even if a guarantee from a guarantee bank is provided for a bank loan, it is always 
the lending bank that is responsible for the credit control. The commercial bank is 
obliged to make regular reports to the guarantee bank. It has to inform the guarantee 
bank immediately about arising special circumstances and/or deteriorations in the 
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credit arrangement. This is a precondition for the payment by the guarantee bank in 
the case of a default. In the event of the borrower’s insolvency, the bank has to resign 
the credit contract and requests the repayment of the outstanding amount. The bank 
informs the guarantee bank and declares the recourse of the guarantee. It determines 
the valuation of collateral and distributes the generated proceeds to the guarantee 
bank (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). 
Financing and risk sharing 
A guarantee from a German guarantee bank covers up to 80 per cent of the overall 
loan amount. As illustrated in Figure 1.8 below, this means that in the case of a 
guarantee of 80 per cent, the commercial bank covers the remaining 20 per cent of 
the risk. Due to counter-guarantees of the federal government and the particular 
federal states, guarantee banks have to bear only a part of the defaults in the context 
of their guarantees. The guarantee bank’s share of default risk currently amounts to 
35 per cent in the old states (20 per cent in the new states). The remaining 65 per cent 
(80 per cent) is covered by the federal government and the principal federal state 
(Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Nitsch and Kramer, 2010). Projected on the overall 
loan amount, the state covers altogether 52 per cent of the risk due to the provision of 
the counter guarantee. The reasons for the different shares in the new and old states 
are distinctly different default probabilities for commercial loans (Stefanovic, 2009). 
Figure 1.8 provides a detailed overview of the distribution of risks in the old states. 
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of risk when guarantee is provided 
 
Source: Own illustration, adopted from Stefanovic (2009) 
The counter guarantees are of enormous importance for the guarantee banks. They 
reduce their need for equity. Therefore German guarantee banks build up a high 
volume of guarantees with comparatively low equity. Additional sources of funding 
for guarantee banks include the cost of commissions and fees for guarantees. These 
sources charge a one-time arrangement fee of about 1.0-1.5 per cent of the guarantee 
amount which has to be paid by the SMEs. Current commissions, which are 
comparable to an annual interest payment, usually account for 1.0 per cent of the 
guarantee amount. 
German guarantee banks additionally obtain loans out of the European Recovery 
Program. These loans are available at reduced interest rates. The maximum amount 
of those loans available is limited up to 12 per cent of the overall amount of 
guarantees (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Schiereck, 2002).  
Furthermore, German guarantee banks are not required to pay corporate tax and trade 
tax. This relief is based on the condition that assets and net incomes are used solely 
to provide additional guarantees (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009; 
Langer and Schiereck, 2002). 
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1.6  Research aim and objectives 
The existence of guarantee banks in Germany means a government interference 
which can only be justified when the allocation of SME loans can really be 
improved. To test whether the access to bank loans for SMEs can be improved is the 
aim of the present research. For each guarantee provided, the majority of the risk is 
covered by the state and therefore indirectly by every German taxpayer. Therefore, it 
is important to continually evaluate whether guarantees are solely provided for viable 
and promising business projects. It is important to prevent the creation of moral 
hazard on the side of the lenders as well as on the side of the borrowers by covering a 
certain amount of the initial risk when a guarantee is allocated. This could result in 
supporting firms that normally quite rightly would not have obtained a bank loan 
because of the high risk. If this is the case, the existence of guarantee banks, the risk 
taking by the state and the related costs will not be justifiable. Moreover, it is 
important to evaluate whether the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank can 
mitigate credit restrictions. The mitigation of credit restrictions can be observed at 
two points: the first time is mitigation of credit restrictions at the time the SME 
initially applies for a loan. The second time is after a guarantee bank has provided a 
guarantee and if access to bank loans can be facilitated in a sustainable way. This 
evaluation process seeks to determine whether SMEs that would not have obtained 
the initial loan without the guarantee from the guarantee bank can graduate to 
borrowers without guarantee over the course of time. If so, this could provide a 
justification for the existence of guarantee banks and for the risk coverage provided 
by the state.  
The literature review has demonstrated that this has not been tested so far. Existing 
research about German guarantee banks is mainly concentrated on macroeconomic 
impacts (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Schmidt and van Elkan, 2010) or is more or 
less simply literature-based and conceptual (Nitsch and Kramer, 2010; Schiereck, 
2002). Regarding literature about Credit Guarantee Schemes in other countries, most 
studies are concentrated on the ability to provide additional loans to SMEs (Cowling, 
2010; Zecchini and Ventura, 2009) or the macroeconomic impacts (Bradshaw, 2002; 
Oh et al., 2009). However, some literature exists which provides a suitable research 
approach to test whether guarantee banks achieve the aims described above. This 
research is concentrated on the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the 
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lending behaviour by creating learning on the side of the lending banks (Green, 
2003; Craig et al., 2008). The main weakness of the existing literature is that it is 
mainly conceptual. However, it provides the basis for creating the framework of the 
present research. According to the literature, Credit Guarantee Schemes stimulate the 
exchange of information between the SMEs and the lending banks. Information plays 
a crucial role in bank lending. One severe weakness of many SMEs is their 
informational opaqueness (Berger and Udell, 1998). If the provision of a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank results in a reduction of information asymmetries between 
the lending banks and the borrowers, this might reduce credit restrictions in a 
sustainable way. To foster the creation of information, close lending relationships are 
expected to be helpful (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
Consequently, the question occurs of whether the provision of a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank has any influence on the relationship between the SME and the 
lending bank. Based on these thoughts, the research objective is as follows: 
Research objectives: 
To reveal whether the provision of a guarantee from a German guarantee bank can 
initiate a learning process on the side of the commercial banks which helps to 
mitigate existing information asymmetries concerning SMEs, supports the building 
of a long-term customer-bank relationship and helps to overcome credit restrictions. 
To test this, several research questions have been created. The first research question 
examines the direct impact on the access to bank loans for SMEs when initially 
applying for a bank loan. It tries to evaluate which SMEs need a guarantee to obtain 
a loan and why. The first research question is as follows: 
Research question 1: 
For what reason and in which situation are guarantees from the guarantee bank 
important for the provision of loans to SMEs? 
The provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank builds the basis for creating a 
learning effect on the commercial bank. Due to the guarantee, the loan can generally 
be provided. This is the precondition for obtaining the opportunity to collect 
information about the SME and reducing information asymmetries. The second 
research question deals exactly with these factors: 
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Research question 2: 
Can the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank help to reduce information 
asymmetries between the lending bank and the borrower?   
One aim of the research is to find out whether SMEs that once needed a guarantee 
from a guarantee bank for obtaining a bank loan can graduate to borrowers without 
guarantees over the course of time. This means that these firms would not need the 
support of the guarantee bank when applying for another loan at a later date. 
Therefore, a more productive flow of information gets created between the 
commercial bank and the SME. The information flow between the guarantee bank 
and the SME would not lead to a reduction of the relevant information asymmetries 
and a successful loan application without the help of the guarantee bank. This is the 
reason why the research is solely concentrated on the reduction of information 
asymmetries between commercial banks and SMEs.  
A closer and more intense contact between the commercial bank and the SME is 
often considered to reduce information asymmetries and create better access to bank 
loans. Research question three is concentrated on the improvement of the bank-
borrower relationship caused by the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank: 
Research question 3: 
Has a new lending relationship been created due to the provision of the loan with 
guarantee? 
Finally, the question is whether SMEs that would not have obtained a bank loan 
without the existence of a guarantee bank have taken the opportunity to create a 
lending relationship, reduce information asymmetries and enhance their access to 
bank lending in a sustainable way. This is addressed in the fourth and last research 
question: 
Research question 4: 
Do German guarantee banks help to overcome credit restrictions?  
At this stage it is important to notice that the guarantee bank can only put in 
operation the above mentioned processes. The provision of the guarantee is expected 
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to build the precondition for the provision of the bank loan. The reduction of 
information asymmetries, the creation of a lending relationship and the reduction of 
credit restrictions in a sustainable way take place between the commercial bank and 
the SME. 
1.7  Thesis structure 
This section provides a brief overview about the structure of the present PhD thesis.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter provides the main definitions of SMEs and highlights the high 
importance of SMEs which act as the engine of economic growth in Germany. 
However, this chapter also illustrates that SMEs often only have limited access to 
bank loans. Followed by an introduction about the German banking system and the 
competition among German banks, reasons for the restricted access to bank finance 
are discussed. These reasons can be existing information asymmetries, a lack of 
valuable collateral or higher costs related to SMEs loans. To facilitate the access to 
bank lending for SMEs is the main aim of guarantee banks in Germany. This chapter 
provides important background about the objectives and the target groups of 
guarantee banks, the organisational structure, financing and risk sharing.  Guarantee 
banks were introduced to provide guarantees for SMEs that would not have received 
a bank loan otherwise since these guarantees act as collateral to the lending bank. 
The present research seeks to evaluate whether guarantee banks achieve the aim to 
mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. Therefore, Chapter 3 concludes with a 
summary of the research aim and objectives of the present thesis.  
Chapter 2: Literature review 
Chapter 2 starts with presenting the most important literature about Credit Guarantee 
Schemes worldwide as well as literature about the German guarantee banks. It sums 
up the core topics within the research field of Credit Guarantee Schemes which are: 
the provision of additional lending, macroeconomic impacts and the ability to alter 
the lending behaviour of banks. Existing literature about the ability of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes to alter the lending behaviour of banks is only conceptual. 
Therefore, it builds the basis for the present investigation. To provide a clear 
understanding about how the lending behaviour might be altered, related literature 
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about market imperfections, collateral in bank lending, and lending relationships is 
presented. Out of the reviewed literature, a framework is deduced which illustrates 
the expected learning process and the key factors that are expected to influence the 
process. It is assumed that the provision of a guarantee lowers the probability of 
default, bridges the gap of missing collateral which substitutes information 
asymmetries and enhances the profit of the lender. These mechanisms allow the 
provision of a loan to a SME in the first place. As a consequence of the loan 
provision, learning will take place if information asymmetries can be reduced and 
lending relationships can be created. The assumed results of the learning process are 
the immediate mitigation of credit restrictions as well as the mitigation of credit 
restrictions in a sustainable way. According to this framework, research questions 
and propositions are presented in the end of Chapter 2.  
Chapter 3: Research methodology and design 
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology of the thesis. It explains the research 
methods that have been applied to generate new data. Since quantitative as well as 
qualitative research methods are applied, the present research follows a mixed 
methods approach. 
To evaluate SMEs that received a guarantee from the guarantee bank a web survey 
was conducted to reach a relatively large number of respondents within a short 
period of time and ensure the highest anonymity possible. Chapter 3 provides 
information about the contents of the survey and about how it was pilot tested. It 
illustrates the distribution of the survey and provides details about the sample and the 
time frame of the investigation. Moreover, it gives explanation about the methods 
used for data analysis. 
Semi-structured interviews with bank managers were conducted to learn about their 
thinking and behaviour in SME lending and the reasons for including a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank in a bank loan. Chapter 3 explains in detail why this 
approach is considered being suitable and how the interviews were piloted. 
Additionally, it provides details about the analysis of the interviews.  
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Chapter 4: Survey results 
Chapter 4 presents the quantitative results of the web survey. The survey has been 
sent out in spring 2011 to 952 SMEs that have received a guarantee from guarantee 
bank Hesse between 2003 and 2008. Overall 157 responses have been evaluated 
(response rate: 16.49%).  
Chapter 4 starts with providing an overview about the main demographic 
characteristics of the sample by presenting frequency distributions. Moreover, it 
gives prove of the accurate representstion of the respondents.  
The results of the web survey were mainly analysed by conducting cross tabulation 
and chi-square test. The analyses follow the logical order of the research questions 
and propositions. In addition, a hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted. The 
analysis ended in a four cluster solution differentiating respondents according to the 
duration and the intensity of the existing relationship with the lending bank. The 
analyses of the web survey confirmed the high significance of guarantees from the 
guarantee bank to make available bank loans to SMEs. Moreover, the results 
demonstrated that information asymmetries can be mitigated and lending 
relationships can be created.   
Chapter 5: Interview results 
Chapter 5 contains the answers from the overall 10 semi-structured interviews that 
were conducted with bank managers engaged in SME financing. The interviews were 
conducted between January and April 2012. The chapter starts with a detailed 
description of the interviewees. To ensure anonymity, all interviewees obtained a 
number. This number is highlighted within the section whenever a statement from 
that source is quoted.  
The qualitative analysis, again, follows the logical order of the propositions. When 
appropriate, the distribution of the answers is highlighted in a frequency table. This is 
followed by discussing the answers and linking them to the research proposition. 
Meaningful statements are cited to underline and illustrate the analyses. 
The interviews revealed new aspects within the expected learning process: the 
meaning of cross-selling and the support of the region. Especially for banks 
operating in a limited area, guarantees from the guarantee bank often enable the 
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provision of a loan in the first place. Additionally, the results confirmed that 
information asymmetries can be reduced, lending relationships can be created and 
the expected learning effect can take place.  
Chapter 6: Merging survey and interview results 
This chapter merges the quantitative and the qualitative results. It starts with 
presenting a table linking the research questions and propositions to the quantitative 
and qualitative findings. This table provides a compressed overview about the 
results.  
For some propositions, the results of the semi-structured interviews differ from the 
results of the web survey. For instance, the answers of the SMEs demonstrated that 
information is provided more regularly by borrowers that obtained a loan including a 
guarantee. However, the results of the semi-structured interviews also demonstrated 
that this often is not directly related to the guarantee. Moreover, the interviewees 
stated that a more regular provision of information not necessarily reduces 
information asymmetries.  
Similar results were found in analysing the significance of guarantees for loan 
provisions, for example. SMEs as well as interviewees confirmed that the guarantees 
were crucial for obtaining the bank loans.  
According to the research questions and propositions, the table is followed by 
illustrations of the results of the web survey as well as of the semi-structured 
interviews. This allows a detailed analysis about similarities and differences. In the 
end of each discussion, a final statement about whether a proposition can be 
confirmed or has to be refused is made.   
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on the merging of the results in Chapter 6 final conclusions about the ability of 
the guarantee bank to alter the lending behavior are made. It contains a clear 
illustration about confirming results, new or additional findings and limitations for 
each proposition. It demonstrates that most assumptions of the initial framework 
about the learning process can be confirmed by the research findings. Information 
asymmetries can be reduced, lending relationships can be created and credit 
restrictions can be reduced immediately. However, there are also some rejections and 
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additional findings which result in adjustments of the overall framework. The 
meaning of cross-selling and the support of the region, for example, had to be 
included into the initial framework. Within this chapter the final conclusion is drawn 
that guarantee banks are beneficial instruments to improve the access to bank loans 
for SMEs. The provision of guarantees from the guarantee bank can initiate a 
learning process which helps to overcome main reasons for credit restrictions like 
information asymmetries and the lack of collateral. These findings provide 
justification for the existence of guarantee banks. However, the chapter also 
highlights the limitations of the present research. For instance, it was not achieved to 
evaluate whether guarantee banks can mitigate credit restriction in a sustainable 
manner. Consequently, this chapter also provides practical implications for further 
research.  
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2 Literature review 
The literature review builds the basis for the overall research aim and objective of the 
present research. This section contains the main literature about Credit Guarantee 
Schemes worldwide as well as existing literature about German guarantee banks. The 
fundamental concept of the research is based on this literature. Moreover, this 
literature illustrates the central research gap to be filled. To fully understand the 
wider context of the research, literature about market imperfections, the role of 
collateral in bank lending and lending relationships is provided. This literature is 
important to comprehend the overall aim of the research. Out of the cited literature, a 
framework about an expected process of learning on the commercial banks’ side is 
derived which is anticipated to take place after a guarantee from a guarantee bank is 
provided. To test whether this process really can be initiated by the provision of 
guarantees from a guarantee bank is the aim of the present research. The concrete 
research aim, objectives and propositions that shall be tested are presented in the end 
of this section. 
2.1  Credit Guarantee Schemes: An overview 
Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGS) are a popular means of policy to support SME 
finance across the globe (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Beck et al., 2010). More than 
2,000 schemes exist in nearly 100 countries. While most schemes in Europe were 
implemented in the 19th and early 20th century, in developing and emerging countries 
the first guarantee schemes emerged during the late 20th century (Green, 2003).  
Although all schemes worldwide have in common that they seek to expand access to 
bank loans for SMEs, a wide variety of organizational features do exist (Honohan, 
2010; Beck et al., 2010). Regarding the corporate structure of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes, three main types can be distinguished: Mutual Guarantee Associations, 
Publicly Operated National Schemes, and Corporate Associations. In Mutual 
Guarantee Associations, firms with restricted access to bank finance form a private 
society with the objective to collectively provide guarantees to each other. This can 
facilitate the access to bank lending since the acceptance of a joint responsibility acts 
as a positive signal for the creditworthiness of the potential borrower. Examples for 
Mutual Guarantee Associations are the Credit Guarantee Scheme in Italy  (Columba 
et al., 2010) or in France. Publicly Operated National Schemes are commonly 
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introduced by the government. The schemes are created to support firms with limited 
access to bank finance (for example SMEs, firms from special industrial sectors or 
firms run by women).  The majority of all Credit Guarantee Schemes in the world is 
publicly operated. Those schemes can be managed by the government or by private 
institutions. Corporate Associations are mostly operated by the private sector like 
entrepreneurs, chambers of commerce or banks. These schemes are funded by the 
initial capital the private owners have provided or by public sources. Examples for 
Corporate Associations are the schemes in Greece or Romania (Beck et al., 2010; 
Green, 2003; Camino and Cardone, 1999).  
Regarding the risk management of Credit Guarantee Schemes, one crucial point is 
the respective risk coverage (Riding et al., 2007; Levitsky, 1993). It has to be high 
enough to induce banks to advise borrowers to apply for a guarantee (Green, 2003). 
In reverse, a high coverage may reduce the incentives of banks to conscientiously 
assess the creditworthiness of the borrower or to provide loans for high-risk projects 
that otherwise would not have been funded. This is known as moral hazard on the 
part of the lending banks (Uesugi et al., 2010; Levitsky, 1993). In addition, moral 
hazard can also occur on the part of the borrower. A high coverage may lead the 
borrower to shift to riskier projects as there is no or only minimal threat of a default. 
Both situations may result in an increase of loan defaults (Levitsky, 1993; Green, 
2003). An evaluation of 76 Credit Guarantee Schemes worldwide undertaken by 
Beck et al. (2010) demonstrated that the coverage rates ranged from 100 per cent of 
the outstanding loan amount to a maximum of 50 per cent. The median coverage rate 
of all Credit Guarantee Schemes under investigation was 80 per cent. To provide 
some concrete examples: a Credit Guarantee Scheme that covers 100 per cent of the 
outstanding loan amount is the one in Japan (Uesugi et al., 2010), the schemes in 
Austria  or Hungary cover up  to 80 per cent, the scheme in Finland covers between 
50 and 75 per cent, and the scheme in Italy covers 50 per cent of the outstanding loan 
amount (European Mutual Guarantee Association, 2003). Another aspect of the risk 
management is the guarantee mechanism. It can be distinguished between Credit 
Guarantee Schemes that guarantee loan portfolios (known as global approach) and 
those that guarantee individual loans (known as selective approach). In the selective 
approach, the borrower applies for a loan at a bank. The bank assesses the 
application and decides that the provision of a guarantee is required for the provision 
of the loan. In a next step, the lender or the borrower applies for a guarantee from the 
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guarantee scheme. It may also be that the borrower himself applies for a guarantee 
from the guarantee scheme before contacting the bank and asking for the loan. In 
either case, the guarantee scheme has to assess every application before making the 
decision about providing a guarantee and before the bank can make a decision about 
providing a loan. When the global approach is applied, lenders can include 
guarantees for loans to borrowers of predefined categories without contacting the 
guarantee scheme in advance. The selective approach requires closer contact. 
Moreover, individual assessments require more time and raise the overall costs 
compared to the portfolio approach. However, it also reduces the risk of moral 
hazard on the part of the lending bank and, therefore, reduces costs of default (Beck 
et al., 2010; Green, 2003). According to Beck et al. (2010) the majority of all Credit 
Guarantee Schemes applies the selective approach. The schemes do not necessarily 
have to decide for one of these approaches. The scheme of the Czech Republic for 
example applies both, the selective as well as the portfolio approach (European 
Mutual Guarantee Association, 2010). 
Concerning the guarantee mechanism, there are direct guarantees and counter- or co-
guarantees. When a Credit Guarantee Scheme provides a direct guarantee to a bank, 
it directly covers the outstanding loan amount. A co- or counter-guarantee covers a 
guarantee of the main guarantor. Only if the main guarantor has become insolvent, 
would the co-guarantor step in (Beck et al., 2010). A combination of both 
mechanisms is conceivable. The German guarantee banks, for example, provide 
direct guarantees to the lenders. A part of these guarantees is covered by a counter-
guarantee of the federal government and the particular state (see Section 1.5).  
Since fees are the main source of income for guarantee schemes, the decision about 
fees is crucial. Fees can be charged annually or up-front, depending on the 
underlying loan as well as on the amount of guarantee provided (Green, 2003; Beck 
et al., 2010). The scheme in Austria charges an annual premium between 0.5 and 1.0 
per cent as well as non-recurrent commission of 0.5 per cent of the guarantee amount 
for the assessment. In Hungary, the fee depends on the duration of the guarantee 
provided and ranges between 0.25 and 0.75 per cent of the overall guarantee amount. 
The scheme in Lithuania requires a single premium of 5.0 per cent (European Mutual 
Guarantee Association, 2003). These figures illustrate the wide range of pricing of 
the different schemes. Additionally, it has to be decided who has to pay the fees: the 
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borrower, which is most often the case, or the lending bank which mostly passes the 
fees on to the borrower in the end (Beck et al., 2010). Since fees have to cover costs 
of default, these costs need to be evaluated regularly and thoroughly. Moreover, the 
circumstances under which a claim can be made should always be specified (Green, 
2003). Since not all borrowers that receive a guarantee will default, a given fund can 
be used to lend an even larger amount. The ratio of the total outstanding guarantees 
to the amount of the guarantee fund is called ‘leverage.’ Achieving a high leverage 
allows a scheme to spread fixed overhead costs over more guarantees. Average costs 
can be reduced, economies of scale can arise and risk can better be diversified. Since 
these positive effects hold up only to a certain level, it is advisable to define a 
maximum level of leverage. To be accepted by the lenders, guarantees have to be 
perceived as liquid and safe securities (Green, 2003). This requires a certain degree 
of regulation. According to Green (2003), guarantee schemes with financial 
institution status are therefore taken more seriously by banks.  
There are also some organizational and operational issues that have to be considered 
during the design phase of a Credit Guarantee Scheme. To ensure an effective 
implementation and ongoing viability, government support and sufficient starting 
capital are essential. Several types of funding like direct budgetary appropriations, 
equity or lump-sum payments are possible. As income from fees is often insufficient 
to cover the costs of administration and defaults, it is beneficial to have a certain 
endowment that can be invested. The investment provides a source of income that 
could prevent bankruptcy. To reduce dependency, it should be avoided that all 
funding is exclusively provided by government and/or one donor. Therefore, 
contributions from business associations, banks and/or other private sources should 
be pursued. Staff have to be qualified in assessing and approving applications, 
monitoring guaranteed loans, and processing and reviewing claims (Green, 2003). 
Moreover, the general criteria for being eligible to obtain a guarantee have to be 
determined whereas many schemes focus on certain regions and specific types of 
enterprises within this region (Honohan, 2010; Green, 2003).  For example, German 
guarantee banks concentrate their business on a single federal state within Germany. 
Moreover, it has to be decided, which kinds of financial instruments can be 
guaranteed (e.g. working capital, funds for investments) (Green, 2003; Riding et al., 
2007). 
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2.2  Existing research about Credit Guarantee Schemes  
The intensity of existing research about the efficacy of various Credit Guarantee 
Schemes worldwide and their impact on SME lending varies widely. While schemes 
in some countries were objects of several studies (e.g. the SBA loan guarantee 
program of the USA, the U.K. Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme), there is little 
investigation of schemes in other countries (e.g. Germany, Spain). The lack of 
studies is mainly due to methodological problems, restricted access to adequate data 
and high costs (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996). Nevertheless, it is important to monitor 
the efficacy of Credit Guarantee Schemes and their impact on lenders and borrowers. 
Research findings may help to improve the schemes’ impact on SME access to 
finance by developing recommendations.  
The establishment of Credit Guarantee Schemes pursues special goals. The aim most 
cited is to provide additional finance by expanding the volume of lending to SMEs 
(Riding et al., 2007; Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). Since SMEs need finance to 
expand or establish a business, an increase in bank lending is considered to be 
connected to an increase in employment. Moreover, this is related to an increase in 
tax revenues from the employees and the SMEs (Riding et al., 2007; Bradshaw, 
2002). Bradshaw (2002) also mentioned that fostering SMEs could augment export 
services within an economy. Since Credit Guarantee Schemes are useful tools to 
extend the relationship between a bank and its customer or to generate new 
customers, they are also thought to have a positive impact on the bank’s profits 
(Riding et al., 2007).  
The following sections will provide an overview of existing literature about Credit 
Guarantee Schemes. Section 2.2.1 contains the main literature about the ability of the 
schemes to provide additional lending to SMEs. Section 2.2.2 illustrates the main 
studies that tried to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of the schemes. Section 2.2.3 
contains the literature about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the 
lending behaviour of banks and Section 2.2.4 presents further literature about the 
guarantee scheme in Germany. At the beginning of each section, a short table is 
presented that gives an overview about author(s) and research methods, the research 
topic and the key findings. Subsequently, each study will be explained in more detail 
and inherent weaknesses will be discussed. Section 2.2.5 provides an interim 
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conclusion about the existing literature directly concerned with Credit Guarantee 
Schemes. 
2.2.1 Provision of additional lending 
Many existing studies about Credit Guarantee Schemes analyse the extent to which 
those schemes provide loans to SMEs that otherwise would not have been provided. 
The ability to provide additional loans is called ‘additionality’ in Europe and the UK 
and ‘incrementality’  in North America (Riding et al., 2007). The assumption that 
additionality is the main evidence to prove the efficacy of Credit Guarantee Schemes 
is widespread. It is considered as the one rationale for the implementation of 
guarantee schemes (Levitsky, 1997a; Boocock and Shariff, 2005; Benavides and 
Huidobro, 2008; Riding et al., 2007). While some studies exclusively measure 
whether the schemes augment the number or amount of loans to SMEs (financial 
additionality) other studies distinguish between financial additionality and economic 
additionality. Economic additionality means the increase of sales, employment, 
profits, etc. and will be considered under the aspect of macroeconomic impacts in the 
following section. Table 2.1 below illustrates that most existing studies confirm the 
ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to provide additional lending. 
Table 2.1: Literature summary about additionality 
Details Research Key findings 
Authors: 
Boocock, Shariff (2005) 
 
CGS: New Principal Guarantee 
Scheme (NPGS), Malaysia 
 
Sample: 92 firms (postal survey), 
15 semi-structured interviews, 
case studies 
 
Methods: Logistic regression 
 
Response rate: 12.3% 
Question: 
Is it possible for NPGS 
to generate financial 
and economic 
additionality without 
putting the financial 
resources of the 
Corporation under 
undue strain and/or 
jeopardizing its 
relationship with the 
participating financial 
institutions? 
- Scheme failed to meet all the 
objectives sought by the corporation 
- There were a number of positive 
outcomes (especially in relation to 
economic additionality) 
- But baseline financial additionality 
was below average, there were high 
rates of default and the lenders bore 
a substantial portion of losses 
incurred 
Author: 
Cowling (2010) 
 
CGS: Small Firm Loan 
Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS), UK 
 
Sample: 27,331 loan contract, 
period of time: 1993 – 1998  
 
Methods: Regression analysis 
Question: 
Has the existence of a 
loan guarantee scheme 
fulfilled its primary 
objective of alleviating 
capital constraints to 
smaller firms? 
- Credit rationing for SMEs in the UK 
were not confirmed. 
- However, there was a pool of SMEs 
that, due to informational problems, 
will always find it more difficult to 
raise funds from the credit market 
when the macroeconomic conditions 
are worsening, even when collateral 
is available 
-  SFLGS broadly fulfilled its     
primary objective 
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Table 2.1                 (continued)  
Details Research Key findings 
Authors: 
Riding, Madill, 
Haines (2007) 
 
CGS: Canada Small Business 
Financing  
 
Sample: Data from 2001 survey 
of Statistics Canada (overall 88 
firms) 
 
Methods: Logistic regression 
Hypothesis 1:  
- It is not possible to 
measure additionality 
with a known degree 
of precision 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
- No additionality 
exists in the 
guarantee program 
- Hypothesis 1 was rejected by the 
methodological approach of this 
paper 
- The empirical study found some 
proof of additionality 
 
 
Authors: 
Zecchini, Ventura (2009) 
 
CGS: State-funded guarantee 
scheme, Italy 
 
Sample: Data from AIDA 
balance sheet data bank (overall 
11,261 firms) 
 
Methods: Econometric tests, 
regression analysis 
Question: 
Can the Italian 
guarantee scheme 
increase the access to 
bank loans and reduce 
borrowing costs for 
SMEs? 
 
A positive impact of the Italian 
guarantee scheme on SME lending was 
confirmed.  
 
 
One important argument has to be considered in this context: the difficulties of 
measuring financial additionality accurately. This is mostly due to the fact that 
different forms of additionality can be identified. Besides the basic definition of 
providing additional loans, additionality can be defined as providing loans on a more 
timely basis, providing loans on more favourable terms, supplying a broader 
financing package for SMEs or the improving of a bank-borrower relationship 
(Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996). Moreover, it cannot be excluded that lenders use 
guarantee schemes to shift distressed loans into a guaranteed portfolio. In these 
cases, lenders have already provided loans to SMEs and merely use the guarantee 
scheme to reduce their risk. If they have been willing to take on the risk in the 
absence of the scheme, this behaviour would affect the measurement of additionality 
negatively (Riding et al., 2007). It becomes clear that it is not possible to precisely 
assess what lenders would have done without the existence of a guarantee scheme. 
Therefore, additionality cannot be proven with certainty.   
This is exactly what Boocock and Shariff (2005) pointed out in their study measuring 
the ability of the Malaysian Credit Guarantee Scheme to provide additional lending. 
The authors contacted 800 firms that received guarantees from the New Principal 
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Guarantee Scheme in Malaysia to answer a postal questionnaire wherefrom 92 firms 
responded (response rate: 12.3%). In addition, they conducted 15 semi-structured 
interviews based on a case study. Even though they argued that it is “…almost 
impossible to establish ‘definitive’ measures of additionality…” (Boocock and 
Shariff 2005, p. 427), they gave some evidence that the analysed scheme failed to 
meet the objective to provide financial additionality without straining its financial 
resources or jeopardizing the relationship with participating banks since their results 
demonstrated high rates of default. 
This is something Cowling (2010) referred to as type 1 error related to Credit 
Guarantee Schemes. This means that the initial decision to not provide a loan to a 
SME turns out to be correct. In this respect the central objective of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes is to prevent type 2 errors. Type 2 errors occur when SMEs are credit 
rationed that can successfully repay their loans (Astebro and Bernhardt, 1999; 
Cowling, 2010). In his article, Cowling (2010) analysed overall 27,331 loan contracts 
issued within the years 1993 to 1998 under the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee 
Scheme. The data set of the analysis included only firms that had already applied for 
all other potential sources to get a loan before applying for the guarantee from the 
UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme. Therefore, these firms would have been 
credit rationed without the scheme. Additionally, the data set comprised information 
about ex post loan defaults of the supported firms. The data analyses revealed that 2 
per cent of all loans ended in default. Cowling (2010) concluded that the UK scheme 
indeed provides additional loans to SMEs. This leads him to the conclusion that the 
scheme has fulfilled its primary objective. However, the ex post loan defaults have 
demonstrated the existence of type 1 errors.  
To overcome the problem of measuring additionality, Riding et al. (2007) for the first 
time created a model which enabled them to predict the lending decision outcome if 
the Credit Guarantee Scheme in Canada had not been available. The authors got 
access to data from Statistics Canada of more than 19,000 owners of SMEs that 
answered a large scale survey about their financial experiences within the year 2000. 
The survey was conducted in 2001. Riding et al. (2007) derived a statistical model 
resembling a credit scoring model based on loan decisions of SMEs that did not need 
a guarantee to obtain the loan (overall 202 loans). According to that model they 
scored a sample of those firms that received a guarantee (overall 88 loans). This 
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allowed them to predict the lending decisions for these firms if the Credit Guarantee 
Scheme would not have existed. Out of the 88 loans that received a guarantee, 71 (80 
per cent) were classified as being denied without the existence of the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme. This proves the ability of the scheme to provide additional 
lending. The authors themselves interpose that the study is limited to the most 
narrowly defined aspect of additionality. Lending on a timelier basis or in favourable 
terms, for example, is not measured in the model.  
Zecchini and Ventura (2009) applied another approach to evaluate the ability of the 
Italian scheme to create additional lending to SMEs which enabled them to make a 
claim about the percentage of additional loans provided due to a Credit Guarantee 
Scheme. The authors stated that no existing study provided econometric evidence 
about the causality between Credit Guarantee Schemes and financial additionality. 
Furthermore, they found fault with the fact that there is no econometric estimation of 
the scheme’s impact on borrowing costs for SMEs with guarantee exists. In using 
financial data of 11,261 SMEs with and without guarantee provided by the AIDA 
balance sheet data bank, they tested whether and to what extent the Credit Guarantee 
Schemes in Italy affects costs and credit supply to SMEs. By running regression 
analyses and econometric tests, they found evidence that the Italian Credit Guarantee 
Scheme reduces the costs of lending for the borrowers of between 16 and 20 per 
cent. Moreover, a median additional supply of loans to SMEs of about 12.4 per cent 
was estimated.   
Demonstrated by the few exemplary studies, it can be said that the existing research 
is rather inconsistent. No clear statement can be made about the ability of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes to provide additional loans to SMEs. This is partly due to the 
differences of the schemes in the world. Additionally, no definite statement can be 
made about additionality. One can never say whether a loan would have also been 
provided without the existence of a guarantee scheme. This was something Riding et 
al. (2007) at least tried to estimate. However, this is considered to be almost 
impossible to assess definitively.  
2.2.2 Macroeconomic impacts 
By implementing Credit Guarantee Schemes, governments throughout the world 
seek to stimulate bank lending to SMEs with viable business ideas to initiate 
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economic growth. Therefore, it is obvious that the economic impact of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes is an appropriate means to measure their efficacy. This is why 
many of the existing studies analyse the schemes’ impact on job creation and 
economic activities. Table 2.2 contains the main studies that examine the economic 
impact of Credit Guarantee Schemes. 
Table 2.2: Literature summary about the economic impact of CGS 
Details Research Key findings 
Author: Bradshaw (2002)  
 
CGS: California State Loan 
Guarantee Program (SLGP) 
 
Sample: 1,166 firms that 
received 1,515 loan 
guarantees (1990 – 1996) 
 
Methods: Pre-post 
comparison; questionnaire 
with 300 firms of the overall 
sample (response rate: 59%) 
Objective: 
The author assessed the 
public benefit in terms of 
jobs and economic 
activities directly 
attributable to small 
business loan guarantees 
by SLGP. 
The following increases attributable to 
SLGP were found: 
- Employment (all firms): 40%  
- Employment (non-agricultural 
firms): 27%  
- State tax revenues: $ 25.5 million  
 
Authors: Lelarge, Sraer, 
Thesmar (2008) 
 
CGS: SOFARIS resp. 
OSEO-Garantie, France 
 
Sample: 1,362 with 
guarantee  
205,852 control firms 
without guarantee (created 
1988-1999) 
 
Methods: Regression 
analysis 
Objective: 
The authors evaluated the 
impact of SOFARIS 
guarantees on the future 
development of newly 
created ventures. 
The authors found:  
- SOFARIS firms showed higher 
employment growth 
- Guaranteed loans had a permanent, 
significant and sizable impact on 
capital growth 
- no clear evidence of a positive 
correlation between guaranteed loans 
and firm creation was identifiable 
Authors: Oh, Lee, 
Heshmati, Choi (2009) 
 
CGS: Korea Credit 
Guarantee Fund, Korea 
Technology Credit 
Guarantee Fund (2001-
2002) 
 
Sample: 44,013 resp. 50,584 
manufacturing firms 
 
Methods: Propensity score 
matching 
Objective: 
The authors evaluate the 
impact of two Korean 
guarantee schemes on 
growth in firm size, 
productivity, R&D, 
investment and survival. 
The authors found that the analysed 
Korean guarantee schemes positively 
affected employment, growth of sales, 
wage levels and the survival rate of 
supported firms. 
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Table 2.2         (continued)  
Details Research Key findings 
Authors: Schmidt, van 
Elkan (2006 + 2010) 
 
CGS: German guarantee 
banks  
 
Sample: 10,136 firms  with 
guarantee in 1996 - 2002,  
3,050 firms with guarantee 
in 2009; interviews with 128 
bank managers 
 
Methods: Desk research, 
expert interviews, 
questionnaires, 
macroeconomic projection 
model 
 
Response rate (firms): 18% 
+ 39% 
Objective: 
The authors examined the 
macroeconomic impact of 
the German guarantee 
banks.  
They found a positive impact on 
employment, GDP and tax income.  
 
Schmidt and van Elkan (2006) undertook a broad study about the macroeconomic 
impact of the guarantee banks in Germany. They analysed official data from the 
German guarantee banks to calculate the average amount of investments per year 
caused by the guarantee scheme. Using a macroeconomic projection model the 
authors derived the macroeconomic impact attributable to the investments made by 
guaranteed loans. To get additional information from firms that received a guarantee 
they sent out a questionnaire to 10,136 SMEs whereof 1,694 firms answered 
(response rate: 18%). Out of those 1,694 firms, 19 per cent stated that their 
investment would have been made even without the guarantee but most likely to a 
lesser extent. This gave a rough impression about how many investments were solely 
attributable to the guarantee scheme. Nevertheless, the authors derived different 
scenarios (100%, 75% and 34% of the investment directly attributable to the 
guaranteed loan). The results confirmed a positive impact on employment, tax 
revenues and GDP. One weakness of the study is the difference of periods under 
consideration. The authors sent out questionnaires to SMEs that received guaranteed 
loans in 1998, 1999 and 2003. There is not further explanation why exactly those 
years were chosen. The results of the questionnaire were utilized to create the 
different scenarios for the projection model. These scenarios were simulated for 
loans with guarantees from 1996 respectively 1996 – 2002. Thus, the information 
drawn from the firms that answered the questionnaire may not coincide with those of 
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the firms analysed in the projection model. Another weakness concerns the overall 
results of the study. The study failed to consider firms that were in default. However, 
it is important to integrate these firms when measuring the overall macroeconomic 
impact as firms in default that received a guarantee considerably reduce the positive 
effects. Therefore the results need to be adjusted. The authors repeated the study in 
2010 with firms that received a guarantee from the guarantee banks in 2009. The 
second study confirmed the results of the first one. However, the weaknesses 
mentioned above had not been eliminated.  
Another way to evaluate changes in economic activities and employment due to 
guarantee schemes is to compare the performance of firms before and after they got a 
guarantee. This approach was used by Bradshaw (2002) to analyse the efficacy of the 
California State Loan Guarantee Program (SLGP). The sample Bradshaw (2002) 
used consisted of 1,623 guaranteed loans. At the time of the realisation of the study 
108 loans were in default (6.6% out of 1,623) and, therefore, were excluded from the 
study. To measure the firms’ contribution to economic activities, the author used data 
of 1,166 SMEs that received the remaining 1,515 guaranteed loans between 1990 and 
1996 (during the depth of the California recession). These figures illustrate that some 
SMEs received more than one loan. Bradshaw (2002) compared employment rates 
from the time before the loans were provided with employment rates after the loans 
were provided. The data at the time loans were initiated were available through the 
agencies that administered the guarantees. Actual data about the firms were available 
for 757 firms only (64.9% of overall 1,166 SMEs). Comparing these data, Bradshaw 
concluded that guaranteed firms increased their employment by about 40.6%. Due to 
the data available, Bradshaw just considered the total number of employees and no 
full-time equivalents which can be stated as one weakness of the study. To obtain 
data about economic development benefit, Bradshaw selected 300 firms to send a 
questionnaire including phone and fax follow-ups (response rate 59%). This helped 
to estimate tax revenues attributable to guaranteed loans. Bradshaw derived an 
increase of state tax revenues of about 25.5 million USD. However, this amount 
should be considered carefully as it is only a rough and estimated amount that depicts 
subjective statements from a small random sample. Moreover, the author did not 
consider about interrelating the tax revenues and the expenses to establish and run 
the SLGP. This is important as tax revenues alone are not reliable for measuring the 
positive economic contribution of guarantee schemes. The connected costs have to 
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be considered as well. Another weakness of the study is that it is considering a period 
of economic recession. To gain a more complete overview about the macroeconomic 
contribution of guaranteed firms, it would be necessary to consider the performance 
of those firms during a complete economic cycle. The main weakness of Bradshaw’s 
study is the fact that loans are considered as necessary conditions for growing 
economic activities. It is assumed that without the loans the borrowers would not 
have been able to perform as well as they did after receiving the loan. But this cannot 
be said with absolute certainty. Borrowers may have been able to successfully run 
their business even without obtaining the loans; it could be that obtaining the loans 
enabled them to use their own resources for other purposes.  
Another approach to measure economic additionality attributable to guarantee 
schemes is comparing the performance of guaranteed firms with the performance of 
a peer group of borrowers without guarantees. On the one hand, many researchers, 
including Bradshaw (2002), are of the opinion that this is not effective (Boocock and 
Shariff, 2005; Green, 2003; Riding and Haines, 2001). They argue that it is 
problematic to compare firms as motivations and constraints vary widely among 
SMEs. On the other hand, this approach is used by other researchers to measure the 
efficacy of Credit Guarantee Schemes (Oh et al., 2009; Lelarge et al., 2008).  
Oh et al. (2009) analysed the impact of the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and the 
Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund on growth of sales, employment, wage 
levels and survival rates of guaranteed firms during the post economic crisis period 
(2000-2003). They concentrated on manufacturing firms with more than five 
employees. To avoid the problem of insufficient comparability of supported with 
non-supported firms, they applied the propensity score matching methodology. This 
methodology allows them to construct comparison groups by “…matching twin 
firms based on the propensity score in the population of unsupported firm groups” 
(Oh et al. 2009, p. 340). They observed the growth in performance during 2001 and 
2002 of 44,013 firms with and without guarantees that already existed during 2000 
and 2003. Their results showed that the Korean guarantee schemes positively 
affected employment, growth of sales and wage levels. To evaluate the impact of 
credit guarantees on firm survival, they analysed a sample of 50,584 firms that 
existed between 2000 and 2002 and survived in 2003.  Their findings also confirmed 
positive impact on the survival rate of supported firms. One weakness of the 
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investigation is the concentration on manufacturing firms with more than five 
employees. This disregards the smallest of all firms as well as firms of different 
sectors. Therefore, the study fails to give a profound overview about the impact of 
the guarantee schemes as a whole. Moreover, it fails to consider a whole business 
cycle. One argument of the study is that the Korean guarantee schemes support firms 
with lower productivity. This may qualify the results of the study as those firms in 
general boast a relatively greater potential to grow in size. Supporting those firms 
may hamper the process of creative destruction. This is an important argument which 
has to be analysed in more detail as this may have a negative impact on the economy 
as a whole which would lower the positive impact of guarantee schemes on the 
Korean economy even if a few firms were benefitting.  
Lelarge et al. (2008) undertook one of the rare studies about the French loan 
guarantee programme. They concentrated their study on the scheme’s impact on 
young firms. By comparing 1,362 guaranteed firms with 205,852 non-guaranteed 
firms, they found that on average firms that received a guarantee showed a higher 
level of employment creation. Moreover, their employment growth rate did not slow 
down in the following four years and stayed at a higher level than the average rate of 
firms without guarantees. The authors also tested the scheme’s impact on capital 
growth and found that the capital of guaranteed firms grew faster. By assessing the 
impact on firm creation, they found no significant positive correlation. They 
concluded that the French scheme indeed supports existing firms but rather had no 
impact on the creation of new firms. They also found that credit guarantee programs 
induce more risk taking from guaranteed firms. Therefore, they pointed out that 
continuing to increase these programs may make the marginal firms more and more 
risky, and thus may be welfare destroying. One weakness of the study is that the 
authors did not further analyse this fact that may be crucial for a definitive 
understanding about the impact on the overall performance of guaranteed firms. 
Another weakness is the significant disparity in the sample size. They contrasted 
1,362 guaranteed firms with more than 160 times more non-guaranteed firms. Hence, 
the results are not truly comparable.  
Regarding the results of the literature review, it is necessary to recognise the 
difficulties in measuring the economic impact of Credit Guarantee Schemes. The 
performance of a firm is influenced by a range of factors like the elasticity of 
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demand, business cycles and competition in the market and the region where a 
certain firm operates. Moreover, it is always a challenge to obtain sufficient and 
suitable data. Therefore, the impact of Credit Guarantee Schemes on economic 
growth can hardly be measured accurately.   
2.2.3 Ability to initiate a learning process 
The third field of research about Credit Guarantee Schemes that shall be discussed 
here is the ability of the schemes to alter the lending behaviour of banks and initiate a 
learning process within the commercial banks. Table 2.3 highlights the main 
literature. The most significant weakness of the existing literature in this field of 
investigation is that most studies are conceptual.  
Table 2.3: Literature summary learning process 
Details Research  Key findings 
Author: Craig et al. 
(2008) 
 
CGS: SBA (USA) 
 
Sample: Over 360,000 
loans from 1991-2001 
 
Methods: Cross-
sectional OLS fixed 
effects regression model 
Objective: 
The authors tested 
whether SBA loan 
guarantees had a relatively 
greater impact on the 
average level of labour 
employment in low-
income areas than in 
higher-income markets. 
They argued that (especially for firms in low-
income markets) it is important to reduce the 
amount of asymmetric information to reduce 
credit rationing. As one very practical 
method to reduce information asymmetries, 
they mentioned the encouragement of lenders 
to provide loans to firms they would 
otherwise not provide any loan. By 
establishing a relationship with the borrower 
this helps to reduce asymmetric information 
and credit rationing for firms in the low-
income area. 
Author: Flaming (2007) 
 
CGS: Guarantees to 
microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) 
around the world 
 
Sample: 96 loan 
guarantees from 8 
agencies 
 
 
Objective: 
The author reviewed the 
specific benefits of loan 
guarantees and describes 
some of the characteristic 
features like cost structure 
and guarantor agencies. 
In his study the author mentioned the 
expectation that experiences with loans to 
MFIs will raise their willingness to lend to 
them without guarantee later as the primary 
rationale for providing guarantees instead of 
lending directly to MFIs. He found that: 
- Guarantors and MFI managers confirmed 
that guarantees help to get loans from 
banks that they would not have obtained 
without guarantee.  
- The provision of guarantees enhances the 
bank’s perception of MFIs.  
- MFIs would not pay the additional costs 
for the guarantee if they were able to get a 
loan without it. 
Author: Green (2003) 
 
CGS: In general 
 
Methods: Conceptual 
paper 
 
Objective: 
The paper tried to 
determine whether CGS 
are efficient and effective. 
The author took the view that CGS need to 
initiate a learning process on the bank´s side. 
CGS can help to alter their risk perception of 
SMEs by learning about their 
creditworthiness and business. Although, the 
author challenged whether lenders are truly 
willing to alter their lending behaviour. 
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Table 2.3        (continued)  
Details Research  Key findings 
Author: Kramer (2008) 
 
CGS: Guarantee banks 
in Brandenburg and 
Berlin 
 
Methods: 38 expert 
interviews, simulation  
Objective: 
The author examined 
whether the guarantee 
banks were able to 
mitigate credit restrictions 
for SMEs. 
Kramer concluded that the analysed 
guarantee banks fostered the provision of 
loans to SMEs, contributed to a reduction of 
informational asymmetries and helped to 
initiate learning processes on the bank´s side. 
Author: Levitsky 
(1997a) 
 
CGS: In general 
 
Methods: Conceptual 
paper 
Objective: 
The author described how 
CGS were being 
implemented and outlined 
the problems and 
advantages of the 
schemes.  
Levitsky cited the opportunity for banks to 
learn about SMEs, their problems and 
operations as one important objective of 
CGS. He argued that this helps to manage 
SME loan portfolios. Thus, banks may 
realize that SMEs are not as risky as initially 
expected. 
Author: Vogel, Adams 
(1996) 
 
CGS: In general 
 
Methods: Conceptual 
paper 
Objective: 
The authors discussed the 
ability of CGS to 
overcome credit market 
imperfections and the 
problem to obtain bank 
loans for some target 
groups (especially SMEs). 
They argued that one aim of CGS is to alter 
lending behaviour by subsidizing the 
recovery risk. CGS does exist to foster the 
production of information about borrowers. 
Lenders will collect sufficient information 
about their borrowers with guarantee so that 
these borrowers will later graduate to 
borrowers without a guarantee.  
 
Green (2003) provides a comprehensive overview about types, objectives, 
advantages and disadvantages of Credit Guarantee Schemes in general. The aim of 
the paper is to assess whether Credit Guarantee Schemes are effective and efficient in 
promoting private sector-led growth. Green (2003) argues that one aim of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes is to make loans available to credible SMEs that they otherwise 
would not have obtained. Therefore, it is important to create a learning process for 
the lending bank. Lenders must alter their risk perception of SMEs. By providing a 
guarantee and initiating a loan to SMEs, banks can learn about the creditworthiness 
of SMEs without bearing the risk involved. Those borrowers that otherwise would 
have been perceived as too risky and would not have received a loan get the 
opportunity to build up a repayment record. That reputation may act as a substitute 
for collateral. In the future those borrowers will be able to obtain loans without a 
guarantee. By gaining experiences with SME lending, banks will also develop the 
knowledge and technologies to reduce transaction costs and make SME lending more 
profitable and attractive. Transaction costs are one of the main deterrents to lend to 
SMEs. Therefore, Green argued, one aim of Credit Guarantee Schemes should be the 
reduction of these costs. Due to the guarantee coverage, the costs of default were 
reduced. The administrative costs may be reduced if the guarantor undertakes the 
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screening and monitoring. However, this would have the disadvantage that the bank 
will not get the opportunity to develop techniques to lend to SMEs efficiently and a 
learning process cannot take place. The author also added the consideration that it is 
not clear whether the behaviour of banks truly can be altered by Credit Guarantee 
Schemes. The author referred to critics that take the view that banks will not 
seriously be willing to alter their lending behaviour. They will take the guarantee to 
reduce their risk but will have no intention to bear the whole risk themselves by 
lending without guarantee later on. In this point, the weakness of Green’s paper 
becomes obvious. As it is only a conceptual paper, no empirical results can support 
or prove the statements she made. Moreover, she admittedly referred to ‘critics’ of 
credit guarantee schemes but fails to identify the literature used. Thus, the arguments 
the author referred to are not empirically proven.  
This weakness is also applicable to the papers of Levitsky (1997a), and Vogel and 
Adams (1996). Levitsky (1997a) concentrated on the implementation of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes all over the world and illustrated some of the problems faced as 
well as the advantages of the schemes. He argued that Credit Guarantee Schemes are 
intended to help commercial banks to improve their handling of SME loans. Banks 
that are willing to provide a loan to a SME under the condition that a guarantee 
scheme reimburses a part of the inherent risk get the opportunity to learn more about 
the problems and operations of SMEs. This may help banks to learn how to lend 
profitably to SMEs even without guarantees. Levitsky pointed out that SME lending 
has never been attractive for banks due to their fear of increasing costs and 
bureaucracy. Moreover, he argued that governments sometimes have to threaten 
banks with penalties unless they participate. This is far too narrowly considered. 
Levitsky failed to analyse the reasons why banks take part in SME lending and make 
use of credit guarantees. In some countries, like Germany, Credit Guarantee Schemes 
have a long history; banks have insisted on guarantees for a long time and still do. 
Thus, it would be interesting to find out whether schemes were able to make lending 
to SMEs a routine and whether any alteration in their lending behaviour can be 
perceived.  
Vogel and Adams (1996) concentrated on the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to 
overcome credit market imperfections and thereby enhance the access to bank loans 
for SMEs. They pointed out that, other than direct subsidies to loans, Credit 
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Guarantee Schemes attempt to alter the lending behaviour of banks by undertaking a 
part of the initial loan-recovery risk. The schemes were established to stimulate the 
commercial banks’ collection of information about borrowers that are widely 
recognized as informationally opaque. Vogel and Adams referred to advocates of 
Credit Guarantee Schemes who argued that borrowers will be able to borrow without 
a guarantee once lenders have had positive experiences with these new clients who 
have guarantees. This is partly due to the fact that borrowers learn how to apply 
successfully for formal loans and partly due to the opportunity of the lenders to 
collect sufficient information about the borrowers. It is a major weakness of the 
paper that Vogel and Adams do not make any detailed reference, especially in this 
context. They do not cite the mentioned proponents. Thus, it cannot be evaluated 
whether these people are in the position to estimate these mechanisms. Moreover, it 
is not clear whether the authors can prove their statements by any empirical analysis. 
Moreover, Vogel and Adams concluded that Credit Guarantee Schemes are only the 
second-best approach to overcome information problems and lower credit restrictions 
to SMEs. Unfortunately, they missed this opportunity to explain why and to make 
any recommendations about what they see as the first-best approach.  
One study that tested the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to induce an alteration 
of the lending behaviour of commercial banks is that of Flaming (2007). Flaming 
focused on the benefits of Credit Guarantee Schemes for microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). Therefore, the study is not completely applicable for the present study which 
will concentrate on commercial banks and SMEs in general. Flaming examined a set 
of 96 loan guarantees issued by eight schemes around the world. One weakness of 
the paper is the fact that the author failed to describe the methods used. One 
interesting statement in the paper is that guarantee schemes “…provide transaction 
expertise and credibility that enhances the local bank´s perception of the MFI” 
(Flaming 2007, p.4). Flaming does not include how he derived this statement.  
Another statement is that “Guarantors and MFI managers report that loan guarantees 
help MFIs to get loans (…) from banks that otherwise would not have lend to them” 
(Flaming 2007, p. 4). This is an important statement about the ability of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes to provide additional loans to otherwise credit-restricted firms. It 
would be extremely important to get information about the data used to form this 
conclusion. Another weakness is the sample size. Flaming analysed 96 loan 
guarantees. Spread over eight guarantee schemes in different countries, this is 
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approximately 12 guarantees for every scheme. Thus, the results can hardly be stated 
as representative.   
The papers of Flaming (2007), Green (2003), Levitsky (1997a) and Vogel and 
Adams (1996) all have in common that they considered Credit Guarantee Schemes in 
general. To make universal assertions about Credit Guarantee Schemes in general, 
researchers disregard the fact that there are some fundamental differences existing in 
different countries which may have an impact on the lending behaviour of banks and 
the design of the guarantee schemes.  
As opposed to analysing Credit Guarantee Schemes in general, Craig at al. (2008) 
concentrated on the US Small Business Administration (SBA) guarantee scheme. 
The authors tried to find out whether SBA loan guarantees have a relatively greater 
impact on the average level of labour employment in low-income areas than in 
higher-income markets. They put their focus on the macroeconomic impact of credit 
guarantees rather than on their ability to induce any changes in the lending behaviour 
of banks. Nevertheless, they also mentioned the need to reduce the amount of 
asymmetric information between commercial banks and SMEs to mitigate credit 
rationing. They referred to Credit Guarantee Schemes as one practical method to 
increase the collection of information by lending banks. By providing guarantees, 
lenders can be encouraged to make profitable loans to SMEs that they otherwise 
would not accept as clients. Doing this, they may develop a relationship with the 
borrower that enables them to collect information at relatively modest cost. This 
helps to reduce information asymmetries and, therefore, reduces credit rationing in 
the future. Since Craig et al. (2008) put the focus of their study on macroeconomic 
viewpoints; there is no further investigation in that topic. Nevertheless, it offers an 
opportunity for further research. The question whether the provision of a guarantee 
from the guarantee scheme can foster the creation of a bank-customer relationship is 
very interesting. Since such a relationship may be one important precondition to 
reduce asymmetric information, it may indeed help to overcome credit restrictions. 
More details about the link between lending relationships, information asymmetries 
and the mitigation of credit restrictions will be presented in Section 2.6. 
One of the few studies about the German guarantee banks is that of Kramer (2008). 
He concentrated on the guarantee banks in the federal states Brandenburg and Berlin 
and analysed whether these two banks helped to overcome credit restrictions for 
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SMEs. He conducted 38 expert interviews with bank managers of commercial and 
guarantee banks. Additionally, he ran a simulation to estimate the probability of 
default under certain circumstances based on the figures of the guarantee bank 
Brandenburg. Learning in the context of Kramer’s study mainly means that 
commercial banks learn how to better collect and evaluate information about SMEs 
as well as improve processes of loan applications of these firms. According to the 
author, a better understanding of the firms and the associated risks can result in a 
mitigation of credit restrictions. To evaluate the ability of the guarantee banks to 
stimulate an alteration of the lending behaviour of commercial banks, the analysis is 
concentrated solely on the results of the expert interviews. The simulation did not 
provide any reference to the learning process. The expert interviews of Kramer 
contained more than 30 main questions. Only one of these questions dealt with the 
topic of a learning process. The author asked the interviewees whether they 
personally or their bank had learned anything during the process of allocating a 
guarantee to an SME. There is no detailed table about the answers the interviewer 
received. Therefore, it is not clear, how many answers were given to that question. 
Only the overall statement was given that corporate account officers learned to 
devote themselves more to products, orders, the future development and the certain 
sector of an SME. Kramer (2008) noted that they learned that it could be helpful to 
visit their clients in their companies. These are rather generalized statements, and it is 
hard to believe that this is something bankers really have to learn from guarantee 
banks as this should be self-evident. Analysing markets, products and sectors should 
be an everyday business activity for corporate account officers making loan 
decisions. Kramer also argued that guarantee banks help to overcome asymmetric 
information. He gave reasons for his assertion by referring to answers from his 
interviewees. According to Kramer, some of them indicated that guarantee banks 
have another perspective even if they do not have more information at their disposal 
than commercial banks have. Kramer referred to respondents that argued that 
guarantee banks often have information that might have a negative impact on the 
creditworthiness of SMEs and which is not available for the commercial banks. For 
that reason, these respondents concluded that the cooperation with a guarantee bank 
may protect against information deficits as the guarantee banks sometimes generate 
more useful information than the commercial banks do. However, these arguments 
were not been supported with definite examples. This can be considered as a strong 
51 
 
weakness in Kramer’s study. Regarding this and other weaknesses pointed out here, 
the arguments of the author seem to be inconsistent. On the one side, he stated that 
guarantee banks do not have more information than commercial banks. On the other 
side, he stated that they have information that commercial banks do not have. 
Consequently, it did not become clear where the reduction of information 
asymmetries should derive from.  
Summing up, the rather conceptual literature and the weaknesses of the existing 
studies offer some interesting opportunity for further investigation about the impact 
of Credit Guarantee Schemes on SME lending. Since information plays a crucial role 
in bank lending and SMEs are often considered as being credit restricted because of 
insufficient information, Credit Guarantee Schemes might be a suitable instrument to 
put in motion processes that help to overcome information problems between the 
borrowers and the commercial banks. When guarantee schemes provide an 
opportunity to commercial banks to lend to SMEs that otherwise would have been 
credit restricted, this might also give these banks the opportunity to collect 
information over the course of time and mitigate credit restrictions for the respective 
SMEs in the future.  
2.2.4 Further literature about German guarantee banks 
Besides the studies of Schmidt and van Elkan (2006 + 2010) and Kramer (2008) only 
four additional studies about the German guarantee banks were found which are 
illustrated in Table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4: Further literature about German guarantee banks 
Details Research Key findings 
Author: Federal Ministry of 
Economy and Technology (2010) 
 
CGS: German guarantee banks 
 
Sample: 20  expert interviews, 
online survey with 2,220 experts 
 
Methods: not mentioned 
 
Response rate: 27% 
Objective:  
Evaluation of the extension 
of the program of the 
German guarantee banks in 
the context of the economic-
growth package II.  
The authors concluded that the 
extension was beneficial and had 
met the main needs of SMEs 
within the crisis. 
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Table 2.4     (continued)  
Details Research Key findings 
Authors: Neuberger, Räthke-
Döppner (2008) 
 
CGS: German guarantee banks 
 
Sample: 780 SMEs 
 
Methods: Survey 
 
Response rate: 15.5%  
Objective: 
Evaluation of the economic 
development of firms that 
received a guarantee from 
guarantee bank in 
Mecklenburg–Hither 
Pomerania.  
The authors confirmed positive 
impacts on firm growth, 
employment and access to 
finance. 
Authors: Nitsch, Kramer (2010) 
 
CGS: German guarantee banks 
Objective:  
Description of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes in 
general and the German 
guarantee banks, no new 
research. 
Only literature based/theoretical 
paper 
Author: Schiereck (2002) 
 
CGS: German guarantee banks 
Objective: 
Description of German 
guarantee banks, no new 
research. 
Only literature based/theoretical 
paper 
 
In 2010, the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology in Germany evaluated the 
extent of the services provided by the German guarantee banks in the context of the 
Economic-Growth Package II. The German government implemented a loan and 
guarantee program in the year 2009 to support German firms to overcome problems 
in obtaining bank loans as a direct impact of the financial crisis of 2007. This 
program was called ‘Wirtschaftsfonds Deutschland.’ One part of the program - the 
Economic-Growth Package II - included the extension of the provision of guarantee 
from the guarantee banks. Within the period of March 2009 until 31 December 
20105, the maximum rate for a guarantee was increased to 90% (prior it was 80%) 
and the maximum amount of a guarantee was raised to two million Euro (prior one 
million Euro). The coverage of the default risk by the federal states was raised up to 
80 per cent in the old federal states (prior it was 65%) and 90 per cent in the new 
federal states (prior 80%) (Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology, 2010). The 
Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology conducted 20 expert interviews with 
members of banks, guarantee banks and chambers and an online survey with around 
2,220 members of banks, chambers and SME consultancies (response rate was 27%) 
to evaluate the extension of the program. The Ministry concluded that the extension 
was important to support SMEs within the crisis and had met the main problems 
within that time: the decline of the liquidity positions and the higher demand for 
                                                 
5 The program ended 31 December 2010. After that date the same regulations as before March 2009 
were applied (see Section 1.5). 
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collateral. They also found that the volume of loans provided due to the provision of 
a guarantee increased by more than 20 per cent. One gap in the research is that it 
failed to evaluate whether the extension of the program was economically desirable. 
For example, it missed the opportunity to analyse the default rate of the loans. The 
increase of the maximum loan amount and the amount of the guarantee will also 
increase the losses for the warrantors in case of default. This is surely something that 
can only be measured with a long-term view. However, this is considered to be 
important to fully examine the effects of the extension.   
Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner (2008) evaluated the efficacy of the guarantee bank 
in the federal state Mecklenburg – Hither Pomerania. The authors used data from a 
survey of 780 SMEs which was conducted in 2007 by a big German accountancy 
firm. Out of these 780 SMEs, 700 had received a guarantee from the above stated 
guarantee bank. The main weakness of the analysis is that only frequency 
distributions have been presented and interpreted. The authors provided a frequency 
distribution of firms of different size (measured against the number of employees) at 
the time the guarantee was provided and in 2006. Based on these data, they 
concluded that firms have grown constantly. Moreover, they compared the equity 
ratios and the turnover of the firms in the year of the provision of the guarantee and 
2006 which was considered to confirm the economic growth of the firms. All firms 
were asked about whether the access to bank finance has improved due to the 
guarantee of the guarantee bank. Seventy-one per cent of the firms confirmed an 
improvement (Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner, 2008). For the authors, the 
interrelation between the improvement of the access to bank finance caused by the 
provision of a guarantee and the growth of the firms was evidence for the efficacy of 
the guarantee bank in Mecklenburg – Hither Pomerania. However, by presenting 
solely frequency distributions, the authors missed the opportunity to provide a solid 
empirical evaluation of the direct relation between these variables.  
Additionally, two literature-based theoretical papers about the German guarantee 
banks exist (Schiereck 2002, Nitsch and Kramer 2012). To be thorough, these studies 
shall be discussed as well. Schiereck (2002) is solely a conceptual paper explaining 
the ownership structure, the size and the tasks of the guarantee banks in Germany. 
The author created a list containing all guarantee banks in the year 1997 including 
the total assets, the equity and the headcount in 1997. Moreover, Schiereck (2002) 
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provided a detailed explanation about the objectives of the guarantee banks, and the 
number and volume of guarantees provided in 1997 collected from the annual 
statements. The paper is more or less an annual report of all guarantee banks from 
1997 (comparable with the reports the Association of German Guarantee Banks 
provides). It is descriptive as no research was conducted. However, the article 
provided a good overview about the tasks and the volume at that time.  
The paper of Nitsch and Kramer (2010) gives a short description of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes in general, the parties involved and the aim of the schemes. Moreover, it 
provides the number and volume of guarantees provided by the German guarantee 
banks in 2007 and 2008 derived from the annual reports of the Association of 
German Guarantee Banks. This paper offers good information about German 
guarantee banks but does not contribute to the academic discussion about Credit 
Guarantee Schemes as the authors do not contribute any of their own research.  
This overview of existing literature about German guarantee banks has revealed that 
this field of investigation is rather underexplored and needs further research. Section 
1.6 has highlighted the need for a regular and thorough analysis of the German 
guarantee banks. The above presented literature review has demonstrated the existing 
literature gap which shall be filled by the present research. 
2.2.5 Interim conclusion 
The previous sections have illustrated the main strands of literature existing about 
Credit Guarantee Schemes. Summing up, it can be stated that a range of studies exist 
that have analysed the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes worldwide to provide 
additional loans. The results of these studies vary. While most studies found some 
indications for the provision of additional lending others did not. Problems arise out 
of different definitions of additionality and the general difficulty of excluding the 
probability that loans would not have been provided without the scheme. This leads 
to the conclusion that financial additionality cannot be measured with absolute 
accuracy. The same applies for the studies about the macroeconomic impacts. Since 
it cannot be said with absolute certainty that the loans have only been provided 
because of the existence of the guarantee schemes, it is difficult to exactly identify 
the macroeconomic effects. Moreover, macroeconomic effects are defined by a vast 
range of factors like market competition, structural situations in certain regions or the 
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business cycle. Therefore, a definitive statement about macroeconomic effects of 
Credit Guarantee Schemes seems to be possible in a long-term perspective only. 
Additionally, it is indeed problematic to define whether macroeconomic effects were 
caused exclusively by the existence of a Credit Guarantee Scheme. One option for 
doing this is a peer group comparison. However, the disadvantages and limitations of 
such a peer group comparison have been illustrated above. Therefore, these two 
approaches were not considered to be promising for the present research. 
The literature about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the lending 
behaviour of commercial banks, however, have revealed some interesting approaches 
for further research. Most of the existing literature presents conceptual frameworks 
so far. Summing up and putting the basic thoughts of these concepts together, the 
following can be said: the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee scheme enables 
a commercial bank to provide a loan to a SME that otherwise would not have 
received the loan. The reasons for being reluctant in lending to SMEs, according to 
the authors of the conceptual papers, are the relatively higher risk of SMEs and the 
related costs (both aspects have been discussed in Section 1.5 in more detail). The 
provision of a guarantee leads to a reduction of the initial risk for the commercial 
bank, and the bank can provide the loan. As time passes, the commercial bank can 
collect information about the borrower. The lack of information is often considered a 
reason for a higher risk perception by commercial banks causing limited access to 
bank loans for SMEs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). When 
the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee scheme gives the opportunity to a 
commercial bank to provide a loan to a SME, it also offers the opportunity to collect 
information about the firm to better understand the related risk. The reduction of 
information asymmetries may also increase access to bank loans for the SME. When 
this is the case, one could conclude that the provision of the guarantee from the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme was decisive for the mitigation of the credit restrictions. 
Without the provision of the guarantee, the loan would not have been provided, and 
the opportunity for reducing information asymmetries would not have been emerged. 
To fully understand these mechanisms, not only literature about Credit Guarantee 
Schemes is important but also literature about the role of information and guarantees 
for the banks’ decisions about whether to provide a loan to a SME or not. The most 
considerable literature about these aspects will be reviewed in the following. 
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It shall be noted that prior to this the literature about Credit Guarantee Schemes 
presented in this section has revealed that many studies only concentrate on 
statistical data about the firms that received a loan and a guarantee or on evaluating 
the banks’ perspectives. The widespread negligence of SMEs in the existing research 
is a severe research gap. Since Credit Guarantee Schemes are created to support 
SMEs, it seems necessary to include these firms into the research. Another weakness 
that has been revealed by the literature review is the scarcity of empirical research 
and the predominance of literature-based research about the German Credit 
Guarantee Scheme. To the author’s best knowledge, only a few studies about the 
German guarantee banks exist and have been included here. Except the studies of 
Schmidt and van Elkan (2006 and 2010) that provided a short description of their 
research in English and the explanation of the German scheme of Nitsch and Kramer 
(2010), all other studies are solely available in German. This is considered to be an 
obstacle for contributing to the international academic discussion within the research 
field of Credit Guarantee Schemes. To overcome the main weaknesses derived out of 
the literature review, the present study is concentrated on the guarantee scheme in 
Germany. By including SMEs into the research, it analyses the ability of a German 
guarantee bank to alter the lending behaviour of banks by initiating a learning 
process as discussed in the conceptual literature.  
As mentioned above, not only the understanding of existing literature about Credit 
Guarantee Schemes is necessary but also the knowledge about existing literature in 
related research fields is needed for a better understanding of the process of learning. 
The conceptual papers about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the 
lending behaviour of banks that have been presented here concluded that learning 
can take place as a result of reducing information asymmetries between banks and 
SMEs. Information asymmetries are widely defined as market imperfection that may 
lead to credit restrictions for SMEs. To learn more about information asymmetries in 
the context of SME finance, the literature review also contains literature about 
market imperfections. This is provided in Section 2.3. Some of the studies about 
Credit Guarantee Schemes also mentioned the role of collateral for making available 
loans for SMEs. Guarantees from the guarantee schemes act as collateral and help 
those firms to obtain loans that cannot provide sufficient own valuable collateral. 
Collateral is often referred to as a substitute for information. Therefore, it seems to 
be appropriate to also provide some literature about the role of collateral in SME 
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financing when analyzing the linking of Credit Guarantee Schemes and information. 
Section 2.4 presents a selection of literature about that topic. The authors of the 
conceptual papers about the alteration of lending behaviour also mention the 
significance of lending relationships in reducing information asymmetries and 
reducing credit restrictions. Consequently, Section 2.5 highlights important literature 
about relationship lending. This literature overview seeks to understand the best 
existing research in these fields of investigation and to highlight research gaps 
related to the present research study. Section 2.6 presents the framework that has 
been derived out of the literature and highlights the research questions and 
propositions which act as foundation for the present research. Section 2.7 presents a 
final conclusion. 
2.3 Market imperfections 
The assumption that even genuine good borrowers with low-risk projects are unfairly 
credit rationed is commonly used as justification for the creation and introduction of 
Credit Guarantee Schemes (Riding and Haines, 2001; Cowling, 2010; Levenson and 
Willard, 2000; Cressy, 2002). However, it is a controversial issue whether the 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans are adequate rationale for governmental 
intervention (Green, 2003; de Meza and Webb, 1992). Proponents typically refer to 
at least one financial market imperfection or distortion. The literature about market 
imperfections is manifold. Therefore, this section cannot provide a complete 
overview of the existing literature. Table 2.5 below contains some basic and current 
literature that shall be explained in more detail to provide a better understanding of 
the present research.  
Table 2.5: Selected literature about market imperfections 
Details Research topic Key findings 
Author: Akerlof (1970) 
 
Methods: Theoretical model 
Objective: 
To explain market 
mechanisms in a situation 
where uncertainty about the 
quality of goods exist.  
Demonstrated that uncertainty in 
a market with goods of different 
qualities and the lack of trust may 
result in market failures. 
Author: Grunert, Norden (2012) 
 
Sample: Germany: 1,062 loans 
granted 1992-1996; USA: 1,761 
loans granted 2003  
 
Methods: regression analysis 
Objective:  
To test the impact of hard 
and soft information on 
SMEs bargaining power 
when applying for a bank 
loan. 
-the assessment of soft 
information was positively 
related to the bargaining power 
and affected the credit scoring 
and the loan terms  
-bargaining power persisted over 
time  
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Table 2.5       (continued)   
Details Research topic Key findings 
Authors: Stiglitz, Weiss (1981) 
 
Methods: Theoretical model 
Objective:  
To demonstrate that loan 
markets may be 
characterized by credit 
rationing in equilibrium. 
Provided the first theoretical 
justification for credit rationing. 
Authors:  
Uesugi, Sakai, Yamashiro (2006) 
 
Sample: 1,344 users of the 
Japanese guarantee program and 
2,144 non-users 
 
Methods: two-step estimation 
procedures 
Objective: 
To find out whether the 
investment-effect of the 
credit guarantee program 
exceeds the adverse-
selection effect. 
 
 
They found that the problem of 
moral hazard of lenders and 
borrowers was less than the 
economic benefits of the 
additional investment projects.  
 
Authors: Van Caneghem and Van 
Campenhourt (2012)  
 
Sample: 79,097 Belgian SMEs 
that obtained a bank loan in 2007 
 
Methods: Ordinary least-squares 
regression model  
Objective: 
To test the impact of the 
quantity and quality of 
information provided by 
SMEs on their leverage. 
 
SMEs that provided more 
information and information on a 
higher quality relied more heavily 
on debt finance 
  
A typical market imperfection stated in the context of credit restrictions is that of 
asymmetric information. Information plays a crucial role in the relationship between 
banks and SMEs as these are the most informationally opaque enterprises (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Information asymmetries arise when borrowers know more about 
the probability of success of their investment projects than lenders. This situation is 
often due to a lack of market information about SMEs (Graham, 2004).  
A range of theoretical papers about asymmetric information and its impact on bank 
lending exists. It was decided to present two of the latest studies (Grunert and 
Norden, 2012; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012) to represent the current 
state of research about that topic. Additionally, two of the most recognized works 
(Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) are presented. These works will give an 
overview of the field and the relationship between information and access to bank 
lending. This is intended to illustrate why the evaluation of the ability of Credit 
Guarantee Schemes to reduce information asymmetries is an important step in 
analyzing the ability to reduce credit restrictions for SMEs of those schemes. 
Grunert and Norden (2012) analysed data from the US Survey of Small Business 
Finance 2003 and from six large German banks to evaluate the impact of soft and 
hard information on the bargaining power of borrowers. The time frame of the two 
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data sets differs significantly. While the US survey was from 2003, the data about the 
German loans was from 1992-1996. This is a main weakness of the study as the data 
is not really comparable. The authors analysed bargaining power by measuring ex 
post indicators like contracted loan terms and relative effects like comparing the 
bargaining power of two borrowers. They run correlations and regression analyses 
and found a positive correlation between soft information (character and 
management skills) and bargaining power which can help to overcome credit 
restrictions. Another weakness of the study is that there are no clear statements about 
the relationship between hard information and bargaining power.  
Van Caneghem and Van Campenhourt (2012) tested whether amount and quality of 
information provided by financial statements affects the leverage of SMEs. The 
quality of the information provided was measured by whether the firms voluntarily 
provided external financial statements or by the quality of the auditor. They analysed 
data from several Belgian statistical databases of the year 2007. Their final sample 
contained 79,097 firms. By running ordinary least-squares regression models, the 
authors found that those firms with low quality information or not enough 
information were less likely to be using external financing. Firms that provided more 
information and more qualitative information used more external debt. This 
confirmed the assumption of a positive relationship between information 
asymmetries and credit restrictions for SMEs. One weakness of the study that shall 
be mentioned here is that it is not clear if the use of debt finance is related to the 
amount and the quality of information provided and not to other things like different 
needs for external finance or different equity bases.  
In their seminal work, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrated by running a 
theoretical model that informational problems can lead to market failure in allocating 
loans to SMEs efficiently. They contend that banks always consider two factors 
when they come to a decision on whether they grant credit to an SME or not: the 
interest rate and the riskiness. If banks can obtain all relevant information, they will 
charge exactly the interest rate that reflects the riskiness of a borrower. If demand 
exceeds supply, they will raise the interest rates to the equilibrium price. In the 
presence of uncertainty in assessing SMEs and to maximize their profits, banks 
always seek to identify those borrowers who are most likely to repay the loans. In 
situations where banks do not have sufficient information about their borrowers it is 
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not possible to accurately measure the quality of the borrowers and to offer contracts 
that reflect their actual risk level. Borrowers that are denied a loan and offer to pay 
higher interest rates or to pledge more collateral will still not get a loan. An increase 
of the interest rate or the demand for collateral may result in an increasing risk of the 
bank’s loan portfolio for two possible reasons. The first is that lower risk borrowers 
might be discouraged from borrowing due to the high costs and collateral demands. 
The second is that borrowers might be encouraged to shift into projects that are more 
risky (moral hazard, see below) and, therefore, increase the risk and decrease the 
profit for the lender. In such a situation, the demand and the supply of loans will not 
be balanced. 
The inability to measure the quality of a borrower due to the lack of information can 
lead to adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). Using a theoretical model, Akerlof (1970) 
illustrated the impact of insufficient information by discussing the market for used 
cars. In a situation where the sellers have more information about the cars than the 
buyers, buyers cannot distinguish between good and bad cars. To cover their 
opportunity costs, sellers of good cars must always require a higher price for their 
cars than sellers of bad cars. However, since sellers of bad cars know that buyers 
cannot distinguish the quality of the cars due to the lack of information, they can 
pretend they are selling good cars and require higher prices. This might end up in a 
situation where the sellers of good cars are no longer able to cover their costs and 
disappear from the market. This leads to a market imperfection in a way that good 
cars will no longer be offered. This example can serve as an analogy for the 
provision of bank loans.  
Related to the price of the cars in the example of Akerlof (1970), the price for a loan 
is the interest rate. The interest rate lenders demand from their borrowers may affect 
the riskiness of a loan and, therefore, the potential profitability of the lender in two 
ways. Borrowers who are willing to pay higher interest rates for their loan may be 
more risky. This adverse selection-effect is based on Akerlof’s ‘lemon’s principle’. It 
can be explained by two arguments: First, borrowers with projects that show a high 
risk know that their probability to default is high. Therefore, they are willing to 
borrow at higher interest rates. Second, higher interest rates will expel borrowers 
with low-risk projects. This is the case when higher returns are expected for projects 
with higher risks. Consequently, higher costs of credit (due to a higher interest rate) 
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have to be compensated with riskier projects. In addition, the interest rate may affect 
the behaviour of the borrower. Higher interest rates may mislead the borrower to 
divert the funds to more risky projects. An increase of the costs of borrowing may 
consequently lead to a decrease of the quality of the pool of borrowers of a bank. 
Another problem that can arise from information asymmetries is that of moral 
hazard. It is based on the principal-agent theory. Moral hazard occurs when the agent 
(e.g. a borrower) acts in a way that has an adverse impact on the return of the 
principal (e.g. the lender). This can happen when the action of the agent cannot be 
thoroughly monitored by the principal. In such a situation, the borrower may switch 
to a riskier project without informing the lender or may even just do his or her best to 
be as successful as possible. According to Green (2005) moral hazard can be reduced 
by the lenders either by giving some incentive to the borrower to be honest with the 
lender or by requiring collateral which can be lost in case of the default of the 
borrower.  
Moral hazard can occur on the part of the borrower as well as on the part of the 
lender which has been evaluated by Uesugi et al. (2006). The authors analysed 
whether the introduction of a credit guarantee program in Japan stimulated the 
investment of SMEs or rather worsened adverse selection problems. The 
implementation of the credit guarantee program was limited to the time between 
1998 and 2001 to overcome a credit crunch faced by SMEs in Japan. During that 
time, the Japanese government provided guarantees of about 30 trillion yen. In case 
of a default of the supported borrowers, the program covered 100 per cent of the loss. 
The credit guarantee program was exceptional in that most Japanese SMEs could 
apply for a guarantee if they were credit rationed or not. The research of the authors 
was based on the 2001 Survey of Financial Environment. The survey contained a 
question about whether a guarantee of the credit guarantee programme was obtained 
or not. By applying two-step estimation procedures for firms that received a 
guarantee (1,344 firms) and those that did not obtain a guarantee (2,144 firms), 
Uesugi et al. (2006) analysed two effects. The first effect was called the investment-
effect and was considered to be positive in that the guarantee program enables the 
realisation of beneficial investment projects since it reduced the interest rate and 
lowered credit restrictions. The second and negative effect was called adverse-
selection effect. This means that the coverage of 100 per cent of the default risk 
reduced the incentives of the lenders to accurately monitor the loans and increases 
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moral hazard of the banks. Moreover, it increases moral hazard on the part of the 
borrowers since the losses would be completely covered by the program in case of 
default. They concluded that the positive effects exceeded the negative effects. The 
economic efficiency was positive for users of the guarantee program and, therefore, 
suggested a positive impact of the program on the Japanese economy. A strong 
weakness of the study is that it was concentrated on successful firms only. Firms that 
were in default were not considered but might have had an enormous impact on the 
results of the adverse selection effect. Moreover, a detailed description of the results 
about the adverse selection effect to allow a better understanding of the conclusions 
is missing.   
The presented literature has demonstrated the role of information in loan decisions. It 
has demonstrated that information asymmetries may result in adverse selection and 
moral hazard and in an increase of the default rates for the lending banks. In a market 
with imperfect information and excess demand it may consequently be better to 
ration the preferable credit volume by refusing loan applicants rather than raising the 
interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Camino and Cardone, 1999). 
For this reason, even creditworthy SMEs with feasible business ideas may suffer 
from credit rationing. A reduction of information asymmetries might, therefore, 
mitigate credit restrictions. 
The conclusion of the present research regarding the ability of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes in altering the lending behaviour of commercial banks and reducing credit 
restrictions for SMEs is as follows: the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee 
scheme enables a SME to obtain a bank loan that it otherwise would not have 
received. The commercial bank now gets the opportunity to collect information about 
the SMEs or, to put it in another way, to reduce information asymmetries. This might 
result in a reduction of credit restrictions for SMEs. To fully understand this process, 
it has to be evaluated why exactly the provision of a guarantee facilitates the 
provision of the loan for the commercial bank. Guarantees of guarantee schemes 
provide collateral to the bank. Therefore, collateral must play a crucial role in the 
whole process that shall be analysed. Consequently, the following section illustrates 
some basic literature on the significance of collateral in bank lending for firms.  
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2.4 The significance of collateral in bank lending to firms 
Collateral plays an important role in bank lending since it reduces the bank’s loss in 
case a borrower defaults. The inclusion of collateral in a loan is costly for the lenders 
as well as for the borrowers. For the lenders, costs arise in valuing and screening 
collateral and in the event of repossession (Leeth and Scott, 1989). Therefore, the 
inclusion of collateral might have a negative impact on the profit of the banks 
(Bester, 1985). For the borrowers it might occasion opportunity costs as assets, that 
otherwise would have been used more productively, are tied up (Berger et al., 
2011a). Nevertheless, the inclusion of collateral in a loan can also increase the profit 
of the lender. According to the lazy bank theory of Manove et al. (2001), the 
provision of collateral may weaken the incentives of the banks to thoroughly monitor 
a borrower and an investment project. This is related to lower screening costs which 
may increase the overall profits of a bank.  
Collateral is also widely thought to mitigate problems arising from asymmetric 
information like adverse selection since it can be considered as substitute for 
information (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Berger et al., 2011a; Menkhoff et al., 
2012; Steijvers et al., 2010). Collateral can play a disciplinary role for the borrowers 
in a way that borrowers get an incentive to use the money they received productively 
and not carelessly shift into more risky projects. This helps to reduce the risk of 
moral hazard for the lender (Manove et al., 2001).  
The literature about the role of collateral in bank lending is manifold with two main 
strands of investigation. The one strand is about ex ante theories regarding the 
meaning of collateral for unobservable riskier borrowers and is therefore based on 
the existence of information gaps that can lead to adverse selection and credit 
rationing. This theory predicts that these borrowers are considered to pledge less 
collateral when receiving a bank loan. The second strand is about ex post theories 
regarding the significance of collateral for observable riskier borrowers and is 
therefore based on the occurrence of moral hazard. It predicts that more collateral is 
required for borrowers that are deemed to be more risky (Berger et al., 2011a; Berger 
et al., 2011b). The literature about the relation of collateral and bank lending is 
extensive. This section can only provide a small sample of the existing research 
about that topic. Table 2.6 presents selected literature about the role of collateral in 
reducing problems of asymmetric information that will be explained in more detail.  
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Table 2.6: Selected literature about collateral 
Details Research Key findings 
Authors: Berger et al. 
(2011a) 
 
Sample: 14,000 loans 
(1993-1997) in USA 
 
Methods: Logit 
regression 
Objective: 
To test whether a 
reduction of information 
asymmetries by using 
credit scoring technology 
results in lower collateral 
requirements.  
The use of credit scoring technology reduced 
information asymmetries and the need for 
collateral by approximately 6 per cent. 
Authors: Berger et al. 
(2011b)  
 
Sample: 32,286 bank 
loans to 2,676 firms in 
Bolivia 
 
Methods: Probit 
regressions 
Objective: 
To identify the impact of 
observed and unobserved 
risk on the provision of 
collateral.  
The authors found that unobservable riskier 
borrowers pledged less collateral when they 
were less known by the lender. Observably 
riskier borrowers with a long lending 
relationship pledged more collateral. 
Authors: Besanko, 
Thakor (1987) 
 
Methods: Theoretical 
model 
Objective: 
To evaluate the impact of 
collateral on credit 
rationing. 
The authors demonstrated that the risk of a 
lender is positively related to the interest rate 
and negatively correlated with the provision 
of collateral.  
Author: Bester (1985)  
 
Methods: Theoretical 
model 
 
Objective: 
To demonstrate that no 
credit rationing will 
occur in equilibrium 
when banks when banks 
require collateral.  
The authors found that in credit market 
equilibrium with perfect information no 
credit rationing existed.  
Authors: Gonas et al. 
(2004) 
 
Sample: 7,619 loans in 
USA (1988 – 2001) 
 
Methods: Logit 
regression 
Objective: 
To analyse the factors 
influence the demand for 
collateral.  
The authors found that factors that are 
typical for adverse selection, moral hazard 
and the likelihood of a default were 
positively related to the provision of 
collateral.  
Authors: Menkhoff et al. 
(2012) 
 
Sample: 1,671 loans in 
Thailand 
 
Methods: Probit 
regressions 
Objective:  
To evaluate the impact of 
relationship lending and 
third-party guarantees on 
the lack of collateral. 
The authors concluded that third-party 
guarantees and relationship lending acted as 
substitute for collateral and mitigated credit 
restrictions. 
 
The ex post theory was tested by Gonas et al. (2004). The authors examined the 
impact of information, moral hazard and protection against losses on the demand for 
collateral of banks. They used information about the borrowers, the lenders and the 
contract terms of 7,619 loans that had been issued between 1988 and 2001 in the US. 
The data was provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database. To 
measure the quality and quantity of information, they differentiated whether 
borrowers were exchange-listed or had a credit scoring grade. By running logit 
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regressions, they concluded that firms without a rating more often pledged collateral 
than rated firms. Another measure for information was whether borrowers were 
domiciled in the US. Those that came from the outside the US had more often 
pledged collateral than firms from the US. These results confirmed the assumption 
that information asymmetries are positively related to the provision of collateral. For 
measuring moral hazard, they used information about the loan maturity and found a 
positive relationship between loan maturity and provision of collateral. However, the 
authors stated that moral hazard was very difficult to investigate (Gonas et al., 2004). 
To investigate the impact of the risk of default for the demand for collateral, they 
limited their sample to those borrowers that had obtained a credit scoring. The results 
indicated that the risk of a loan was positively related to the demand for collateral. 
One shortfall of the study is that it only considered hard information when analysing 
the impact of information asymmetries on collateral. However, soft or private 
information plays also a role when analysing the significance of information for the 
need of collateral.  
Berger et al. (2011a) also concentrated on the impact of credit scoring systems on the 
reduction of information asymmetries and the provision of collateral. The authors 
conducted logit regressions with official statistical data about 14,000 loans issued 
between 1993 and 1997 in the US. They also concluded that the use of credit scoring 
systems helped to overcome information asymmetries and lowers the demand for 
collateral. Berger et al. (2011a) inferred that the use of credit scoring technologies 
may mitigate credit restrictions especially for firms with asymmetric information 
problems and a lack of collateral since these systems reduced the need for collateral. 
This is elusive as the scoring technologies were based on the information. The 
existence and the use of these technologies alone will not reduce existing information 
asymmetries. Firms that cannot provide information will obtain a bad credit scorings 
and, therefore, still be required to provide collateral or even credit rationed.  
While the studies above provided evidence of the relationship between the use of 
collateral and observable risk, the following studies concentrated on the relationship 
between collateral and unobservable risk.  
The first two studies that shall be mentioned here are rather theoretical ones. Bester 
(1985) ran theoretical models that demonstrated that in credit market equilibrium 
with imperfect information about the risk of the borrower, credit restrictions did not 
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exist when the lenders use the collateral requirements as signaling device. Under 
these conditions borrowers were always pooled in bad and good ones. More risky 
borrowers chose a loan contract with lower collateral requirements and a higher 
interest rate while low-risk borrowers chose loan contracts with lower interest rate 
and higher collateral requirements. The author presupposed that low-risk borrowers 
had sufficient collateral to pledge. However, this cannot be assumed.  
Besanko and Thakor (1987) also ran a theoretical model that confirmed the results of 
Bester (1985). They simulated a market with perfect competition where banks could 
pool borrowers into divergent risk classes by offering loan contracts with different 
interest rates and collateral requirements. The authors demonstrated that in such a 
situation low-risk borrowers chose loan contracts with high collateral requirements 
but low interest rates where high-risk borrowers chose the opposite.  
These results were disproved by the more recent and less theoretical study of Berger 
et al. (2011b). The authors combined the two theories in their study. They analysed 
credit registry data including private and public information of 32,286 bank loans 
provided to 2,676 different firms in Bolivia between 1998 and 2003. Private 
information was not available for the lending banks. This allowed the authors to 
measure both the observable and the unobservable risk for the sample. The authors 
conducted probit regression analyses and found that borrowers with observable 
higher risk were more likely to pledge collateral. The findings correspond to the ex 
post theories. According to these theories, observably riskier borrowers have to 
pledge more collateral to reduce the risk of moral hazard for the lending bank. 
Another result was that borrowers with positive private information decided to 
pledge more collateral. In doing this they can signal their quality to the borrowers. 
This especially applies when the relationship to the lending bank was short, and the 
bank does not know enough about the good quality of the borrower. These results 
imply that the ex ante theories only apply for borrowers with no or a relatively short 
lending relationship to the bank. For these borrowers, asymmetric information 
problems were more severe. The length of the lending relationship was detected to be 
negatively related to the demand for collateral.  
For the present research, the study of Menkhoff et al. (2012) is of certain interest. 
The authors examined the role of third-party guarantees and relationship lending 
substituting for missing collateral.  They analysed a sample of overall 1,671 loans to 
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rural households in north-eastern Thailand based on a household survey in 2007. The 
households in the survey also operated as small entrepreneurs. Menkhoff et al. 
(2012) referred to third-party guarantees that can be pledged as collateral if not 
enough business or private collateral is available. These guarantees help to mitigate 
an expected loss for the lender but are not considered to solve moral hazard 
problems. Another mechanism to overcome the lack of collateral mentioned by the 
authors is relationship lending. By using probit regressions, the authors concluded 
that third-party guarantees and existing lending relationships frequently acted as 
substitutes for business or personal collateral and improved the access to bank 
lending. In respect of the significance of both substitutes, they concluded that third-
party guarantees were more important to facilitate the access to bank loans. 
Regarding the impact of the inclusion of a third-party guarantee on the occurrence of 
moral hazard, they could not make a definitive statement. However, they found that 
the inclusion of the collateral substitutes had no significant impact on the default risk 
of the lenders. The weakness of the study is that only 15 per cent of the loans within 
the sample provided any form of collateral, and that the authors did not clearly 
distinguish between loans for consumptions needs of the households and production 
needs for the entrepreneurs. However, they distinguished between third-party 
guarantees and other collateral which is also of interest in the present research.  
The presented literature about the significance of collateral in bank lending to firms 
has illustrated the connection between information asymmetries and the need for 
collateral. Banks require more collateral when not enough information about the 
borrowers is available (Gonas et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2011a). Guarantees from the 
guarantee bank are required when borrowers cannot provide sufficient collateral. 
Without those guarantees, the firms would not have obtained the loans and, therefore, 
would have to face credit restrictions. Therefore, it seems promising to evaluate 
whether the provision of the guarantee which enables the provision of a loan in the 
first place results in a reduction of information asymmetries and finally in mitigating 
credit restrictions for SMEs. This is the focus of the conceptual papers about the 
ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to foster learning (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 
2003; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). Due to the provision of guarantees, 
commercial banks were enabled to provide loans to SMEs that the banks do not have 
enough valuable information about. Over the course of time, they get the opportunity 
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to collect more valuable information and reduce existing information asymmetries. If 
this works, this might end up in a reduction of credit restrictions in the long term.  
The above cited studies of Berger et al. (2011b) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) have also 
highlighted another interesting connection. They confirmed a positive correlation 
between the existence or the duration of a lending relationship and the provision of 
information. This relationship is also mentioned in the conceptual papers about the 
ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the lending behaviour of banks that were 
discussed in Section 2.2.3 (Craig et al., 2008). The impact of lending relationships on 
the reduction of asymmetric information has been the subject of several studies. 
Since relationship lending might also play a role in the context of the present 
research, the following section will provide a selection of existing literature about 
that topic. 
2.5 Lending relationships 
The results of the studies of Berger et al. (2011b) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) in 
Section 2.4 have revealed the impact of lending relationships on the loan availability 
and collateral requirements for firms. Relationship lending is considered as “…one 
of the most powerful technologies available to reduce information problems” (Berger 
and Udell 2002, p. F32) in SME lending. Relationship lending can mitigate 
information asymmetries by developing private or soft information about, e.g. the 
creditworthiness, a firm´s financial prospects and owner characteristics over time. 
This information can help to better assess the risk of the borrower to make a decision 
about whether to grant a loan to a firm and with which conditions (Menkhoff et al., 
2012; Diamond, 1984; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2002; Kano 
et al., 2011; Behr et al., 2011). Table 2.7 contains crucial and current literature about 
relationship lending that will be explained in more detail in this section.  
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Table 2.7: Selected literature about relationship lending 
Details Research topic Key findings 
Authors: Behr et al. (2011) 
 
Sample: 30,100 loan 
applications between 2000 
and 2006 in Mosambique 
 
Methods: Probit 
regressions 
Objective: 
To evaluate the impact of 
lending relationships on loan 
decisions. 
The authors found a positive impact on 
lending relationships on the 
availability of bank loans for micro 
and small firms and the reduction of 
information asymmetries.  
Author: Berger, Udell 
(1995) 
 
Sample: About 3,400 
businesses in USA (1988 – 
1989) 
 
Methods: Regression 
analysis 
The authors examined the 
influence of customer-bank 
relationships on loan interest 
rate and collateral 
requirements. 
They found that firms with lending 
relationships had to pledge less 
collateral. Moreover, they found that 
the interest rates decreased as a 
function of duration of the 
relationship. 
Author: Cole (1998) 
 
Sample: 5,365 small 
businesses (USA, 1993) 
 
Methods: Multivariate 
logistic regression analysis 
The author examined the 
direct impact of lending 
relationships on the 
likelihood that a lender 
denies or extends a loan. 
His results confirmed a positive impact 
of lending relationships on the 
availability of credit as well as on the 
generation of valuable private 
information. He also found that the 
probability that the lender will extend 
was negatively correlated to the 
number of financial services used. 
Author: Harhoff, Körting 
(1998) 
 
Sample: 1,509 German 
SMEs 
 
Methods: Interviews, multi-
variate regression analysis 
The authors examined the 
impact of lending 
relationships on the 
availability, cost and 
collateral requirements of 
German SMEs. 
The authors found that lending 
relationships improve credit 
availability, collateral requirements 
and interest rates for SMEs. The 
results suggest that lending 
relationships had a greater positive 
impact on credit availability and 
collateral requirements than on interest 
rates/price.  
Author: Petersen, Rajan 
(1994) 
 
Sample: 3,404 businesses 
(USA, 1988-1989) 
 
Methods: Regression 
analysis 
The authors examined how 
customer-bank relationships 
affect the cost and 
availability of funds to the 
firm. 
They found no relation between the 
length of a lending relationship and the 
price of credit. However, they found 
that credit availability increased with 
the length of a lending relationship.  
 
Some studies exist about relationship lending. Two of the most important ones are 
those of Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994). Both studies 
analysed data from the U.S. National Survey of Small Business Finance. The data 
was obtained by telephone interviews in 1988 and 1989. Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
examined the effect of lending relationships on cost and availability of funds for 
firms with fewer than 500 employees. By conducting regression analysis, they could 
not find any relation between the length of a lending relationship and the price of 
credit. However, they found that credit availability increased with the length of a 
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lending relationship. The authors pointed out the difficulties to measure credit 
availability as it could not be determined whether a firm had no loan because it did 
not need one or because it was credit rationed (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). For that 
reason they used the extent of trade credit paid late as an indicator for credit 
availability. Trade credit is probably one of the most expensive external sources of 
finance (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). Therefore, an extensive use of trade credit can 
be considered as indicator for credit constraints, Petersen and Rajan stated. As not all 
firms in the sample received trade credit, they had to cut down their sample size to 
less than one third of the initial sample (1,119 of 3,404). The findings of Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) confirmed a positive impact of lending relationships on credit 
availability for SMEs. Nevertheless, the indirect measurement and the reduction of 
the sample can be considered as one weakness of the study. 
Berger and Udell (1995) noted that another weakness of the above study is that the 
authors combined various types of loans in their interest rate regression. They 
decided to concentrate on one particular type of loan to provide cleaner results. 
Berger and Udell (1995) used the same data set as the one used by Petersen and 
Rajan (1994). They tested whether lending relationships had some influence on the 
interest rate charged and the collateral requirements. They also used regression 
analysis and indeed found that SMEs with longer customer-bank relationships had to 
pay lower interest rates and pledged less collateral than other small firms. Based on 
their empirical results, they also observed the ability of banks to accumulate private 
information about the firms over the duration of the lending relationship (Berger and 
Udell, 1995).  
Another study about relationship lending based on data of the U.S. National Survey 
of Small Business Finances was undertaken by Cole (1998). In contrast to Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), Cole used data from the 1993 survey 
which “…provides a larger, richer, and more timely dataset…” (Cole 1998, p. 961). 
Cole tested whether lending relationships have a positive impact on the provision of 
loans to SMEs. He analysed whether or not SMEs were extended loans as he 
considered this to be a more intuitive and direct measure than analyzing trade credit 
(see Petersen and Rajan 1994). Moreover, he analysed different dimension of the 
lending relationship (saving accounts, checking accounts, financial services, loans). 
Cole also ran regression analysis and found that lending relationships generate 
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valuable private information and, therefore, are improving the likelihood that a 
lender will extend loans to SMEs (Cole, 1998). What he failed to analyse is the 
question of what impact lending relationships have on the terms of credit. This can 
be described as one weakness of the study as it is not only important if firms get 
credit but also with which terms. Banks might provide a loan but with 
disproportionately high interest rates or the loan amount provided is remarkably 
lower than the loan amount the firm needed and applied for. If interest rates and 
conditions are unfavourable, this will not mitigate financial distress for SMEs.  
Harhoff and Körting (1998) tried to provide a more complete analysis. They 
examined the impact of lending relationships on the availability, cost and collateral 
requirements of German SMEs. The authors used data from a 1997 survey of 1,509 
German SMEs conducted by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit-rating firm. 
Based on this data, the authors conducted face-to-face interviews. The questionnaire 
they created for the interviews was very similar to the one used by the U.S. National 
Survey of Small Business Finances. Harhoff and Körting (1998) confirmed that 
lending relationships improved collateral requirements as well as credit availability 
for small firms. They even found that lending relationships positively affected the 
interest rates charged for SMEs. However, the effect on interest rates appeared to be 
less strong (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
The more recent study of Behr et al. (2011) analysed a sample of around 30,100 loan 
applications by 15,000 micro and small firms in Mozambique between 2000 and 
2006. The sample contained information about the rejection or acceptance of the loan 
applications and allowed them to analyse the impact of lending relationships on the 
loan decision. Moreover, information about collateral pledged was available. The 
authors applied probit regressions. The number of loans granted per potential 
borrowers acted as proxy for the intensity of the lending relationship. This allowed 
measuring the relationship between lending relationship and access to bank loans for 
the firms of the sample. The results of the analyses demonstrated that the likelihood 
of obtaining loans increases with the duration of a lending relationship. Moreover, 
borrowers with longer lending relationships had to pledge less collateral. The 
analysis showed that not all borrowers obtained a loan. Only around 70 per cent of 
all applications were accepted. Regarding the risk of the lenders measured by the 
default rates the results indicated that borrowers that received more than two loans 
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were not less risky than borrowers that received only one loan. The authors 
concluded that banks monitored borrowers more intensively when they were new to 
the bank. At that stage, the information asymmetries were the most severe. After the 
first loan had been provided, the banks could learn much about the borrower and 
obtained more information for a second loan decision. Borrowers benefitted from the 
reduction of information asymmetries and the learning effect of the banks when 
applying for further loans. Another result of the study was that smaller and younger 
firms, that are the most opaque benefitted most from lending relationships and 
learning effects of the banks.  
All the studies presented here confirm a positive impact of lending relationships on 
the access to finance. Lending relationships reduce the need for collateral and help to 
overcome information asymmetries. This underlines the importance of creating a 
relationship to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. However, referring to the 
specific research focus of the present study and the evaluation of the process of 
learning initiated by the provision of guarantees from Credit Guarantee Schemes, it 
can be stated that the weakness of all existing literature is the fact that it has not been 
tested whether guarantee schemes can initiate the creation of a customer-bank 
relationship. Therefore, this aspect has been included in the present research to fill 
this gap. 
2.6  Research questions and propositions  
The extensive literature review builds the basis of the present research. The research 
is based on the conceptual papers about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes 
presented in Section 2.2.3. These papers mainly explained how Credit Guarantee 
Schemes might or should help to overcome credit restrictions for SMEs. Credit 
restrictions for SMEs arise from a higher default risk that is associated with SMEs. 
This association is often due to the fact that commercial banks cannot generate 
sufficient information about the businesses which applies especially for start-ups, and 
that the business success is uncertain (Levenson and Willard, 2000). The problem of 
asymmetric information especially arises for young or new firms that have no track 
record (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Another reason is that SMEs often have no 
audited annual statements. Thus, they cannot prove their creditworthiness to the 
banks (Columba et al., 2010; Behr and Guettler, 2007). To limit the risk for the 
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lender, SMEs may provide collateral to the commercial banks. However, especially 
young and small firms often do not have sufficient valuable assets to pledge (Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998). Another reason for the restricted access to bank loans for SMEs 
is the associated costs. SMEs tend to apply for lower loan amounts than bigger firms 
do. Since every credit assessment causes overhead costs, the costs for SME loans are 
comparatively higher for commercial banks (Beck et al., 2010; Bosse, 2009). 
The central aim of Credit Guarantee Schemes is to provide guarantees to reduce 
existing credit restrictions and to make available loans to SMEs that these firms 
otherwise would not have obtained (Honohan, 2010; Beck et al., 2010). The question 
is how exactly this works and whether the provision of guarantees really helps to 
overcome credit restrictions for SMEs. 
The majority of the overall risk of each guarantee provided by a guarantee bank is 
covered by the federal states and the federal government. To justify the risk-bearing, 
it is important to analyse whether guarantee banks really help to overcome credit 
restrictions for SMEs. Moreover, it is important to find out whether the provision of 
a guarantee is a singular or a steady and repetitive mechanism. Guarantee banks 
should be interested in establishing a basis for once credit restricted SMEs to 
overcome these restrictions and to reach a position in which the firms can obtain 
bank loans under their own power. The literature review has demonstrated that this 
has not been analysed so far.  
The conceptual studies about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the 
lending behaviour of banks provided the theoretical basis for the present research. It 
has been demonstrated in Section 2.2.3 that most of the presented studies referred to 
the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to foster the creation of information about 
SMEs by the lending banks. Since the provision of a guarantee makes available a 
loan in the first place, it is assumed that the commercial bank uses this opportunity to 
collect additional information and therefore reduce existing information asymmetries 
over the course of time (Craig et al., 2008; Vogel and Adams, 1997). The review of 
literature about information asymmetries has revealed a close connection between 
information and the use of collateral. Collateral can act as substitute for information 
(Steijvers et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2011a). Since guarantees from Credit Guarantee 
Schemes act as collateral for the lending banks, the provision of a guarantee 
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mitigates the existence of information asymmetries and makes available a loan to a 
SME that it otherwise would not have received (Green, 2003).  
For a better understanding of the relationship between information, collateral and the 
provision of a loan, the components for evaluating credit risk will be explained in 
more detail. The consequences of loan defaults can be divided into expected losses 
and unexpected losses6. Since defaults can partly be predicted with a particular 
statistical probability, the concomitant losses have to be calculated and considered 
when loan decisions are made and loan prices are calculated. The part of a loss that 
can be predicted is called expected loss (EL). It is calculated by multiplying the 
exposure at default (EaD), the loss given default (LGD), and the probability of 
default (PD) of a loan.  
EL = EaD x LGD x PD 
The exposure at default is defined by the expected outstanding liabilities of the 
lender towards the borrower in case of default. The loss given default is the part of 
the exposure at default that will not be paid back by the borrower in default in the 
case of a default. It is calculated by subtracting the recovery rate from 1. The 
recovery rate is determined by the collateral pledged by the borrower (Daldrup, 
2005; Schierenbeck et al., 2008; Becker and Peppmeier, 2013). Consequently, the 
value of collateral has a direct impact on the recovery rate and the expected loss. To 
quantify the recovery rate, banks analyse the possible impacts of the value of the 
collateral pledged. In this regard, banks evaluate whether the value of collateral itself 
is expected to be impaired by the default of a borrower. The probability of default is 
the expected probability that a borrower defaults. The probability of default is 
defined by the creditworthiness of a borrower and is calculated by scoring systems of 
the borrower (internal rating) or rating agencies (external rating) (Schulte and 
Horsch, 2004; Schierenbeck et al., 2008). For SMEs, scoring systems evaluate hard 
facts like the financial state of the firm, the profit situation and financial key figures. 
Moreover, soft facts or private information (both terms can be used synonymously) 
like the quality of the management, the tradesman’s morality and the reliability of the 
business owner is assessed. The results allow a classification according to the 
                                                 
6 The unexpected loss is measured by the Credit Value at Risk and defines the potential variance from 
the expected loss (Becker and Peppmeier, 2013). It is not calculated for a single loan but for the whole 
loan portfolio of a bank and, therefore, will not be explained in detail.  
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predicted ability of timely repaying the obligations as a borrower (Bösch, 2009). The 
above highlighted equation builds the basis for calculating the standard risk costs the 
lenders will charge when a loan will be provided.  
For a thorough assessment of the creditworthiness, information about the borrower 
and the SME is needed. However, the already discussed information asymmetries of 
SMEs lead to difficulties in evaluating the expected probability of default of these 
firms. Many SMEs have no financial reporting systems and, therefore, cannot 
provide the hard facts needed for a thorough assessment of the creditworthiness 
(Beck et al. 2010; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Moreover, soft information about the borrower can only be generated over the course 
of time.  Especially for start-ups or young firms, soft information is not available and 
cannot be assessed. The given uncertainty may lead to a more cautious estimation 
which results in a worse probability of default and higher standard risk costs for 
borrowing. The same applies when SMEs cannot provide sufficient valuable 
collateral. Valuable collateral reduces the loss given default and therefore the 
expected loss and the standard risk costs. Thus, for a younger firm or start-up, a lack 
of collateral leads to a higher expected loss. Consequently, asymmetric information 
and a lack of sufficient valuable collateral can result in credit restrictions for SMEs.   
According to the existing conceptual literature, the present research will assess 
whether the provision of a guarantee can mitigate the above mentioned credit 
restrictions. It is assumed that the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
reduces the expected loss of a borrower and makes available a loan in the first place. 
The guarantee of the guarantee bank provides collateral that is independent from the 
financial and economic situation of the borrower. In this regard guarantees from a 
guarantee bank are labeled secure securities. The guarantee is backed up by the 
Federal Government and the Federal State. This means that the default of the 
borrower will not have a negative impact on the value of the collateral. This raised 
the Recovery Rate calculated for the loan and reduces the expected loss. Moreover, 
the probability of default of the guarantee bank can better be assessed than the 
probability of default of many SMEs. Guarantee banks exist for several years and 
provide financial statements which allow a thorough assessment of the expected 
probability of default for the warrantor. Additionally, guarantee banks are public 
institutions which are widely related to a low probability of default in Germany. 
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Consequently, a guarantee from a guarantee bank can reduce the loss given default 
and the probability of default and therefore reduce the expected loss of a loan which 
allows the provision of the loan in the first place.  
Therefore, the provision of a guarantee is expected to have a direct and immediate 
impact on the access to bank loans for SMEs. In this regard, the provision of a 
guarantee from a guarantee scheme has a short-term impact on the loan availability 
for SMEs. However, it is the question of whether a guarantee scheme can mitigate 
credit restrictions for SMEs in a sustainable way. The literature about the ability of 
Credit Guarantee Schemes to reduce credit restrictions is mainly concentrated on the 
long-term perspective. According to this, the provision of a guarantee offers the 
possibility to the lending banks to collect private information about the borrower. 
This aspect is concentrated directly on the exchange of information between the 
lending bank and the borrower. The exchange of information between the guarantee 
scheme and the borrower will not help to overcome credit restrictions in a sustainable 
way because Credit Guarantee Schemes do not provide loans to SMEs. Therefore, 
this is not considered to play a crucial role in an investigation about the ability of 
commercial banks in altering their lending behaviour. Credit Guarantee Schemes are 
merely the instrument to initiate the expected processes. 
The literature review has also revealed a close connection between information 
asymmetries and lending relationships (Craig et al., 2008). Lending relationships 
between the borrower and the lender foster the lender’s generation of information 
about the borrower (Cole, 1998). Consequently, the reduction of information 
asymmetries and the creation of a lending relationship can be considered as being 
favourable for the mitigation of credit restrictions for SMEs. Bringing this into the 
context of the impact of the German Credit Guarantee Scheme and its ability to alter 
the lending behaviour of commercial banks is the main objective of the present 
research which is as follows:  
Research objective: 
To reveal whether the provision of a guarantee from a German guarantee bank can 
initiate a learning process on the side of the commercial bank which helps to mitigate 
existing information asymmetries concerning SMEs, supports the building of a long-
term customer-bank relationship and helps to overcome credit restrictions.  
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The objective of the present research has been derived from the detected research 
gaps in the existing literature about Credit Guarantee Schemes in general, the 
German guarantee banks in particular, and the role of information asymmetries, 
collateral and lending relationships. It is a combination of different factors that have 
not been combined and analysed so far. Based on this literature, a framework of the 
expected process of learning has been derived which is illustrated in figure 2.1 
below. 
Figure 2.1: Learning process 
Bank denies loan to SME  
High LGD related to lack of collateral High PD related to lack of sufficient 
information  
High EL 
 
Guarantee bank provides guarantee 
Guarantee reduces LGD  Guarantee reduces PD 
Lower EL 
 
Bank provides loan to SME 
 
Learning process 
Bank collects information about 
borrowers 
SME learns what information is needed to 
get access to bank loans 
A lending relationship can be created 
 
SME receives loan without guarantee 
SME has grown and own valuable 
collateral is available (LGS reduces) 
Collection of information allows thorough 
assessment of the SME (PD reduces) 
Source: Own illustration 
 
However, the learning process is much more complex. Therefore, Figure 2.2 is 
enhanced by the main key factors that are expected to play a crucial role within the 
learning process. The key factors are derived from the literature presented in the 
literature review. Each key factor is explained in more detail and the related research 
questions and propositions are presented in the following.  
 
 
78 
 
Figure 2.2: Key factors and their role within the process of learning  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
A thorough assessment of the expected probability of default of a loan can be 
exacerbated when a SME cannot provide sufficient hard and soft information about 
the business. Moreover, the loss given default is higher for SMEs that cannot provide 
own valuable collateral. A higher loss given default and a higher probability of 
default result in a higher expected loss (Schierenbeck et al., 2008). When the 
expected loss is too high, a bank will not provide a loan to a SME. In such a 
situation, the lack of collateral and information asymmetries can result in credit 
restrictions for a SME (Reize, 2011; Beck et al., 2010; Reize, 2005). Relatively high 
costs related to relatively low loan amounts can also lead to credit restrictions for 
SMEs. SMEs typically apply for lower loan amounts than bigger firms. However, the 
overhead costs for assessing a loan application are the same. Therefore, SME lending 
is less profitable for banks (Beck et al., 2010; Bosse, 2009; Cressy, 2002). For this 
reason, loans to SMEs might not be provided.  
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In these situations, guarantees from guarantee banks might facilitate SME lending. 
As a consequence, this is the starting point for the present research. The first step is 
to evaluate why and under which circumstances guarantees from the guarantee 
scheme promote the provision of loans to SMEs. Consequently, this is the first 
research question that shall be answered in the present research: 
Research question 1: 
For what reason and in which situation are guarantees from the guarantee bank 
important for the provision of loans to SMEs? 
 
The research question will be answered by testing three propositions. The literature 
review and the information about SME lending provided in the introduction imply 
that the reasons for credit restrictions of SMEs are market imperfections that arise 
from asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Akerlof, 1970). The lack of 
sufficient information about a borrower allows no thorough assessment of the 
probability of default (Beck et al., 2010; Cressy, 2006). Therefore, banks might deny 
loans to SMEs or make a conservative assessment that leads to a higher probability 
of default. Consequently, the default risk of these firms tends to be higher.   
Collateral is perceived to reduce the default risk for the lending banks and to act as a 
signalling device for the quality of the borrowers (Berger et al., 2011b; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Collateral defines the loss given default of a loan. When a borrower 
can provide sufficient valuable collateral, the loss given default and therefore the 
expected loss of a loan is lower. However, SMEs often do not have enough valuable 
collateral that can be pledged. This might result in restricted access to bank finance 
for SMEs. Credit Guarantee Schemes have been implemented to overcome these 
threats and to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). The aim of the schemes is to bridge the lack of 
collateral and, therefore, enable otherwise credit restricted SMEs to obtain bank 
loans (Menkhoff et al., 2012). The provision of collateral in the form of a guarantee 
reduces the expected loss for the lending banks. The reduction of the expected loss 
may lead to moral hazard on the part of the banks because banks are more willing to 
provide loans to riskier projects. In addition, the inclusion of a third-party guarantee 
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may also increase moral hazard on the part of the borrowers (Uesugi et al., 2010; 
Green, 2003).  
Based on the above explained assumptions, the first two propositions have been 
derived: 
P1: SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank loans because of a higher default risk 
and a lack of collateral.  
P2a: Providing a guarantee acts as a substitute for collateral and allows SMEs to 
receive a bank loan. 
 
Additionally, Credit Guarantee Schemes are considered to make SME lending more 
profitable by reducing administrative costs for the lending banks (Green, 2003; 
Manove et al., 2001). Since SMEs typically apply for relatively low loan amounts, 
SME lending is perceived to be less profitable than lending to bigger firms (Bosse, 
2009; Riding et al., 2007). Existing conceptual literature assumes that lenders might 
transfer the screening and monitoring to the guarantor. This would reduce the costs 
for the lender and make SME lending more profitable (Green, 2003; Levitsky, 
1997a). To assess whether guarantees can increase the profitability of SME lending 
for commercial banks, proposition 2b will be tested: 
P2b: Including a guarantee from the guarantee bank makes SME loans more 
profitable for the banks. 
 
The reduction of the lack of collateral and the default risk as well as the impact on 
the profits of the commercial banks are considered to take place in the moment the 
guarantee is provided and, therefore, to have an impact on the immediate access to 
bank finance. A reduction of information asymmetries between the commercial bank 
and the borrower, however, can only take place over the course of time and is 
considered to be one of the main factors for the bank’s process of learning and a 
sustainable mitigation of credit restrictions for SMEs. A learning process that has 
been activated by the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank can only 
operate when learning on the side of the commercial banks takes place. Learning is 
initiated by the creation of private information. This leads to the next research 
question: 
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Research question 2: 
Can the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank help to reduce information 
asymmetries between the lending bank and the borrower? 
Vogel and Adams (1996) and Craig at al. (2008) described Credit Guarantee 
Schemes as a practical instrument to foster the production of information about the 
borrowers by the lending banks. To reduce information asymmetries, information 
about the borrowers has to be generated. The provision of a guarantee from a 
guarantee scheme is considered to make available a SME loan in the first place. The 
provision of the loan builds the basis for creating information about the borrower by 
the lending bank. When the exchange of information is increased over the course of 
time, information asymmetries might be mitigated and SME access to bank loans 
increased in the future. Consequently, it has to be determined whether a lending bank 
collects more information about the borrower after the loan has been provided. Two 
general types of information can be collected: hard facts and soft facts. Hard facts are 
mainly related to the financial situation of a firm. This information can be generated 
over time by regularly assessing financial key figures and observing the profit 
situation over the years. Soft facts are related to the quality of the management and 
the trustworthiness of the borrower (Bösch, 2009). This information has to be 
collected by steadily communicating with the borrower. The aim is to find out 
whether SMEs that initially needed a guarantee from a guarantee bank to obtain a 
bank loan can graduate to borrowers without guarantee in the future. Therefore, the 
research is concentrated on the reduction of information asymmetries between the 
SMEs and the banks that provide loans (commercial banks). The analysis of a 
reduction of information asymmetries between SMEs and guarantee banks will be 
unproductive for the present research. This would not help to answer the question 
about whether a process of learning on the side of the commercial banks can be 
initiated which results in a situation where SMEs obtain loans without the support of 
the guarantee bank.  
It is not only important to evaluate the amount of information but also the value of 
the information that can be collected. Information asymmetries could only be 
reduced when new and useful information about the borrower can be aggregated. 
Whether this can really achieved has been evaluated by testing the following 
proposition: 
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P3a: SMEs provide more information and more regular information to the lending 
bank as a consequence of obtaining the guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
 
The literature review has demonstrated that the reduction of information asymmetries 
is often related to the establishment of a lending relationship. Lending relationships 
help to overcome asymmetric information and might lower the requirements for 
collateral  (Berger and Udell, 2002). Lending relationships are characterized by a 
close contact between lenders and borrowers. A close contact is often related to more 
communication and an increased exchange of information. The more a borrower 
talks to the bank, the more can be learned about his or her business. The lender can 
learn about the management qualities of the borrower. Moreover, the lender can learn 
whether the borrower timely discusses problems or threats for the business with the 
lending bank. This provides important soft facts about the borrower and helps to 
create a relationship of trust. Therefore, the creation or the intensification of the 
relationship between the borrower and the commercial bank can be considered as 
being supportive for the reduction of information asymmetries and vice versa. The 
provision of a guarantee from a guarantee scheme makes available a loan to a SME 
in the first place. Consequently, it builds the basis for the establishment of a lending 
relationship. To find out whether lending relationships can really be created as a 
consequence of the loan provision is part of the following research question: 
Research question 3: 
Has a new lending relationship been created due to the provision of the loan with 
guarantee? 
To evaluate this, the following proposition has been tested: 
P3b: Increased information supports the creation of a bank-borrower relationship. 
 
This leads to the end of the expected learning process: the mitigation of credit 
restrictions for SMEs. The framework of the learning process predicts that the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank alleviates the main problems of 
restricted access to bank finance for SMEs - collateral, default risk and costs - 
directly. Moreover, it helps to reduce information asymmetries and the creation of a 
lending relationship over time. When the learning process takes place as assumed, 
83 
 
this will lead to a sustainable amelioration of the access to bank loans for SMEs. 
Therefore, the final research question is: 
Research question 4: 
Do German guarantee banks help to overcome credit restrictions for SMEs?   
The research question is phrased in a way that it addresses both, the sustainable and 
long-term mitigation of credit restrictions as well as the mitigation in a single case. 
The existing literature about lending relationships has demonstrated a positive impact 
on credit availability for SMEs (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Behr et al., 2011) and on 
the collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
When a learning process takes place, banks can better evaluate the default risk of 
SMEs and manage SME loans more profitably (Green, 2003). Whether this takes 
place in the case of the German guarantee scheme has been tested with the last 
proposition: 
P4: Guarantee banks help to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. 
 
Only when all propositions can be confirmed can the learning process be confirmed 
as a whole. 
To allow a better understanding of the present research, Table 2.8 provides an 
overview about the research questions and propositions that have been evaluated. 
Table 2.8: Research questions and propositions 
Research Question Propositions 
For what reasons and in which situations 
are guarantees from the guarantee bank 
important for the provision of loans to 
SMEs? 
P1: SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank 
loans because of a higher default risk and lack 
of collateral. 
P2a: Providing a guarantee acts as a substitute 
for collateral and allows SMEs to receive a bank 
loan. 
P2b: Including a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank makes SME loans more profitable for 
banks. 
Can the provision of a guarantee from a 
guarantee banks help to reduce 
information asymmetries between the 
lending bank and the borrower? 
P3a: SMEs provide more information and more 
regular information to the lending bank as a 
consequence of obtaining the guarantee from 
the guarantee bank. 
Has a new lending relationship been 
created due to the loan with guarantee? 
P3b: Increased information supports the creation 
of a bank-borrower relationship. 
Do credit guarantee schemes help to 
overcome credit restrictions for SMEs? 
P4: Guarantee banks help to mitigate credit 
restrictions for SMEs. 
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The propositions can be integrated in the process of learning that is analysed in the 
present research. This allows a better understanding of the whole research aim. 
Figure 2.3 contains the inclusion of the research propositions in the above illustrated 
learning process. 
Figure 2.3: Integration of the research proposition in the learning process 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
2.7 Summary 
The literature review has revealed the weakness of the existing research to evaluate 
the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to alter the lending behaviour of banks.  A 
conceptual framework exists concerning the ability to alter the lending behaviour of 
banks. However, none of the existing research has tested whether a certain Credit 
Guarantee Scheme really achieves a change in the lending behaviour of banks and 
sustainably mitigates the credit restrictions for SMEs. This clearly illustrates the need 
for empirical research. To fill this gap is the main aim of the present study.  
Lack of 
collateral 
Costs / profit Default risk caused by 
information asymmetries 
 
Credit restrictions 
German guarantee banks 
facilitate access to bank loans  
 
Default risk 
 
Lack of 
collateral 
Costs / profit Information 
asymmetries 
 
Moral hazard 
Relationship 
lending 
 
Immediate access to 
bank loans 
Sustainable access to 
bank loans 
Initial situation 
M
ain learning process 
P1 
P2a P2b 
P4 
P3b 
P3a 
85 
 
What the studies mentioned so far disregard is the question of whether banks refuse 
lending to all kinds of SMEs or whether banks need to learn about problems and 
businesses of all SMEs regardless of sector or owner characteristics. It may also be 
that there are some SMEs that obtain loans without any restrictions. If so, one could 
conclude that the lending behaviour of banks must not be altered for SMEs generally 
and that lending relationships are not important for SMEs in general. From another 
point of view this may also mean that for some SMEs the lending behaviour cannot 
be altered because the general conditions, of a sector e.g., may be so severe that a 
bank will never take the risk for a loan without guarantee even if a lending 
relationship would exist. This has not been tested to date.  
Summing up, the present research seeks to extend the existing literature about Credit 
Guarantee Schemes by analysing whether a learning process, as shown in Figure 2.2, 
can be activated due to the existence of a Credit Guarantee Scheme. To the author’s 
best knowledge, this process has not been analysed so far. It also expands the 
existing literature by concentrating on both the banks that provide the loans as well 
as the SMEs that obtained the loans. Besides the contribution about Credit Guarantee 
Schemes, the present research enriches the evaluation of the German guarantee 
scheme which has not been analysed much so far.  
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3 Research methodology and design 
This section provides detailed information about the research methods that have been 
applied to investigate the research questions. Section 3.1 contains detailed 
information about methods and the methodology of the present research. Since the 
research applied quantitative as well as qualitative research methods, two sections 
illustrate the research methods that have been applied. Section 3.2 outlines the 
quantitative research consisting of a web survey with SMEs that have obtained a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank in Hesse. Section 3.3 provides information about 
the qualitative research that has been conducted to evaluate the significance of the 
guarantee banks from the commercial banks’ perspective. 
3.1  Research methods and methodology 
The purpose of the research is to evaluate whether the provision of a guarantee from 
the guarantee bank can initiate a learning process on the side of the lending banks. 
Existing literature about SME financing has demonstrated potential reasons for credit 
restrictions of SMEs like higher default risk associated with SME lending 
(Creditreform 2013; Beck et al. 2010; Stefanovic 2009; Coco 2000), information 
asymmetries (Beck et al. 2010; Zimmermann 2006; Petersen and Rajan 1994), lack 
of valuable collateral (Columba et al. 2010; Harhoff and Körting 1998) and lower 
profitability for the lender (Beck et al. 2010; Bosse 2009; Ridings et al. 2007). The 
expected learning process is assumed to reduce asymmetric information and risk for 
the lender, make SME lending more profitable and facilitate the access to bank 
finance for SMEs. Hence, the research aims to address the difficulties some SMEs 
face when applying for a bank loan and to find out whether guarantee banks help to 
overcome these difficulties. In other words, the research addresses “…practical 
problems in the ‘real world’…” (Feilzer 2010, p. 8). The researcher accepts that the 
knowledge provided by the study is not absolute but rather relative. In sum, this all is 
very typical for the philosophy of pragmatism (Feilzer, 2010; Scott and Briggs, 2009; 
Morgan, 2007). Moreover, pragmatism is typically related to research about learning 
within the business sector (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Pragmatism considers 
various standpoints, positions or perspectives. Pragmatists espouse to efficiently 
apply qualitative as well as quantitative research methods to conduct practical 
research (Cameron, 2011; Sommer Harrits, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007). As opposed 
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to positivism which is typically exclusively related to quantitative research or 
constructivism which is commonly related to qualitative research, pragmatism is the 
philosophy which is primarily related to mixed methods research (Heyvaert et al., 
2013; Cameron, 2011; Mertens, 2010; Johnson et al., 2007; Bryman, 2007). In mixed 
methods research, qualitative and quantitative research methods are combined. The 
combination can occur at different stages within a research study like the formulation 
of the research questions or the collection, analysis or interpretation of the data 
(Bryman, 2006; Johnson et al., 2007). Rationales often mentioned for combining 
qualitative and quantitative research are the generation of a better understanding of 
the phenomena under investigation and to improve the value of the final conclusions 
(Molina-Azorín, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Greene et al., 2001). In the present 
research, a web survey with SMEs and semi-structured interviews with bank 
managers were conducted. The mixed methods approach was applied to combine the 
advantages of qualitative and quantitative research. The quantitative approach of 
conducting a web survey provided the opportunity to reach a larger population within 
a relatively short period of time (Abernethy et al., 1999; Simsek and Veiga, 2000). 
Moreover, it allowed ensuring anonymity which was expected to be very important 
for the respondents. The qualitative approach, however, enabled the researcher to 
learn about thinking and behaviour of the respondents (Malhotra, 2010; Saunders et 
al., 2009). In addition, semi-structured interviews were considered helpful to gain the 
trust of the interviewees and reduce the risk of response bias (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  
The research follows a deductive approach (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al., 
2009). From an extensive literature review, a framework for the expected learning 
process and the assumed impact on SME lending has been derived. The literature 
review has demonstrated that this framework has never been empirically tested. This 
gap shall be filled by evaluating SMEs that obtained a guarantee from a German 
guarantee bank as well as commercial banks that provided loans including a 
guarantee to SMEs. Regarding these research objects, the analysis of existing data 
did not seem promising. Official data about firms that received a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank was not available. The same applied for information about which 
banks have already provided loans including a guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
Consequently, new data had to be generated.  
88 
 
Regarding the evaluation of SMEs, it was decided to address all firms that received a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank Hesse within a predetermined period of time 
(more details about the sample and the time frame is given in Section 3.2.4 below). 
To reach a relatively “…large quantity of ‘generalisable’ data…” (Abernethy et al. 
1999, p. 7) within a short period of time, a questionnaire approach seemed to be 
appropriate. In SME research, questionnaires are considered as an effective form of 
data collection (Newby et al., 2003; Bartholomew and Smith, 2006). Secondary 
published data about small businesses is scarce (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006). One 
of the advantages of a questionnaire is the small expense in time and cost (Simsek 
and Veiga, 2000). Another advantage is the fact that questionnaires are often 
perceived to be more anonymous than interviews. As the present research seeks to 
obtain information about sensitive data, anonymity is a very important factor. 
Additionally, it was decided to provide a self-administered questionnaire since these 
are considered to be more convenient for respondents as speed and date of 
completion can be chosen individually (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Simsek and Veiga, 
2000). One disadvantage of self-administered questionnaires is that respondents have 
no opportunity to ask questions for better understanding (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
These uncertainties can be reduced to a minimum by comprehensive pretesting 
(Saunders et al., 2009) which has been done in this study and will be explained in 
detail later. Another disadvantage is the uncertainty about who exactly answered the 
questionnaire (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In the present survey, respondents had to 
state their function within the firm. This helped to eliminate the problem. 
After the decision was made to use a questionnaire for evaluating SMEs in the 
present research, it had to be determined how to distribute the questionnaires. This 
could be done by postal mail or by using the internet. For facilitating the decision, 
Table 3.1 was created which compared the two types of questionnaires applicable for 
the present research. Those rows that are highlighted in grey were considered to be 
more favourable. 
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Table 3.1: Postal questionnaire vs. web survey 
 Postal questionnaire Web survey 
Expenditure of 
time (researcher) 
Relatively high  
-working hours for printing, 
packing and bringing to the post 
office; 
-creating own manual statistics 
about responses (days, number,…) 
-transferring the data into a 
database for statistical analysis 
Relatively low 
-working hours for sending 
emails 
-converting the electronic data to 
the statistical analysis tool (can 
be done by one click) 
Expenditure of 
time (respondent) 
Relatively high 
-answering questionnaire 
-wrapping in envelop 
-bringing to post office/post box 
Relatively low 
-answering survey 
-sending back the survey by 
clicking the ‘close’ button (one 
click) 
Cost Relatively high (more working 
hours, letterheads, envelops, 
stamps) 
Relatively low (working hours for 
sending emails, no material 
needed)  
Anonymity Can be given Can be given 
Convenience for 
the respondent 
Less convenient  
-answering the survey 
-wrapping the letterhead 
-bringing the letter to the post 
office/post box 
More convenient  
-accessing the internet 
-answering the survey  
-no need to leave the house 
Risk of not being 
noticed by 
respondent 
Invitation letter stays at the desk 
(steady reminder) 
Invitation might not be read 
(when registered as spam mail)  
Source: Own illustration, in parts adopted from Bryman and Bell (2007), Saunders et al. (2009) 
For the researcher, it was important to save cost and time. The budget was limited, 
and it had taken a long time to get in touch with a guarantee bank that agreed to 
cooperate and support the research by granting access to SMEs that obtained a 
guarantee. Therefore, time and cost became decisive factors. Moreover, it was 
optional to cause as little inconveniences (measured against time and workload) as 
possible to the participants of the survey to enhance the response rate. A very 
important precondition for the evaluation of sensitive data was the reassurance of 
anonymity. This was possible with both types of questionnaires. Altogether, it 
became clear that a web survey would best meet the requirements of the researcher.  
The survey provided quantitative data about SMEs that obtained guarantees. Since 
the research aim was to analyse the influence of guarantee banks on the creation of 
relationships between SMEs and banks, it was considered to be important to not only 
investigate the experiences of SMEs but also to evaluate the perspective of 
commercial banks. However, conducting another survey with bank managers was not 
perceived to be a proper means for obtaining the information needed. It was aspired 
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to understand the reasons and motivations why and under which circumstances banks 
insist on the provision of guarantees and whether institutions that guide SMEs on 
their way to receive bank loans feel any necessity and possibility for an alteration in 
the lending behaviour (Saunders et al., 2009; Malhotra, 2010). Learning and 
understanding patterns, thinking and behaviour is best gained through semi-
structured interviews. Moreover, semi-structured interviews allow interaction with 
the participants. It becomes possible to react to interesting answers and to go deeper 
into a certain topic than initially planned if it seems necessary and promising 
(Abernethy et al., 1999; Malhotra, 2010). Moreover, banks are very reluctant to 
provide confidential and sensitive information due to the banking secrecy. Interviews 
are considered to facilitate the access to sensitive data for the researcher as 
participants may refuse to provide data to people they have never met personally 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Hesse-Biber, 2010). Meeting with bank managers face-to-face 
allowed the researcher to demonstrate an awareness of the sensitivity of the research 
questions and to better ensure the appropriate handling of the interview results. This 
was the main key necessary to encourage bank managers to participate in the 
research. 
Combining a web survey and semi-structured interviews allowed a more in-depth 
analysis and helped the researcher to better understand the complexity of the research 
questions since different views had to be analysed and combined (Molina-Azorín, 
2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Greene et al., 2001). This was decided to consider 
interests of both parties involved in a bank-borrower relationship: the SMEs and the 
lenders. It was important to fully understand the process of relationship development. 
Neither the quantitative nor the qualitative analysis can be considered dominant in 
the present research. Both approaches have the same importance for analysing the 
phenomenon of learning (Cameron, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Hall and Howard, 
2008). The data was collected sequentially. This means that both analyses were 
conducted separately (Molina-Azorín, 2011; Plano Clark et al., 2010; Cameron, 
2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006; Gilbert, 2006).  The 
different time frames of the qualitative and quantitative research do not represent any 
hierarchy in importance as both provide comprehensive and discrete research 
findings. The research followed a coordinated design (Greene et al., 2001). The 
primary connection of the results from different methods happens in the final stage 
when drawing conclusions (Johnson et al., 2007; Bryman, 2006). 
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3.2  Web survey  
The following sections will provide more detailed information about the web survey 
of the present research. Section 3.2.1 highlights the structure of the survey. It also 
illustrates the link between the particular questionnaire sections and the main 
propositions of the research. Section 3.2.2 discusses data quality. Section 3.2.3 
provides details about the pilot tests that were undertaken before the survey was sent 
out to the SMEs. A detailed explanation about the selection of the sample and the 
distribution of the invitation letters is contained in Section 3.2.4. Section 3.2.5 
provides information about the response rate and Section 3.2.6 deals with the issue of 
nonresponse bias. Finally, Section 3.2.7 presents basic information about the analysis 
of the collected quantitative data.  
3.2.1 Design 
The survey is divided into four main parts. It starts with an explanation of the 
purpose of the research, an assurance to treat the answers confidentially and the 
contact details of the researcher. This is considered to be necessary to gain the trust 
of the participants and to encourage answering (Simsek and Veiga, 2001; Porst, 
2009).  Each part begins with a short introduction explaining its contents. The first 
part contains entry level questions which should attract the attention of the 
participant and underline the fact that the research really reflects the concerns of 
small firms (Porst, 2009). The second part is about the influence of guarantees on the 
access to finance for SMEs. The information behaviour and lending relationship is 
covered in part three, and part four contains general questions about the firm. The 
web survey including a translation in English is presented in Appendix I. Table 3.2 
presents the relationships among the research questions, propositions and parts of the 
questionnaire and highlights main issues asked in every section. 
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Table 3.2: Research questions, propositions and related questionnaire parts 
Research 
Question 
Proposition Questionnaire Section Main issues 
For what reasons 
and in which 
situations are 
guarantees from 
the guarantee 
bank important 
for the provision 
of loans to 
SMEs? 
P1: SMEs have 
difficulties in 
obtaining bank loans 
because of a higher 
default risk and lack of 
collateral. 
Part I: Access to bank 
finance (question 1) 
Difficulties in 
obtaining bank 
loans 
Part III: Bank-borrower 
relationship (question 
5) 
Bank 
Part IV: General 
information about the 
firm (questions 1 – 7) 
Firm characteristics: 
Age, legal form, 
sector, headcount, 
education 
P2a: Providing a 
guarantee acts as a 
substitute for collateral 
and allows SMEs to 
receive a bank loan. 
Part II: Loan provision 
and guarantees of a 
guarantee bank 
(question 3 e) 
Significance of 
guarantee for 
receiving a loan 
P2b: Including a 
guarantee from a 
guarantee bank makes 
SME loans more 
profitable for banks. 
Is concerned with the 
bank´s side of view and 
therefore will be 
evaluated by interviews 
only 
 
Can the provision 
of a guarantee 
from a guarantee 
bank help to 
reduce 
information 
asymmetries 
between the 
lending bank and 
the borrower? 
P3a: SMEs provide 
more information and 
more regular 
information to the 
lending bank as a 
consequence of 
obtaining the guarantee 
from the guarantee 
bank. 
Part II: Bank-borrower 
relationship (questions 
3c and 3d) 
Amount and 
regularity of 
information 
provided 
Has a new 
lending 
relationship been 
created due to the 
loan with 
guarantee? 
P3b: Increased 
information supports 
the creation of a bank-
borrower relationship. 
Part II: Loan provision 
and guarantees of a 
guarantee bank 
(question 3 f) 
Relationship after 
receiving a 
guaranteed loan 
Do German 
guarantee banks 
help to overcome 
credit restrictions 
for SMEs? 
P4: Guarantee banks 
help to mitigate credit 
restrictions for SMEs. 
Part II: Loan provision 
and guarantees of a 
guarantee bank 
(questions 4 and 5) 
Loan renewal 
without guarantee 
 
The questionnaire has a total of 20 questions with three filter questions. Closed-
ended questions dominate and additional information about how to answer a question 
has been given when necessary (e.g. when more than one answer is possible). 
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Instructions are very clear and simple and the questionnaire layout was thoroughly 
designed. Every page is reduced to a minimum of questions which makes scrolling 
unnecessary. The intention was to keep the questionnaire as short as possible to 
encourage response and completion (Saunders et al., 2009; Dolnicar et al., 2011; 
Simsek and Veiga, 2001, 2000) without neglecting important issues. An expected 
completion time of approximately 10 minutes is stated in the introduction. At the end 
of the questionnaire, contact name and address are provided for any queries the 
respondent may have, and the possibility is offered to receive the results of the 
research when available. The questionnaire is closed by thanking respondents for 
their participation (Saunders et al., 2009). 
3.2.2 Data quality in quantitative research 
In quantitative research, the collection of accurate and consistent data is a central 
aim. Accuracy and consistency are especially related to validity and reliability. 
Another aim is results of one study that can be applicable to other research settings.  
Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the extent to which measures applied in the research 
produce consistency. In other words, it shows the robustness of a questionnaire 
(Malhotra, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
One of the methods most commonly used to measure reliability is the test-retest 
method (Dolnicar et al., 2011). In test-retest reliability, identical sets of measures are 
provided to the same respondents at two separate times under as similar conditions as 
possible. To determine the similarity between the two tests, correlation coefficients 
are computed. Several weaknesses of the test-retest method exist wherefore this 
method is not generally recommended. First, the value of the reliability coefficient 
depends on the time between the first and the second measurement. For longer time 
intervals, lower correlation coefficients are expected. Second, the initial 
measurement may change the respondent’s behaviour or thinking. This exacerbates a 
comparison with the second measurement. Third, the test-retest method may not be 
compatible with the overall research aim. When the initial reaction to a new 
phenomenon shall be tested, for example, a second measurement is not suitable. 
Lastly, the reliability coefficient contains correlations of each item with itself. 
Therefore, correlations tend to be higher than correlations between different items 
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(Malhotra, 2010; Peter, 1977). Regarding the present research, test-retest was not a 
suitable method to assess reliability. Besides the weaknesses mentioned above, 
German SMEs are known to be very reluctant to answer questionnaires (Becker and 
Ulrich, 2009b; Piontkowski, 2009). Requiring respondents to answer a questionnaire 
twice instead of once would, therefore, reduce the willingness to take part in a 
survey.  
This is also the reason why alternative forms reliability was not tested in the present 
research. To assess alternative forms reliability, the same respondents are measured 
with two different scales or instruments at different times. To evaluate whether the 
same respondents gave similar answers, the scores are correlated. The two scales or 
instruments need to be as similar as possible. This is the main limitation of the 
alternative form reliability (Malhotra, 2010; Peter, 1977).  
Since it was not possible to administer the same or an equivalent set of scales twice, 
internal consistency reliability has been tested. The basic idea of this method is to 
split measures containing multiple items in two halves and to compute correlations 
for the two halves. This measure is known as split-half test. High internal consistency 
can be confirmed by high correlations (Muijs, 2011; Malhotra, 2010). The problem 
of the split-half method is its dependence on the results on the way scale items are 
split. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha provides a useful method to overcome this 
problem (Malhotra, 2010; Dolnicar et al., 2011). To compute Cronbach’s alpha, the 
scale items are split in different ways and the average of all possible split-coefficients 
is calculated (Malhotra 2010). In the present research, Cronbach’s alpha has been 
computed for the core questions about the learning effect to estimate internal 
consistency reliability. According to literature, the coefficient alpha has to be over 
0.7 to prove internal consistency (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Malhotra, 2010; Muijs, 
2011). The alpha value for the questions about the learning effect is 0.745. Regarding 
the required value of 0.7 mentioned above, this result demonstrates satisfactory 
internal consistency for the present research.  
Validity 
Reliability is a necessary condition for validity. If a measure appears to be unreliable, 
it will not be valid (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Gill and Johnson, 2010). To achieve a 
perfect validity, it is important that no measurement error exists (Malhotra 2010).  
95 
 
According to existing literature, mainly three types of validity can be distinguished: 
content validity, criterion validity and construct validity (Muijs 2011; Malhotra 2010; 
Saunders 2009).  
Content validity in survey design is an evaluation about whether the questions of a 
questionnaire are appropriate for measuring what is intended to be measured. To 
become able to judge adequate research instruments, it is important to thoroughly 
review existing literature and carefully deduce the research from existing theories 
(Muijs 2011; Saunders 2009). This has been done in the present research. The 
research started with conducting an extensive literature review. From existing 
theories and concepts, the research objectives and propositions have been derived. 
Another possibility to assess content validity is asking experts or potential 
respondents to comment on the questions. This is widely known as face validity 
(Muijs 2011; Malhotra 2010; Saunders 2009). In the present research this has been 
done by conducting extensive pilot testing which is explained in Chapter 3.2.3 in 
more detail. As a first step, the questionnaire was sent to an expert group to analyse 
the appropriateness of the contents and to receive recommendations for amendments. 
In a second, SMEs were asked about their understanding of the questions. In a third 
step, completion time and the way of answering to the questions was discussed. The 
examples above demonstrate that content validity is a rather subjective evaluation. 
For that reason, the evaluation of criterion and construct validity is useful to obtain a 
more formal assessment (Malhotra 2010).   
Criterion validity is the evaluation of the relationship between test scores and a 
measurable practical performance criterion (Gebotys, 1999). It can be subdivided 
into concurrent validity and predictive validity. Predictive validity will be assessed 
when future behaviour of respondents shall be predicted, for example. This can be 
done by comparing data collected on the scale at one time with data collected on the 
criterion variables at a later (future) time. This is often done by running correlation 
analyses (Malhotra 2010; Saunders 2009). Since this was not an issue for the present 
research, predictive validity has not been evaluated. If data on the scale and data on 
the criterion variables are collected at the same point in time, concurrent validity 
coefficients might be assessed. This method can be used when a concurrent criterion 
shall be measured by the test scores (Gebotys, 1999).  
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Since the aim of the present research is to analyse the ability of guarantee banks to 
initiate learning on the bank’s side, the evaluation of construct validity seems to be 
appropriate. Learning is a behaviour domain which cannot be seen or adequately be 
represented by a certain criterion. Therefore, it is important to ascertain that the 
theoretical construct of learning has been well operationalized by the measurement 
applied. This can be done by assessing construct validity (Shephard, 1993; Gebotys, 
1999; Malhotra, 2010; Abernethy et al., 1999; Gill and Johnson, 2010; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). Following existing literature, construct validity has been evaluated by 
using principal component analysis for the questions about the learning effect (part 
III, question 3 a-f) (Williams et al., 2010; Williams and Vaske, 2003). In factor 
analysis, assessment of the sample plays a crucial role. Suggestions about the 
required sample size to complete a factor analysis vary widely (Williams et al., 2010; 
Matsunaga, 2010). However, regarding the results of the factor analysis, the sample 
size of 157 can be considered as being suitable (Sapnas and Zeller, 2002; MacCallum 
et al., 1999). Moreover, sample suitability has been assessed by computing Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Barlett’s Test of Sphericity. At 
0.655, the Kaiser-Myer-Olkin index can be considered suitable for factor analysis. 
The same applies for the Barlett’s Test of Sphericits (Approximate Chi-Square 
197.093 , df 6, Sig. 0.000) (Williams et al., 2010). If the construct that shall be 
measured is well operationalized, the factor analysis will ideally end with a 1-factor-
result to confirm construct validity (Gebotys 1999; Williams et al. 2010). To 
determine factor extraction, Kaiser’s criteria (eigenvalue > 1), the scree plot, and the 
cumulative per cent of variance extracted have been considered (Williams et al., 
2010; Gebotys, 1999). The principal component analysis resulted in a one-factor 
solution with one component presenting an eigenvalue of > 1. All other components 
showed an eigenvalue of 0.880 or below. The factor explains a variance of over 50 
per cent. The scree plot presented in Figure 3.1 supports the one-factor solution 
showing a clear elbow with a distinct break between the first and the other factors.  
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Figure 3.1: Scree plot 
 
 
The results of the one-factor-solution are highlighted in Table 3.3. The figure 
demonstrates that each factor loading is greater than the required 0.4 (Matsunaga, 
2010). The one-factor solution meets the requirements of containing at least two 
(Williams et al., 2010) or four items (Henson and Roberts, 2006) to allow 
meaningful interpretation (Williams et al., 2010; Henson and Roberts, 2006).  
Table 3.3: Results of the factor analysis 
Item Loading Explained Variance KMO 
Amount information  0.880 58.509% 0.655 
Intervall information 0.775 
  Significance guarantee 0.528 Eigenvalue Significance (Barlett) 
Relationship 0.829 2.340 0.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
The factor loadings demonstrate that the four items can reasonably be pooled in one 
factor that measures whether learning on the side of the commercial banks can take 
place.  
Generalizability 
Generalizability is also referred to as external validity. It is concerned with whether 
the findings of one study may also be appropriate for other populations or settings 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Malhotra, 2010; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The present 
research is concentrated on the guarantee bank in Hesse. However, since the design 
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of all German guarantee banks is nearly the same (Langer and Schiereck 2002; 
Schiereck 2002; Schmidt and van Elkan 2006), the research frame as well as results 
can be transferred to the other guarantee banks. Moreover, the general aim to support 
SMEs on receiving loans that these firms would not have obtained without a 
guarantee is the same for many Credit Guarantee Schemes throughout the world 
(Riding et al. 2007; Zecchini and Ventura 2009). Therefore, the present research can 
also be applied for schemes in other countries.  
3.2.3 Pilot testing 
Before starting data collection an extensive pilot study was conducted to reveal 
technical problems, misunderstandings, missing items or resistances (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007; Kirchhoff et al., 2010; Simsek and Veiga, 2001). The pilot study was 
divided into three main stages. According to Saunders (2009), at first, the link to the 
online questionnaire should send out via email to an expert group. This group was 
comprised of two university professors and lecturers, two bank managers, four 
consultants from different chambers of commerce and one chief executive of a 
guarantee bank. At that stage, the contents and suitability of the questionnaire were 
checked, and suggestions for additional questions or changing the response spectrum 
were made. Moreover, the technical procedure was tested to ensure that the online 
survey operated well and deployed filter really functioned. All nine experts replied 
and gave online comments about the questions and the technical process. The first 
two of them stated that the button for finishing the questionnaire did not work. So 
this was changed, and the following comments did not mention this problem again. 
Besides this, the experts’ comments resulted in adding a question about the purpose 
of the loan and in rephrasing some questions for a more precise wording.  
Second, the online questionnaire was sent out via email to three SMEs to further test 
whether the technical changes worked. More importantly, these were the first pretests 
with SMEs. These tests were important to learn about the comprehensibility of the 
questions for the firms and the acceptance of the online survey. There were no 
problems with the technical process. However, the comments about the questions 
received online did not allow to find out whether the firms really got the questions 
right and would be willing to answer. For that reason, in the third stage of the 
pretesting the SMEs were contacted personally. This was aexpected to get a more 
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precise picture about how well questions were understood and whether some 
questions might be considered as too sensitive. Therefore, the online questionnaire 
was printed and handed over to 14 SMEs. This allowed the research to discuss the 
questions with each of the pretest participants face-to-face. This ended in deleting 
some technical words but required no major changes of the questionnaire.  
As result of the 26 pretests, the technical process was optimized, some questions and 
answers were added and some questions were rephrased. This was a continuous 
process to ensure that all changes have been tested in the end before sending out the 
final questionnaire. The pilot was conducted with people that are not members of the 
subsequent sample (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
3.2.4 Distribution and sample 
Official secondary data about SMEs that received a guarantee from a guarantee bank 
in Germany is scarce. Annual reports from the guarantee banks and the Association 
of German Guarantee Banks present data about the amount and volume of guarantees 
provided, but due to the German banking secrecy, it was a challenge to find out 
which firms received a guarantee and to contact them. Finally, the guarantee bank in 
the state of Hesse agreed to support the research. Hesse is one of the sixteen federal 
states and is located in the middle of Germany. Measured against spending capacity, 
productivity, economic output and taxable capacity, Hesse is on the fourth place in 
the actual ranking of all federal states. However, measured against economic 
development, research and development and employment, it is only number 12 
(Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln [Institute of German Economy Collogne], 
2011). Considering the provision of guarantees of all guarantee banks in Germany, 
the guarantee bank in Hesse also ranks in twelfth place (Verband Deutscher 
Bürgschaftsbanken, 2011). SMEs are known as engines of economic growth and 
account for a high degree of dynamism and innovation (Geisen and Hebestreit, 
2009). To maintain good economic output and productivity Hesse should enhance its 
economic development and innovation strength. The guarantee bank Hesse might 
help to reach these aims by enabling SMEs to make necessary investments or 
establish new firms. Concentrating the research on the guarantee bank in Hesse 
might give an insight into the ability of the bank to support the economic 
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development of the state. Later on the results can be used as a kind of blueprint to be 
transferred to other guarantee banks. 
Out of those SMEs that have received one or more guarantees from the guarantee 
bank of Hesse between 2003 and 2008, altogether 952 SMEs have been included into 
the research. According to the guarantee bank of Hesse, all of these firms still existed 
in spring 2011. Data about the total number of SMEs that received at least one 
guarantee within that timeframe (including those firms that died in the meantime) 
was not accessible. This timeframe has been selected to avoid effects of the financial 
crisis on the results. In the beginning of May 2009 the German government passed 
the so-called ‘Wirtschaftsfonds Deutschland’ to enhance access to credit to firms 
suffering from the impacts of the crisis. The passage contained several arrangements 
to extend the benefits of the guarantee banks. For a limited period of time, guarantee 
banks were allowed to provide guarantees up to 90 per cent of the initial loan amount 
(previously it was up to 80 per cent) with a maximum guarantee rate of 2 million 
euro (previously it was 1 million euro). Moreover, it was possible to provide 
guarantees not only to healthy firms but also to those that really suffered from the 
crisis (e.g. firms with severe liquidity shortages). This measures were limited until 31 
December 2010 (Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology, 2010). Since these 
were merely temporary regulations, data from 2009 and 2010 would not represent the 
ordinary circumstances which should be the subject of the research. 
To satisfy the regulations of the banking secrecy, no names or address details of the 
contacted SMEs have been provided by the guarantee bank. One problem occurred 
after discussing the data availability of the guarantee bank: the guarantee bank Hesse 
had no email addresses of the SMEs that received a guarantee. Based on the 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of web surveys and postal 
questionnaires demonstrated in Section 3.1, it was decided to conduct a web survey. 
The easiest way to do this would have been sending emails including the link to the 
survey to every firm. However, since the method assessment had revealed that the 
risk of respondents not noticing the questionnaire was higher for web surveys, the 
lack of email addresses offered some interesting ways to overcome this weakness. It 
was decided to send out postal invitation letters to the firms instead of emails. This 
created the advantage of the physical presence of postal invitations. The letter 
remained on the desk of the recipient and, therefore, regularly reminded him or her to 
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answer the questionnaire. E-mail invitations were more likely to be overlooked due 
to daily e-mail overload (Simsek and Veiga, 2001; Newby et al., 2003; Lozar 
Manfreda et al., 2006).  
The invitation letter contained a short introduction on the purpose of the survey, an 
introduction to the researcher, an explanation about how the potential respondents 
had been selected and an assurance to treat all answers confidentially. The letter was 
printed on letterhead of the guarantee bank Hesse and signed by the two chief 
executive officers of the guarantee bank Hesse. To demonstrate the scientific 
background of the research and the connection to a German university, the logo of 
Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen University of Applied Sciences was also 
printed on the letter. This was to provide trust in the research and to avoid concerns 
about data privacy (Simsek and Veiga, 2001; Cho and LaRose, 1999; Lozar 
Manfreda et al., 2006; Gill and Johnson, 2010). Moreover, including university and 
organization sponsorship were expected to increase response rates (Simsek and 
Veiga, 2001; Newby et al., 2003). The invitation letter contained the link to the 
survey. The link was established on the webpage of the guarantee bank Hesse 
(www.bb-h.de) which can be considered as being well known by those firms that 
have received a guarantee from the guarantee bank. This was decided because the 
firms considered the guarantee bank to be trustworthy and the research project would 
be positively associated with the bank, hopefully stimulating their willingness to 
respond (Cho and LaRose, 1999). To reduce the threat that people outside the sample 
might reply to the questionnaire, a unique password was required to get access to the 
survey (Simsek and Veiga, 2001). The password was communicated in the invitation 
letter. A screenshot of the webpage with the link to the questionnaire is included in 
the Appendix III. 
The first invitation letter was dispatched in May 2011. After two weeks the response 
rate was rather low, so a follow-up letter was dispatched. Because of the given 
anonymity, it was not known who exactly had completed the questionnaire at this 
point of time. For that reason, the reminder was sent out to all 952 SMEs.  Follow-up 
letters are widely considered as an effective means to increase the response rate 
(Bartholomew and Smith, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009; Newby et al., 2003) and it 
also works in the present research. The first reminder is widely assumed to be most 
effective (Newby et al., 2003; Westhead and Cowling, 1998; Kanso, 2000). For this 
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reason, solely one follow-up letter was dispatched. It was also distributed by the 
guarantee bank. To enhance the respond rate a monetary incentive (an online voucher 
at amazon.de for 25 euro) has been promised for ten out of the first 30 respondents as 
well as a deadline for answering has been placed. To ensure anonymity of those who 
wanted to take part in a price draw they were requested to send an email to the 
secretary of Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen after finishing the survey. This was 
to ensure confidentiality by preventing that the researcher herself knows the names 
of those who answered. The follow-up letter is shown in Appendix IV. 
Since many authors confirm that incentives can have at least a small positive impact 
on the response rate (Church, 1993; Saunders et al., 2009; Teisl et al., 2005) it was 
decided to try a monetary incentive to increase the response rate of the survey. 
Indeed, the rate increased significantly after dispatching the follow-up. However, 
only around 13 per cent of all respondents sent an email to take part in the lottery. 
This indicates that in the present research the monetary incentive was not crucial for 
answering the questionnaire. 
3.2.5 Response rate 
Achieving an acceptable response rate is a fundamental aim of every survey. 
Saunders et al. (2009) mention a likely response rate of 11.0 per cent or lower in 
online surveys. Some studies refer to average response rates of between 19.3 and 
76.5 per cent (Simsek and Veiga, 2000) or between 27.0 and 56 per cent 
(Bartholomew and Smith, 2006) in SME research. However, it seems that none of 
these studies mentioned has been conducted in Germany. Since the present study is 
concentrated on SMEs in Germany, response rates of comparable German studies 
seems to be more suitable to assess the response rate. Analyzing German studies 
reveals much lower average rates (Piontkowski, 2009; Becker and Ulrich, 2009b). 
Becker and Ulrich (2009b) compared published studies in SME research between 
1981 and 2008. They found an average response rate of 16.4 per cent with a 
maximum of 39.9 per cent and a minimum of 7.0 per cent. Considering studies since 
year 2000 only, the average rate is even lower (13.8 per cent). Piontkowski (2009) 
encouraged firms to answer his survey personally or with the aid of banks. His 
efforts resulted in a response rate of around 15 per cent whereof only 5.6 per cent 
103 
 
have been SMEs. Compared to these results the response rate of the present study, 
which is presented in Table 3.3, can be considered as good.  
Table 3.4:  Detailed presentation of the response rate 
 Numbers  Per cent 
Invitation letters dispatched 952 100.00% 
Responses  174 18.28% 
    - not filled in 9 0.95% 
    - only poorly answered  
    and unusable 
8 0.84% 
Evaluated 157 16.49% 
3.2.6 Non-respondent bias 
To ensure external validity and generalizability of the survey results, it has to be 
analysed whether the findings would have been different when the response rate was 
100.0%. The existence of differences between respondents and non-respondents is 
known as non-respondent bias (Malhotra, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009; Lindner and 
Wingenbach, 2002). One way to test this is to compare answers of respondents to 
those of non-respondents (Lindner and Wingenbach, 2002; Lindner et al., 2001; 
Miller and Smith, 1983). Due to the banking secrecy, details about the SMEs that 
have been contacted to answer the survey were not available for the researcher in the 
present research. Therefore, a comparison between respondents and non-respondents 
was not possible. However, since some recent literature has revealed that late 
respondents are similar to non-respondents (Miller and Smith, 1983; Newman, 
1962), a comparison between early and late respondents has been undertaken to 
warrant external validity and generalizability of the present research. To define late 
respondents, the recommendations of Lindner et al. (2001) were followed. The 
authors suggested (p. 52): 
“(…) that late respondents be defined operationally as those who respond in the last 
wave of respondents in successive follow-ups to a questionnaire (…)”. 
The authors additionally recommended that the number of late respondents should 
not be less than 30 persons. In applying these recommendations, late respondents 
were defined as those SMEs that answered after the follow-up letter was sent out 
which were overall 93 firms. The answers of the late and the early respondents have 
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been compared by running chi-square tests. The results revealed no essential 
differences between the two waves and therefore confirm that there are no major 
problems with external validity and generalizability. All results can be seen in 
appendix V.  
3.2.7 Data analysis 
Data from the web survey has been analysed by using the software SPSS. As a first 
step, univariate analysis was undertaken to give an impression about the frequency 
distribution of answers and to enable statements about the representative status of the 
sample. Propositions were tested by using bivariate and multivariate analysis. The 
bivariate analyses mainly contained tests about the association between two 
variables. Dependent on the scale of the variables, different statistical measurements 
existed and had to be applied (Bryman and Cramer, 2009; Kinnear and Gray, 2008; 
Bühl, 2008). As a consequence, contingency tables and chi-square test were 
conducted. When pairs of different measures were analysed, the lower measurement 
level recommended was used (Bryman and Cramer, 2009). Appendix VI contains an 
overview of variables used for statistical analysis, the corresponding question within 
the web survey and its scales.  
Contingency tables and chi-square tests have been computed to evaluate expected 
relationships between two variables. Within the contingency tables, the independent 
variables are presented across the tables and column percentages are illustrated 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2009). The total sum within the last column can differ from 
the overall number of evaluable responses (157) since it contains only those 
respondents that answered both questions under investigation. The chi-square 
statistic tested the null hypothesis of no association between the two variables.  For a 
valid null hypothesis, observed and expected frequencies within the table “…should 
not differ by more than chance” (Ingersoll, 2010, p. 2). High differences result in 
high chi-square values and indicate a stronger statistical relationship (Ingersoll, 2010; 
Bühl, 2008). The chi-square test is a non-parametric statistic. It is also known as 
Pearson chi square test. It can be used for data that becomes nominal or ordinal due 
to categorization (McHugh, 2013). For an appropriate use, some requirements or 
assumptions have to be met. These assumptions include, for example, that variable 
categories have to be mutually exclusive. In addition, no more than 20 per cent of the 
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expected frequencies within the cells should be less than 5 and no expected 
frequency should be less than 1 (Bühl, 2008; Bryman and Cramer, 2009; Brosius, 
2006; McHugh, 2013). In the present research, this assumption has mainly been met 
by categorizing variables. The categorization of variables often resulted in 2x2 
tables. However, in very few cases, the required minimum limit of 20 per cent of the 
expected frequencies of less than 5 was not met. In these cases, the exact percentage 
is stated, and the results of the contingency tables are used for a descriptive analysis 
of the relationships. When the minimum level is not met in 2x2 tables, Fisher’s exact 
test (two-sided; to evaluate a general relationship) is illustrated instead of Pearson’s 
chi-square test (McHugh, 2013; Lydersen et al., 2009; Bühl, 2008; Freeman and 
Campbell, 2007). For variables with high chi-square values (resulting from high 
differences between the observed and the expected frequencies within the cells) 
which turned out to be statistically significant, further investigation was conducted to 
evaluate the strength of association (McHugh, 2013; Malhotra, 2010; Brosius 2006). 
In the present research, Phi for 2x2 tables and Cramer’s V for tables larger than 2x2 
were computed (Malhotra, 2010; Bühl, 2008, Brosius, 2006).  
Multivariate analysis in the form of a cluster analysis was applied to divide the 
sample into groups that were homogeneous in respect to the stability and degree of 
the relationship between the lending bank and the borrower before the loan with 
guarantee from a guarantee bank was provided. This allowed a grouping of firms 
according to the existing lending relationship: firms that had a long relationship with 
their bank and those that had no existing relationship with the bank at the time they 
have received the loan as well as SMEs with regular contacts to their bank managers 
and with rather rare contacts. This was done by using hierarchical cluster analysis. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted by applying the widely used Ward’s 
method. In Ward’s procedure, means for all variables are calculated for each cluster. 
In a next step, the squared Euclidean distance to the means of the clusters is 
computed, and the sums of the distances are built for all cases. Those clusters are 
merged that show the smallest growth of the squared within-cluster distance. The 
clustering allowed the unique creation of four different groups: firms with an existing 
relationship to their bank were called ‘Old Hands’. Firms that had no relationship to 
the lending bank were called ‘Rookies’. In addition, firms with rare contacts to the 
bank before applying for the loan received the label ‘Reserved’. Firms with a very 
close contact were labeled ‘Present’. The clustering ended in a four-cluster-solution 
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composed of the following four clusters: ‘Present Old Hands’, ‘Reserved Old 
Hands’, ‘Present Rookies’ and ‘Reserved Rookies’. Cluster analysis allowed a 
deeper analysis of the significance of lending relationships for SMEs and the impact 
of existing relationships on the loan availability and the need for a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank.   
3.3  Semi-structured interviews 
To obtain a more comprehensive picture of the impact of guarantee banks on SME 
lending, it is necessary to learn about the bank’s reasons and motivation for insisting 
on a guarantee when providing a loan to a SME. This can best be done by conducting 
semi-structured interviews. This is underlined by Saunders et al. (2009), p. 324: 
“Where it is necessary for you to understand the reasons for the decision that your 
research participants have taken, or to understand the reasons for their attitudes and 
opinions, you are likely to need to conduct a qualitative interview.” 
As the aim was to understand why banks require guarantees from guarantee banks 
for some loans and how they would estimate the information behaviour and the 
establishment or intensification of lending relationships, a qualitative interview 
seemed to be most promising. To send out questionnaires to bank managers engaged 
in SME lending was not expected to be expedient. The researcher’s working 
experiences at different banks in Germany for around nine years suggested that 
questionnaires are rarely answered by the persons researchers addressed. However, it 
was considered to be very important to get in contact with those persons in banks that 
make the initial loan decision and that have the closest contact with the SMEs. 
Therefore, a qualitative interview approach was chosen.  
The following sections will provide detailed information about the semi-structured 
interviews. Section 3.3.1 contains an explanation of how the interviews were 
conducted, the use of an interview guide and the link between the interview sections 
and the main propositions of the research.  Section 3.3.2 discusses aspects of data 
quality. Section 3.3.3 is about the piloting of the interviews. Section 3.3.4 provides 
information about the interviewees, and Section 3.3.5 discusses aspects of 
interviewer and response bias. Finally, Section 3.3.6 explains how interview 
transcripts have been analysed.  
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3.3.1 Interview guide 
Semi-structured interviews are non-standardised and allow the researcher to directly 
respond to the answers given. Even though a guideline with subjects and questions to 
be covered exists, the interviewer is free to change the order of questions asked, 
broach a subject again and add or omit questions depending on the interview 
situation (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Malhotra, 2010).  
The interviews were carefully prepared. After an appointment was fixed, every 
participant received a short list of the main interview subjects as well as a short 
description of the research aim. This was something most participants expressly 
asked for when they were invited for an interview. The short description gave the 
participants the opportunity to prepare for the interview and collect useful 
information in advance if necessary.  An interview guide was prepared to facilitate 
the interview for the interviewer and to reduce the risk of forgetting subjects. The 
interview guide followed a logical order beginning with questions that were 
considered to be easy to answer and not very sensitive. Questions that were 
considered to be more sensitive were put at the end of the interview. This enabled the 
interviewer to gain the trust of the interviewee in the course of the interview and to 
ask sensitive questions later on (Harvey, 2011; Richards, 1996). Nevertheless, it was 
not considered as mandatory order to ask all of the questions. The order of subjects 
discussed with the participants varied according to the individual process of every 
interview. The interview guide was divided into five main parts. Part A was about 
the reasons of banks for insisting on a guarantee when making loan decisions and the 
general criteria that might influence the decision about whether to provide a loan or 
not. Part B was about the information banks receive or require from the firms. Part C 
dealt with the establishment or intensification of lending relationships. Part D was 
about the ability of the guarantee bank to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. Part E 
dealt with the impact of the inclusion of the guarantee on the cost side of banks and 
the default rate related to SMEs that obtained a loan including a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. The interview guide was nearly identical for all interviews with only 
one exception. After the second interview, a question about additional profits (cross-
selling) was included in part E. This was something, both interviewees of the first 
two interviews referred to when talking about the expected profits and was 
considered to be an important issue. The translated interview guide of this research 
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project is attached in Appendix VII. Table 3.5 presents the relationships among the 
research questions, propositions and parts of the interview guideline and highlights 
main issues asked in every section. 
Table 3.5: Research questions, propositions and related interview parts 
Research Question Propositions Interview Section Main Issues 
For what reasons and 
in which situations are 
guarantees from the 
guarantee bank 
important for the 
provision of loans to 
SMEs? 
P1: SMEs have difficulties 
in obtaining bank loans 
because of a higher default 
risk and lack of collateral. 
Part A: Rationales 
for insisting on a 
guarantee 
Reasons for insisting 
on a guarantee: 
default rate, collateral, 
business project, firm 
characteristics, costs 
P2a: Providing a guarantee 
acts as a substitute for 
collateral and allows SMEs 
to receive a bank loan. 
Part A: Rationales 
for insisting on a 
guarantee 
Significance of 
guarantees 
P2b: Including a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank 
makes SME loans more 
profitable for banks. 
Part E: Costs Impact on costs and 
profit 
Can the provision of a 
guarantee from a 
guarantee bank help to 
reduce information 
asymmetries between 
the lending bank and 
the borrower? 
P3a: SMEs provide more 
information and more 
regular information to the 
lending bank as a 
consequence of obtaining 
the guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. 
Part B: 
Information 
Amount and 
regularity of 
information provided 
Has a new lending 
relationship been 
created due to the 
provision of the loan 
with guarantee? 
P3b: Increased information 
supports the creation of a 
bank-borrower relationship. 
Part C: Lending 
relationship 
Relationship after 
receiving a guaranteed 
loan 
Do German guarantee 
banks help to 
overcome credit 
restrictions for SMEs? 
P4: Guarantee banks help to 
mitigate credit restrictions 
for SMEs. 
Part D: Credit 
restrictions 
Impact on future 
credit provision 
 
To save the participant’s time and costs, the interviews were conducted in their own 
offices. This was where they feel the most comfortable and where they may have 
access to data needed. A central aim within the first few minutes was to establish the 
researchers credibility and to gain the participant’s confidence (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007; Harvey, 2011). Therefore, every interview started with a 
short explanation of the research aim and an introduction of the interviewer. This 
was intended to signal the existing knowledge of the researcher and her background. 
The aim was to ensure the participant that technical terms can be used and will be 
understood as the researcher herself has worked in a bank for several years. It also 
illustrates the researcher’s awareness of the sensitivity of information given and the 
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existence of the banking secrecy. It was explicitly emphasized that all information 
will be treated absolutely confidentially (Saunders et al., 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008; Harvey, 2011). Every interview was audio recorded thanks to the permission 
of the participants. The permission was always granted when arranging the 
appointment. Nevertheless, the researcher took individual notes during the interview. 
These notes were for reminding the researcher to probe questions if necessary after 
the participant had completed a thought. Moreover, making notes demonstrated the 
importance of the answers given (Saunders et al., 2009). Respect for the participant’s 
knowledge of the subject matter was also demonstrated by closing every interview 
with asking the participant whether, in his or her opinion, important aspects had been 
ignored. This was also aimed to make sure that no important points were missing 
(Gläser and Laudel, 2009; Harvey, 2011).  
Conducting two or more interviews in the same day was avoided. This allowed time 
to record the responses of the interview immediately and prevented mixing up data. 
Besides the responses, the role of the participant within his or her bank, the location 
of the interview, the duration and date of the interview and a short note about how 
good or bad the interview went were recorded (Bryman, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009).  
The first interview was conducted in January 2012 and the last one in April 2012. 
The final amount of interviews had not been determined in advance. Instead, the 
decision to finish interviewing was made when the data collected seemed to 
adequately address all research questions and no further or surprising answers were 
expected (Pratt, 2009; Liamputtong, 2009).  
3.3.2 Data quality in qualitative research 
Data quality is an important issue when conducting semi-structured interviews. Data 
quality in qualitative research should be reliable, valid and generalizable (Saunders et 
al., 2009). 
Reliability 
Reliability in semi-structured interviews is concerned with whether two or more 
interviewers would receive identical answers from one interviewee. Since the 
particular advantage of semi-structured interviews is the opportunity to react in 
interviews, the attempt to ensure reliability is not really feasible.  
110 
 
In semi-structured interviews, reliability is always related to issues of bias (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Measures adopted to reduce reliability and bias to a minimum will be 
explained in 3.3.5. 
Validity 
According to Saunders et al (2009), p. 327, in qualitative research, validity 
“(…) refers to the extent to which the researcher gains access to their participants’ 
knowledge and experience, and is able to infer a meaning that the participant 
intended from the language that was used by this person.” 
The opportunity to probe questions, discuss and clarify responses in semi-structured 
interviews leads to a high degree of validity. Therefore, validity of semi-structured 
interviews is not really an issue when conducted carefully (Saunders et al., 2009).   
Generalizability 
Considering semi-structured interviews, generalizability is not an issue about 
whether the people interviewed are representative for a population. Due to normally 
relatively small numbers of interviews concentrated on one locality or organization, 
it cannot be aimed to generalize research results on a wider population (Hubermann 
and Miles, 2002). Therefore, in qualitative research the assessment of 
generalizability is concerned with whether findings or settings are applicable to 
existing theories and with understanding meanings and behaviours in the research 
context (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Hubermann and Miles, 
2002). Moreover, generalizability in qualitative research is rather concerned with 
whether the situations studied are adaptable to other settings (Guba and Lincoln, 
1982; Goetz and LeCompte, 1984). The literature review has demonstrated that the 
research objectives and propositions have been derived from existing theories about 
the influence of Credit Guarantee Schemes on the access to finance for SMEs. These 
theories have been tested by conducting interviews with bank managers to analyse 
the motivations and rationales for insisting on a guarantee and to deduce the impact 
of the guarantee bank in Hesse on bank lending. The interview guide that was used 
ensured that every interview was conducted in the same structured manner. This 
allows an application to other settings and populations and enables comparability of 
results with other studies. Moreover, this research includes detailed description of the 
interviewees, the settings and the interview guideline. This allows comparison with 
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other research that used similar approaches (Hubermann and Miles, 2002; Goetz and 
LeCompte, 1984; Guba and Lincoln, 1982).   
3.3.3 Piloting the interviews 
The subjects and questions to be covered in the interviews were discussed with two 
university professors, two bank managers and one member of the Chamber of Trade 
and Industry. Moreover, test interviews were conducted with another two bank 
managers which took approximately 70 minutes each. As a result, the importance of 
making additional business by providing instead of denying, loans to SMEs became 
clear. Therefore, it was decided to add this topic to the interview guide. Apart from 
that, no changes were made.   
3.3.4 Facts about the interviewees 
The interviews were conducted with bank managers who are employed in SME 
financing and who had already worked with guarantees of the guarantee bank in 
SME financing. When interviewees were chosen, it was considered to be important 
to find persons who were skilled and experienced in SME financing. To get access to 
these persons, the guarantee bank Hesse provided a list containing all banks that have 
applied for a guarantee from 2003 on (this was the first year the guarantee bank 
recorded such data) as well as the number of guarantees they have applied for in 
every year. Ten banks that appeared to be frequently engaged in applying for 
guarantees were chosen and reported to the guarantee bank. The guarantee bank then 
provided the names and contact details of their contact persons at these banks. The 
contact persons were called and appointments were made by the researcher herself. 
Some other things were considered to be important when choosing the interviewees. 
One was to find interviewees at all three sorts of banks in Germany: the co-operative 
banks, the savings banks and the private banks. As the private banks are less engaged 
in SME financing, two private banks were contacted, whereas four savings banks and 
four co-operative banks were contacted. Moreover, it was intended to talk to banks 
located all over the federal state of Hesse. 
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3.3.5 Interviewer and response bias 
There are two types of bias that might occur when conducting semi-structured 
interviews: interviewer bias and interviewee or response bias. The interviewer him- 
or herself might create bias when interpreting responses of participants as well as in 
the way of asking questions. To reduce this type of bias, the interviewer avoided 
enforcing her own beliefs and thoughts about the research topic when asking 
questions. Moreover, it was considered to be important to prevent influencing 
answers by the sound of the voice, comments or non-verbal behaviour. In addition,  
the demonstration of credibility and gaining the participants’ trust was used to avoid 
interviewer bias (Saunders et al., 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). As opposed to 
interviewer bias, response bias is not necessarily related to the interviewer. 
Participants may ‘govern’ their responses (Saunders et al., 2009). They might 
endeavour to throw a positive light on their bank and their business practices and, 
therefore, depict their decision making process in a more positive way. Due to the 
banking secrecy, they also might withhold some information considered as being 
sensitive. To reduce this risk to a minimum, the creation of a relationship of trust 
between the interviewer and the participants as well as the proof of the interviewer’s 
credibility and the assurance of confidentiality was considered as essential in the 
present research. Nevertheless, response bias cannot be eliminated with absolute 
certainty.  
3.3.6 Analysis of transcripts 
Qualitative research is most often inductive (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Patton, 2001). 
However, the presented research used well-defined research questions and 
propositions derived from theory and therefore it follows a deductive approach. This 
is not a contradiction to qualitative research which can be both inductive or deductive 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Pratt, 2009; Bitektine, 2008). Where a deductive approach is 
applied, data collection can be conducted with categories and initial code words 
derived from the propositions. Therefore, the qualitative data analysis is more 
structured and formalized and more closely oriented towards testing proposition 
(Saunders et al., 2009). This is exactly the case in the present research. After every 
interview was transcribed, the data analysis started by reading every transcript 
without making any notes. In a second step, every transcript was read over again. 
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This time, notes were made and sentences of certain importance have been marked. 
Codes were orientated towards categories according to the topics of the propositions 
like ‘information’, ‘meaning guarantee’, ‘costs’. The next step was producing 
separate word documents for every category and copying the highlighted sentences 
from every interview into these documents. The word documents contained tables 
which consisted of three columns each. The first column contained the label of the 
interviewee to demonstrate which interviewee made the comment included. The 
second column contained the sentences marked in the transcripts. In the third 
column, a summary of key points was produced to compress long statements in to 
briefer ones. Sometimes only one or two key words were used to summarize the key 
message of the statements. The next step was to read over every separate word 
document very thoroughly to make sure that the sentences copied were consistent. 
Moreover, the sentences were checked for code words which have been used very 
often. Analysing the statements about the reasons for insisting on a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank, for example, reveals that most interviewees referred to risk and the 
meaning of a viable business project. These code words were highlighted in different 
colours and played an important role in the final analysis.   
All interviews were conducted in German as this is the primary language of all 
interviewees. The transcription and the analysis of the data was conducted in German 
to avoid the time consuming translation in English as well as to avoid distortions of 
the data (Bryman and Bell, 2007). For writing up the research those sentences that 
were directly cited were translated into English language.  
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4 Survey results 
This chapter analyses the results of the web survey carried out in summer 2011 with 
SMEs that received a guarantee from guarantee bank Hesse. Section 4.1 starts with 
univariate analyses presenting frequency distributions of those demographic 
variables that are important for further analyses in the following sections. This gives 
a first impression about the distribution of these variables. In the subsequent sections 
propositions will be examined. Section 4.2 is about statistical analyses of the access 
to bank loans of the respondent firms. Section 4.3 examines the meaning of 
guarantees from the guarantee bank for SMEs. Whether SMEs that obtained a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank provide more and more regular information to 
their banks will be analysed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 is about the creation or 
intensification of bank-borrower relationships. Section 4.6 analyses whether credit 
restrictions can be mitigated due to guarantees from the guarantee bank. Section 4.7 
contains the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis. The clustering is based on the 
variables about the bank-borrower relationship at the time the loans with guarantees 
from the guarantee bank were provided. This section also contains the analyses of the 
existing relationships between the clusters and other variables. 
4.1  Main demographic characteristics of the sample 
This section includes frequency tables with demographic variables of particular 
importance for the research to provide an impression about the structure of the 
sample. Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of the legal forms. The figure 
demonstrates that most SMEs of the sample are either sole proprietors or private 
limited companies.  
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of legal forms (PVI, Q1) 
 
Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of the age of the firms. Since firms that answered 
the web survey in spring 2011 received the guarantee between 2003 and 2008 it is 
not surprising that the sample contains only a small number of firms between 1 and 3 
years old. To receive a guarantee in 2008 at the latest, respondent firms must have 
had been established before December 2008. The highest share of all respondents 
within the sample was more than nine years old.  
Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of age of the firms (PVI, Q2) 
 
Figure 4.3 contains the distribution of the industrial sectors. The categories have 
been oriented towards the industrial sectors commonly used by guarantee banks 
which, for example, do not contain the communications or logistics sector 
(Association of German Guarantee Banks, 2012). The categories highlighted in 
Figure 4.3 below demonstrate that the classification is more clustered than the 
classification used by the Institute of SME Research, the Reconstruction Loan 
Corporation or the Federal Statistical Office (NACE code), for example. Therefore, a 
comparison between the sample and the wider population of SMEs in Germany was 
not possible.   
39% 
7% 
39% 
10% 
3% 2% 
0,00%
5,00%
10,00%
15,00%
20,00%
25,00%
30,00%
35,00%
40,00%
45,00%
Sole
proprietorship
Partnership Private limited
company
Private limited
company & Co.
Public limited
company
Other
8% 
24% 
19% 
49% 
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
1 - 3 years 4 - 6 years 7 - 9 years More than 9 years
116 
 
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of industrial sectors (PVU, Q3) 
 
To examine the representative status of the sample, it has to be compared to the basic 
population of the guarantee bank Hesse. Comparable data about the basic population 
was only available for two variables: the number of employees of the SMEs and the 
type of bank the firms received the loans from. Information about the type of bank 
was calculated from the annual reports of the guarantee bank Hesse. Since the web 
survey was sent out to SMEs that received a guarantee between 2003 and 2008, the 
annual reports of these years were analyzed to compute the basic population. Figure 
4.4 illustrates the frequency distribution of the type of bank within the sample and 
the basic population. 
Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of type of bank (PIII, Q5) 
 
Additionally, the guarantee bank Hesse provided information about the number of 
employees of the supported firms between 2003 and 2008 to the researcher. Figure 
4.5 contains the frequency distribution of the number of employees within the sample 
as well as the basic population.  
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Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of number of employees (PVI, Q5) 
 
Since headcount is one important criteria that defines SMEs (European Commission, 
2006; Institute for SME Research, 2012), this was used to analyze the 
representativeness of the sample. To test whether the distributions of the sample are 
significantly different from those of the basic population, chi-square tests were used 
for the two variables that allowed a comparison.  Table 4.1 demonstrates that  no 
significant difference is perceivable. Regarding the frequency distributions, it cannot 
be rejected that the sample and the basic population underlie the same distribution. 
Consequently, no evidence against representativeness could be found.  
Table 4.1: Tests for representativeness of the sample 
  Sample             Basic population             Total 
Savings bank 57 37.7% 419 44.0% 476 43.2% 
Co-operative bank 77 51.0% 428 45.0% 505 45.8% 
Private bank 17 11.3% 105 11.0% 122 11.1% 
Total 151 100.0% 952 100.0% 1,103 100.0% 
χ2 = 2.228; df = 2; p = 0.328; Sig. ≥ 0.01       
         Sample             Basic population           Total 
1-9 employees 86 56.6% 618 64.9% 704 63.8% 
10-49 employees 56 36.8% 276 29.0% 332 30.1% 
50-249 employees 9 5.9% 48 5.0% 57 5.2% 
≥ 250 employees 1 0.7% 10 1.1% 11 1.0% 
Total 152 100.0% 952 100.0% 1,104 100.0% 
χ2 = 4.514; df = 3; p = 0.211; Sig. ≥ 0.01       
 
Appendix VIII contains frequency distributions of all other questions which are not 
discussed in this or the following sections. It presents, for example, the frequency 
distribution of the answers about the respondent’s position within the SMEs. The 
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question was asked to ensure that respondents were adequately qualified to answer 
the survey. Additionally, it contains questions about the guarantee bank. However, 
these questions did not contribute to the evaluation of the expected learning effect 
between the lending banks and the borrowers and were not further analyzed.  
4.2  Access to bank loans 
The first question within the web survey (Part I) asked how severe the difficulties 
were in obtaining bank loans (from 1 = not severe to 5 = severe). Analysing the 
answers to this question allowed an estimation of credit restrictions for SMEs 
(proposition 1). In a first step, univariate descriptive analyses were conducted. Table 
4.2 shows the frequency distribution of the answers given. 
Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of problems in obtaining bank finance 
Value label Value Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Not severe 1 2 1.3 1.3 1.3 
 2 16 10.2 10.2 11.5 
 3 45 28.7 28.7 40.2 
 4 57 36.3 36.3 76.5 
Severe 5 36 22.9 22.9 99.4 
Missing 0 1 0.6 0.6 100.0 
 Total 157 100.0 100.0  
 
The table above demonstrates that the majority of all respondents confirmed 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans for SMEs. This is also confirmed by a mean value 
of 3.68 and a standard deviation of 1.020.  
It has already been illustrated that some firm characteristics are widely associated 
with higher difficulties in receiving bank loans than other. To test whether this also 
applies for those SMEs that answered the survey, bivariate analyses were conducted. 
Based on existing literature, higher difficulties were expected for those SMEs that 
were associated with a higher risk by the lending banks. These are especially 
younger and smaller firms (Creditreform, 2013; Schwarz and Zimmermann, 2012; 
Beck et al. 2010; Reize 2011), firms of industrial sectors that have higher default 
risks (Creditreform, 2010) and firms in a legal form with limited liability (Reize, 
2011). Therefore, the relationship between the access to bank finance and the age of 
119 
 
the firm, the industrial sector, the size of the firm and the legal form where analysed 
by using cross tabulation and chi-square tests. To find out whether difficulties are 
related to the type of bank the SME applied for a loan, the relationship between the 
access to bank loans and the type of bank was tested. 
Relation between access to bank loans and number of employees 
Higher difficulties in obtaining bank loans are expected for the smallest SMEs 
(Reize, 2011; Schwarz and Zimmermann, 2012). In the web survey, size of the firms 
was measured by headcount. Table 4.3 highlights the results of the cross tabulation 
and the chi-square test. To distinguish between the smallest firms and bigger firms 
within the sample, two categories were created. The first category contains firms 
with up to 9 employees; the second category is firms with more than 9 employees.  
The answers about access to bank loans are divided in three categories: those that 
indicated no severe difficulties (values 1 + 2), those that decided for the neutral 
position (value 3) and those that indicated severe problems (values 4 + 5). The 
categorization was intended to improve results of the contingency tables. Without the 
categorization, the contingency table contained an expected count of less than 5 for 
more than 20 per cent of all cells.  
Table 4.3: Access to bank finance (PI, Q1) vs. number of employees (PIV, Q5) 
    Number of employees   
  ≤ 9 employees > 9 employees Total 
Difficulties in obtaining  
bank finance 
      Not severe 11 12.8% 7 10.6% 18 11.9% 
Neutral 25 29.1% 19 28.8% 44 28.9% 
Severe 50 58.1% 40 60.6% 90 59.2% 
Total 86 100% 66 100% 152 100% 
χ²=0.190; df=2; p=0.909; Sig. ≥0.1           
 
Other than expected, the results convey that the smallest firms did not indicate more 
severe problems in obtaining bank loans than older firms. All firms affirmed the 
existence of financing problems for SMEs. Consequently, the assumed relationship 
cannot be confirmed.  
Relation between access to bank loans and legal form 
One could assume that SMEs with a legal form that limits the liability of the owners 
have more problems in obtaining bank loans than firms with a legal form of 
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unlimited liability since these firms can unload a part of their default risk upon the 
lender in the case of an insolvency (Reize, 2011). To test this, the responses to the 
question about the legal form were categorized. One category contained the legal 
forms with unlimited liability (sole proprietorship and partnership), and the other 
category contained legal forms with limited liability (limited company, GmbH 
limited company & Co., stock company). Table 4.4 shows the results of the statistical 
tests: 
Table 4.4: Access to bank finance (PI, Q1) vs. legal form (PIV, Q1) 
    Legal form   
 
Unlimited Limited Total 
Difficulties in obtaining  
bank finance 
      Not severe 10 14.3% 8 10.0% 18 12.0% 
Neutral 21 30.0% 23 28.7% 44 29.3% 
Severe 39 55.7% 49 61.3% 88 58.7% 
Total 70 100.0% 80 100.0% 150 100.0% 
χ²=0.786; df=2; p=0.675; Sig. ≥0.1           
 
The table demonstrates that no difference is perceivable between legal forms with 
unlimited liability and those with limited liability.  
Relation between access to bank loans and industrial sector 
Industrial sectors are associated with different default risks (Creditreform, 2010). 
SMEs that are acting within an industrial sector that is connected to a relatively high 
default risk might have more severe difficulties in receiving bank loans than others 
(Reize, 2011). To test this, industrial sectors with bad solvency, according to 
Creditreform 2010, have been identified. The so-called Bonitätsindex (solvency 
index) of Creditreform is presented in Table 4.5:  
Table 4.5: Creditreform solvency index 2010  
Industrial sector Solvency index 06/2010 
Hospitality industry 276 
Building industry 257 
Consumption services 257 
Automobile trade 256 
Traffic/logistic 252 
Enterprise services 251 
Retail industry 251 
Overall economy 250 
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Table 4.5        (continued)  
Industrial sector Solvency index 06/2010 
Agriculture 249 
Information and communication  249 
Consumer goods 245 
Provider and disposer 239 
Metal processing 239 
Mining 239 
Wholesale trade 238 
Engineering 236 
Electrical industry 234 
Financial services 229 
(Source: Creditreform 2010a, p. 15) 
The definitions of the industrial sectors used in the web survey are oriented toward 
those used by the guarantee banks (Association of German Guarantee Banks 2012). 
Therefore, the definitions do not correspond to those of Creditreform, and the index 
could not be reproduced exactly. Industrial sectors that were contained in both 
sources are the hospitality industry, the retail industry and the service industry (even 
though this sector was divided into two parts in the solvency index of Creditreform, 
both sectors are worse than the overall economy and can be merged). The crafts 
industry is not represented in the solvency index. However, regarding all sectors 
presented in the index, it fits mostly to the building industry. In the solvency index, 
the building industry is worse than the overall economy. For allowing better 
distinction between those industrial sectors that are related to a solvency better than 
the overall economy and those related to a worse solvency, two separate groups have 
been created. Firms of the industrial sectors industry and wholesale were merged to 
the group ‘better solvency’ and firms of the crafts industry, retail, hospitality and 
service were merged to the group ‘worse solvency’. The results of the chi-square test 
and the contingency table for these two groups are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Access to bank finance (PI,Q1) vs. industrial sector (PIV,Q3) 
  Industrial sector 
    Worse solvency Better solvency Total 
Difficulties in obtaining  
bank finance 
      Not severe 14 10.4% 4 18.2% 18 11.5% 
Neutral 41 30.6% 4 18.2% 45 28.8% 
Severe 79 59.0% 14 63.6% 93 59.6% 
Total 134 100.0% 22 100.0% 156 100.0% 
χ²=2.059; df=2; p=0.357; Sig. ≥0.1         
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The findings demonstrate that no significant statistical relationship between the two 
variables was found. It becomes visible that also firms of industrial sectors which are 
better than the overall economy reported difficulties in obtaining bank loans.  
Relation between access to bank loans and age  
Another relationship can be expected between the age of the firm and its access to 
bank loans. It is assumed that younger firms or start-ups have more severe 
difficulties in receiving bank loans than older firms (Columba et al. 2010; Beck et al. 
2010; Berger and Udell, 1998). The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.7 
below. 
Table 4.7: Access to bank finance (PI, Q1) vs. age of the firms (PIV, Q2) 
  Age of the firm 
  1-3 years 4-9 years >9 years Total 
Difficulties in obtaining  
bank finance 
       Not severe  2 16.7% 3 4.5% 13 17.1% 18 11.7% 
Neutral 4 33.3% 26 39.4% 14 18.4% 44 28.6% 
Severe  6 50.0% 37 56.1% 49 64.5% 92 59.7% 
Total 12 100.0% 66 100.0% 76 100.0% 154 100.0% 
χ²=11.210; df=4; p=0.024; Sig. <0.05             
 
For a descriptive analysis, the results confirm a relationship between the two 
variables. Younger firms less often stated having more severe difficulties in 
obtaining bank loans for SMEs than expected whereas older firms more frequently 
indicated severe problems. This is not in line with the expected outcome. However, 
due to the fact that 22.2 per cent of the cells had an expected count of less than 5, 
reliable statistical results cannot be generated.  
Relation between access to bank loans and type of bank 
SME loans in Germany are primarily provided by either savings banks or co-
operative banks. This is due to the central aim of these two banks to support German 
SMEs. Private banks are more reluctant in providing SME loans. To demonstrate 
this, cross tabulation and chi-square test for the relationship between bank sector and 
the number of employees, legal form, industrial sector and age of the firm have been 
conducted. The results are presented in Table 4.8 below.  
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Table 4.8: Demographic variables (PIV, Q1,2,3,5) vs. bank sector (PIII, Q5) 
    Bank type   
  
Savings bank or     
co-operative bank Private bank Total 
Number of employees 
     ≤ 9 employees 78 59.1% 7 41.2% 85 57.0% 
10-49 employees 50 37.9% 5 29.4% 55 36.9% 
> 49 employees 4 3.0% 5 29.4% 9 6.0% 
Total 132 100.0% 17 100.0% 149 100.0% 
χ²=18.493; df=2; p=0.000; Sig. <0.01         
       Legal form 
      Unlimited liability 66 50.8% 3 17.6% 69 46.9% 
Limited liablilty 64 49.2% 14 82.4% 78 53.1% 
Total 130 100.0% 17 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ²=6.622; df=1; p=0.015; Sig. <0.05         
       Industrial sector 
     Worse solvency 118 86.1% 13 76.5% 131 85.1% 
Better solvency 19 13.7% 4 23.5% 23 14.9% 
Total 137 100.0% 17 100.0% 154 100.0% 
χ²=1.111; df=1; p=0.292; Sig. ≥0.1         
       Firm age 
      1-3 years 9 6.7% 2 11.8% 11 7.3% 
4-9 years 58 43.3% 8 47.1% 66 43.7% 
>9 years 67 50.0% 7 41.2% 74 49.0% 
Total 134 100.0% 17 100.0% 151 100.0% 
χ²=0.817; df=1; p=0.664; Sig. ≥0.1         
 
The results demonstrate that private banks provide a smaller number of loans to 
SMEs. No relationship between the bank and the industrial sector or the age of the 
firms is perceivable. Regarding the size of the firms, the results illustrate that private 
banks provide more loans to bigger firms which are related to a lower probability of 
default. Savings banks and co-operatives provided more loans to smaller firms which 
are related to a higher  probability of default (Beck et al. 2010; Cressy, 2006; Leeth 
and Scott, 1989). The relationship between the bank and the size of a firm is 
statistically significant (Sig. <0.01). To evaluate the strength of the association, 
Cramer´s V was calculated (McHugh, 2013; Bühl, 2008; Brosius, 2006). The value 
of 0.352 demonstrates that the association is not strong. The results illustrated in 
table 4.8 also demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between the bank 
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and the legal form (Sig. <0.05). It is perceivable that private banks provide loans 
more often to firms with a legal form of limited liability. To measure the association 
of the 2x2 table, Phi was calculated (Malhotra, 2010; Bühl, 2008; Brosius, 2006). 
The value of 0.212 shows a low association. 
To find out whether difficulties in obtaining bank loans are dependent on the bank of 
a firm, cross tabulation and chi-square test were also run for these two variables. The 
results are illustrated in Table 4.9 below. 
Table 4.9: Access to bank finance (PI, Q1) vs. bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Bank  
  Savings bank Co-operative Private bank Total 
Difficulties in obtaining  
bank finance 
       Not severe  9 15.3% 9 11.7% 0 0.0% 18 11.8% 
Neutral 16 27.1% 21 26.3% 6 35.3% 43 28.1% 
Severe  34 57.6% 47 61.0% 11 64.7% 92 60.1% 
Total 59 100.0% 77 100.0% 17 100.0% 153 100.0% 
χ²=3.094; df=4; p=0.542; Sig. ≥0.1             
 
According to the results, no difference between the banks is perceivable. SMEs have 
to face the same difficulties in obtaining bank loans from private banks as SMEs face 
from savings banks or co-operatives. However, the results do not meet the 
requirements for a chi-square test since 22.2 per cent of the cells have a count of less 
than 5.  
Interim conclusion about access to bank loans  
The previous sections have demonstrated that SMEs indeed have to face difficulties 
in obtaining bank loans. However, the expected relations have not been confirmed 
statistically. The findings indicate that difficulties exist independently of the legal 
form, the industrial sector, the number of employees or the type of bank a firm 
applies for a loan. These findings are widely in line with an analysis undertaken by 
the Reconstruction Loan Corporation in 2011. It empirically tested loan denials for 
SMEs and found that the legal form and the industrial sector play a minor part in 
credit refusals. However, they also found that very small SMEs with not more than 
five employees have to face higher difficulties in obtaining bank loans (Reize, 2011). 
The classifications of the single categories are not that acute in the presented 
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research. The smallest group consists of one to nine employees. That might be one 
reason for the slightly different results. Another reason might be that the research 
presented here was addressed solely to SMEs that received a guarantee of a 
guarantee bank. Those SMEs are more involved in difficulties in obtaining bank 
loans. Most of them would not even have received a loan without the guarantee 
which will be demonstrated later. 
The results also demonstrated that co-operative banks and savings banks are more 
important for SME financing since these banks provide more loans to the respondent 
firms. Moreover, savings banks and co-operative banks provided more loans to 
smaller and younger firms and firms with unlimited liability.  
4.3  Significance of guarantees for the access to bank finance 
To assess whether guarantees from the guarantee bank help to mitigate problems in 
obtaining bank loans of SMEs (proposition 2a), respondents of the web survey were 
asked to give a statement about the significance of the guarantee for receiving the 
bank loan (part II, question 3e). Firms had to state whether they ‘absolutely agree’ 
(value 1), ‘rather agree’ (value 2), ‘rather not agree’ (value 3) or ‘absolutely not 
agree’ (value 4) to the statement that the guarantee was crucial for obtaining the loan. 
As visible in Figure 4.6, the vast majority of all SMEs absolutely or rather agree to 
the statement that the guarantee was crucial to obtain the loan. 
Figure 4.6: Frequency distribution of significance  
 
The high importance of guarantees also becomes visible by the mean value of 1.46 
and the standard deviation of 0.705.  
It can be expected that the significance of a guarantee is higher for those SMEs that 
have to face more difficulties in obtaining bank loans. To test this, contingency tables 
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and chi-square tests have been computed. The appropriate use of the chi-square test 
requires that no more than 20 per cent of the cells show an expected frequency of 
less than 5 (Bühl 2008; Brosius 2006). To better meet this prerequisite, the answers 
about the significance of the guarantee have been categorized. The category 
‘guarantee was crucial’ contains respondents that absolutely agreed and agreed to the 
statement that the guarantee was crucial for obtaining the loan. Respondents that 
rather not or absolutely not agreed are pooled in the category ‘guarantee was not 
crucial’. 
Relation between significance of guarantee and number of employees 
In a first step, the relationship between the significance of a guarantee for obtaining 
bank loans and the number of employees of the firms are illustrated. It is 
distinguished between firms with up to nine employees and those with more than 
nine employees. The classification is related to existing data showing that smaller 
firms have more severe difficulties in obtaining bank loans due to higher insolvency 
risk (Creditreform, 2012) or smaller equity ratios (Creditreform, 2013; Zimmermann, 
2009). The results of cross tabulation and chi-square test are demonstrated in Table 
4.10 below. 
Table 4.10: Significance guarantee (PII, Q3e) vs. number employees (PIV, Q5) 
    Employees     
  ≤ 9 employees > 9 employees Total 
Significance guarantee 
      Guarantee was crucial 81 96.4% 52 85.2% 133 91.7% 
Guarantee was not crucial 3 3.6% 9 14.8% 12 8.3% 
Total 84 100.0% 61 100.0% 145 100.0% 
χ²=5.822; df=1; p=0.016; Sig. <0.05            
 
The results confirm a relationship between the significance of a guarantee for 
obtaining a bank loan and the number of employees of a SME. Smaller firms more 
often indicated a high significance of the guarantee than bigger firms. The 
relationship is statistically significant (p=0.016). To evaluate the strength of the 
association between the number of employees and the significance of a guarantee 
(two dichotomous variables; 2x2 table), Phi was computed (Malhotra 2010; Saunders 
et al. 2009; Bühl 2008). The Phi-value of 0.200 (Sig. 0.016) illustrates that the 
association is not very strong.  
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Relation between significance of guarantee and legal form 
To find out whether a relationship between the legal form of a firm and the 
significance of a guarantee exists, the legal forms were divided into two groups: 
those with unlimited liability and those with limited liability. Table 4.11 shows that 
the expected relationship cannot be confirmed. 
Table 4.11: Significance of guarantee (PII, Q3e) vs. legal form (PIV, Q1) 
  Legal form 
  Unlimited Limited Total 
Significance guarantee 
      Guarantee was crucial 64 92.8% 67 90.5% 131 91.6% 
Guarantee was not crucial 5 7.2% 7 9.5% 12 8.3% 
Total 69 100.0% 74 100.0% 143 100.0% 
χ²=0.227; df=1; p=0.633; Sig. ≥0.1           
 
Relation between significance of guarantee and industrial sector 
It can be assumed that the significance of guarantees from guarantee banks is higher 
for SMEs from industrial sectors which are related to high risk. The assumption is 
that SMEs from industrial sectors with a higher risk have more problems to obtain a 
loan (Creditreform 2010). Therefore, the guarantee is more important to obtain a 
loan. To test whether a relationship between the industrial sector and the assessment 
of the significance of a guarantee exists, contingency table and chi-square test were 
conducted. The results are demonstrated in Table 4.12 below. According to the 
Creditreform Solvency Index 2010 the following distinction was applied: firms of the 
industrial sectors wholesale and industry were merged to the group ‘better solvency’ 
and firms of the  crafts industry, retail, hospitality and service were merged to the 
group ‘worse solvency’ (compared to the overall economy).  
Table 4.12: Significance guarantee (PII, Q3e) vs. sector groups (PIV, Q3) 
  Industrial sector 
  Worse solvency Better solvency Total 
Significance guarantee 
      Guarantee was crucial 114 90.5% 21 100.0% 135 91.8% 
Guarantee was not crucial 12 9.5% 0 0.0% 12 8.2% 
Total 126 100.0% 21 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ²=0.227; df=1; p=0.140; Sig. ≥0.1           
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Within the contingency table, 25.0 per cent of the cells have an expected count of 
less than 5. Therefore, Fisher’s exact test was used. However, the value of 0.216 (2-
sided) and the value of 0.145 (1-sided) do not indicate a significant relationship.  
Relation between significance of guarantee and age of the firm 
As it was supposed that younger firms have more difficulties in obtaining bank loans 
(Columba et al. 2010; Reize, 2005; Berger and Udell, 1998), it can also be expected 
that for those firms, guarantees from guarantee banks are more important. Table 4.13 
below demonstrates that the expected relationship between the two variables cannot 
be confirmed. Guarantees from guarantee banks had the same high significance 
within all groups of firms. 
Table 4.13: Significance of guarantee (PII, Q3e) vs. age of the firms (PIV, Q2) 
  Age of the firm 
  1-3 years 4-9 years >9 years Total 
Significance guarantee 
        Guarantee was crucial 11 91.7% 60 92.3% 64 91.4% 135 91.8% 
Guarantee was not crucial 1 8.3% 5 7.7% 6 8.6% 12 8.2% 
Total 12 100.0% 65 100.0% 70 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ²=0.035; df=2; p=0.983; Sig. ≥0.1               
 
Relation between significance of guarantee and types of bank 
To evaluate whether the importance of a guarantee from a guarantee bank depends 
on the type of bank a firm applies for a loan, contingency table and chi-square test 
were computed with these two variables. The results are highlighted in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14: Significance guarantee (PII, Q3e) vs. type of bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Bank  
  Savings bank Co-operative Private bank Total 
Significance guarantee 
        Guarantee was crucial 53 94.6% 67 91.8% 13 86.7% 133 92.4% 
Guarantee was not crucial 3 5.4% 6 8.2% 2 13.3% 11 7.6% 
Total 56 100.0% 73 100.0% 15 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=1.137; df=2; p=0.566; Sig. ≥0.1               
 
Within the contingency table, two cells (33.3%) have an expected count of less than 
5, and further categorization is not possible. However, the p-value of 0.566 
demonstrates that no statistical significance is perceivable. Regarding the percentage 
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distribution within the cells, it can be stated that even from a descriptive standpoint a 
relationship between the significance of a guarantee and the type of bank is not 
perceivable.  
Interim conclusions about the significance of guarantees 
The previous sections have demonstrated that guarantees from the guarantee bank are 
widely considered to be crucial for obtaining bank loans. However, expected 
relationships between the significance of a guarantee from the guarantee bank and 
the examined demographic variables were not confirmed statistically. The only 
exception was that smaller firms indicated a higher importance of guarantees than 
bigger firms did. Regarding the other demographic variables, the results lead to the 
interim conclusion that guarantees were important for all respondents independent of 
the age, legal form, industrial sector or lending bank.  
4.4  Provision of information 
One aim of the research was to find out whether SMEs that obtained a loan including 
a guarantee from the guarantee bank Hesse provide more information or more 
regular information to their bank (see proposition 3a). To test this, SMEs were asked 
to judge two statements. The first statement was: ‘Since I have received the 
guaranteed loan, I provide more information about my business to my bank’ (PII, Q 
3c) and the second was: ‘Since I have received the guaranteed loan, I provide more 
regular information about my business to my bank’ (PII,Q 3d). Respondents had to 
state whether they ‘absolutely agree’ (value 1), ‘rather agree’ (value 2), ‘rather not 
agree’ (value 3) or ‘absolutely not agree’ (value 4) to the statements. Following the 
framework which was derived from the literature review (see Section 2.4), it was 
expected that SMEs provided more information as well as more regular information 
after they received the loan including the guarantee. This might reduce information 
asymmetries which are considered to be one reason for credit restrictions (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). Moreover, it was expected that SMEs that provided information 
more regularly also provided more information. The frequency distributions of the 
answers to the two questions are demonstrated in Figure 4.7 below. 
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Figure 4.7: Frequency distribution of information provided  
 
The figure illustrates that the ratio between those firms that absolutely or rather 
agreed to the first statement (amount of information provided) and those that did not 
agree is nearly equal. Regarding the second statement (regularity of information 
provided), approximately two-thirds of all respondents agreed and one-third 
disagreed. 
The answers to the two statements define the information behaviour in this research. 
This was determined by the judgement of the firms about whether they provided 
more information or/and more regular information to their bank since they received 
the loan including the guarantee from the guarantee bank. Additional univariate 
analyses were undertaken to further investigate the information behaviour of the 
respondent firms. Comparing the means, it becomes visible that the two values differ. 
The mean value of the statement about the amount of information provided is 2.388 
(standard deviation 0.917). This is slightly higher than the mean value of the 
statement about the regularity of the provision of information which is 2.027 
(standard deviation 0.866). The difference of the two values and, therefore, between 
the answers about the amount and the interval of information provided was also 
confirmed by running a paired t-test. The results are highlighted in Table 4.15. 
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Table 4.15: T-test of answers about amount and interval of information  
Mean 0.333 
Standard deviation 0.757 
Standard error 0.063 
T 5.282 
df 143 
Sig. 0.000 
 
The difference between the mean value generated from the t-test (0.333) and the 
mean value, which would have been expected regarding the means of the two 
variables (0.361), is explainable by missing values. While the mean value for the 
variable about the amount of information provided was calculated for N=147 (out of 
an overall sample of N=157), the mean value for the variable about the regularity of 
information provided was calculated for N=145. The t-test was calculated for N=144. 
For the 144 respondents that answered to both questions, the mean values are slightly 
different (amount of information provided: 2.368; regularity of information provided: 
2.035). This results in the above highlighted mean value of 0.333.   
To analyse the relationship between the two variables about the provision of 
information, a chi-square test is run. To ensure consistency with the statistical tests of 
this section, the answers about the provision of information are categorized for this 
test. The explanation for the categorization is provided below.  
Table 4.16: Amount information (PII, Q3c) vs. interval information (PII, Q3d) 
    Interval information     
  More regularly Not more regularly Total 
Amount information 
     More information 69 70.4% 2 4.3% 71 49.3% 
Not more information 29 29.6% 44 95.7% 73 50.7% 
Total 98 100.0% 46 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=54.657; df=1; p=0.0000; Sig. <0.01          
 
The results are statistically significant and confirm a relationship between the amount 
of information provided and the interval of information provided. The strong 
association between the two variables is  confirmed by the Phi-value of 0.616 (Bühl, 
2008).  
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It was already discussed that SMEs often have to face credit restrictions because of 
asymmetric information (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). 
Within the following sections it is tested whether information asymmetries can be 
reduced as a result of the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank. This is 
considered as being important especially for those firms that are related to a higher 
probability of default. Therefore, the relationships between the answers of the two 
statements concerning the information behaviour and demographic variables that are 
related to problems in obtaining bank loans were calculated. To ensure that the data 
better meets the requirements of the chi-square test (less than 20 per cent of the cells 
within a contingency table shall have an expected count of less than 5), answers 
about the information behaviour were categorized. SMEs that absolutely agreed or 
agreed to have provided more information since the loan including a guarantee was 
obtained were merged in the category ‘more information’. Firms that rather not 
agreed or absolutely not agreed to the statement are grouped in the category ‘not 
more information’. The category ‘more regularly’ includes firms that absolutely 
agreed or agreed to have provided information more regularly. The category ‘not 
more regularly’ contains firms that rather not agreed or not agreed to the statement.  
Relation between information and number of employees 
Table 4.17 presents the results about the tests for a relationship between the number 
of employees of a firm and the information behaviour.  
Table 4.17: Information (PII, Q3c,d) vs. number of employees (PIV, Q5) 
    Employees     
  ≤ 9 employees > 9 employees Total 
Amount information 
     More information 46 55.4% 24 39.3% 70 48.6% 
Not more information 37 44.6% 37 60.7% 74 51.4% 
Total 83 100.0% 61 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=3.638; df=1; p=0.056; Sig. <0.1          
       Interval information 
     More regularly 63 75.9% 34 57.6% 97 68.3% 
Not more regularly 20 24.1% 25 42.4% 45 31.7% 
Total 83 100.0% 59 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ²=5.321; df=1; p=0.021; Sig. <0.05          
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The results indicate that smaller firms provided more information since they received 
the loan including the guarantee. To further analyse the statistically significant 
relationship, Phi was computed (Malhotra, 2010; Bühl, 2008; Brosius, 2006). The 
value of 0.159 indicates a small association between the two variables.  
Considering the regularity, a relationship statistically cannot be rejected. Smaller 
firms provided information more regularly. The calculated Phi-value of 0.194 
indicates a small association between the two variables. 
Summing up the results, it can be said that smaller firms provide more and more 
regular information to their bank. It may be assumed that these firms are related to 
higher information asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 
2008). Therefore, the provision of a guarantee might contribute to a reduction of 
asymmetric information. 
Relation between information and legal form 
It was tested whether firms with limited liability had to provide more or more regular 
information after receiving a guarantee from the guarantee bank. The results are 
presented in Table 4.18 below. 
Table 4.18: Information (PII, Q3c,d) vs. legal form (PIV, Q1) 
  Legal form 
  Unlimited Limited Total 
Amount information 
     More information 33 48.5% 38 51.4% 71 50.0% 
Not more information 35 51.5% 36 48.6% 71 50.0% 
Total 68 100.0% 74 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ²=0.113; df=1; p=0.737; Sig. ≥0.1         
       Interval information 
     More regularly 52 78.8% 45 60.8% 97 69.3% 
Not more regularly 14 21.2% 29 39.2% 43 30.7% 
Total 66 100.0% 74 100.0% 140 100.0% 
χ²=05.298; df=1; p=0.021; Sig. <0.05         
 
The results demonstrate that no relationship between the amount of information 
provided and the legal form exists. Regarding the results about the regularity of 
information provided, SMEs with unlimited liability more often agreed to have 
provided information more regularly. For these firms, information asymmetries 
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might be reduced. The results are statistically significant. The association between 
the two variables is low (0.195).  
Relation between information and industrial sector 
To test whether SMEs of industrial sectors which are related to a higher probability 
of default provide more information or more regular information, contingency tables 
and chi-square tests were conducted. The results are illustrated in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19: Information (PII, Q3c,d) vs. industrial sector (PIV, Q3) 
  Industrial sector 
  Worse solvency Better solvency Total 
Amount information 
     More information 60 47.6% 12 57.1% 72 49.0% 
Not more information 66 52.4% 9 42.9% 75 51.0% 
Total 126 100.0% 21 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ²=0.653; df=1; p=0.419; Sig. ≥0.1         
       Interval information 
     More regularly 86 69.4% 13 61.9% 99 68.3% 
Not more regularly 38 30.6% 8 38.1% 46 31.7% 
Total 124 100.0% 21 100.0% 145 100.0% 
χ²=0.460; df=1; p=0.498; Sig. ≥0.1         
 
The table demonstrates that no statistically significant relationship has been found. 
SMEs that were engaged in industrial sectors related to a higher probability of 
default did not provide more information nor did they provide information more 
regularely after having received a guarantee from a guarantee bank.  
Relation between information and age of the firm  
Young SMEs often have more problems with providing sufficient information due to 
their short business history (Zimmermann, 2007; Craig et al., 2008; Columba et al., 
2010). This section is about testing whether these SMEs provided more information 
and more regular information since they received the loan with guarantee. Table 4.20 
presents the results of the contingency tables and chi-square test. 
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Table 4.20: Information (PII, Q3c,d) vs. age of the firms (PIV, Q2) 
  Age of the firm 
  1-3 years 4-9 years >9 years Total 
Amount information 
       More information 5 45.5% 35 53.8% 32 45.7% 72 49.3% 
Not more information 6 54.5% 30 46.2% 38 54.3% 74 50.7% 
Total 12 100.0% 65 100.0% 70 100.0% 146 100.0% 
χ²=0.963; df=2; p=0.618; Sig. ≥0.1             
Interval information 
       More regularly 11 91.7% 45 72.6% 43 61.4% 99 68.8% 
Not more regularly 1 8.3% 17 27.4% 27 38.6% 45 31.3% 
Total 12 100.0% 62 100.0% 70 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=5.103; df=2; p=0.078; Sig. <0.1             
 
The table demonstrates that no relationship between the amount of information 
provided and the age of the firms exists. Regarding the interval of information 
provided, it can be stated that younger firms more often indicated to have provided 
information more regularly after the guarantee from the guarantee bank was 
obtained. For these firms, information asymmetries might have been reduced. To 
further analyse the statistically significant relationship, Cramer’s V was computed 
(Malhotra, 2010; Bühl, 2008; Brosius, 2006). The value of 0.188 indicates a small 
association between the two variables.  
Relation between information and bank 
An interesting question is whether the information behaviour differs according to the 
bank an SME received a loan from. Table 4.21 contains the results of the 
contingency tables and chi-square tests of the variables about the information 
behaviour and the bank. 
Table 4.21: Information (PII, Q3c,d) vs. type of bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Bank  
  Savings bank Co-operative Private bank Total 
Amount information 
       More information 31 55.4% 33 45.2% 6 40.0% 70 48.6% 
Not more information 25 44.6% 40 54.8% 9 60.0% 74 51.4% 
Total 56 100.0% 73 100.0% 15 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=1.804; df=2; p=0.406; Sig. ≥0.1             
             
        
136 
 
Table 4.21            (continued)       
 Bank 
 Savings bank Co-operative Private bank Total 
Interval information 
       More regularly 43 76.8% 46 63.9% 8 57.1% 97 68.3% 
Not more regularly 13 23.2% 26 36.1% 6 42.9% 45 31.7% 
Total 56 100.0% 72 100.0% 14 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ²=3.315; df=2; p=0.191; Sig. ≥0.1             
 
The table illustrates that no statistically significant relationship exists between the 
information behaviour and the bank a SME receives a loan from.  
Interim conclusion about the information behaviour 
To evaluate whether the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank can reduce 
existing information asymmetries contingency tables and chi-square tests were 
computed. The statistically significant results indicated that smaller firms provided 
more information since they received the loan including the guarantee. Regarding the 
interval of information provided, statistically significant relationships can be 
confirmed for smaller firms, firms with a legal form of unlimited liability and 
younger firms. Younger and smaller firms especially had problems in obtaining bank 
loans due to information asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Zimmermann, 2007; 
Craig et al. 2008; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Columba et al. 2010). The results 
have demonstrated that for these firms, guarantees from a guarantee bank can be 
considered as beneficial instrument to mitigate asymmetric information.  
4.5  Bank-borrower relationships 
To test whether guarantees from the guarantee bank can alter the lending behaviour 
of banks in a sustainable way (proposition 3b), special attention was paid to the 
creation of bank-borrower relationships. The literature review has demonstrated that 
lending relationships have a direct impact on the availability of loans for firms 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Cole, 1998). Therefore, the 
respondent firms were asked to state whether they ‘absolutely agree’ (value 1), 
‘rather agree’ (value 2), ‘rather not agree’ (value 3) or ‘absolutely not agree’ (value 
4) to the statement: ‘The relationship to my bank has intensified since I have 
received the guaranteed loan’ (Part II, Q 3f).  
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 In a first step, univariate analyses have been conducted to find out whether lending 
relationships were intensified or created. The frequency distribution of the answers to 
the statement concerning the lending relationship revealed that only a low number of 
the respondents agreed. Figure 4.8 shows the number of answers to the statement 
mentioned above.  
Figure 4.8: Frequency distribution of intensification of relationship 
 
For the majority of all respondents the relationship to their bank was not intensified 
since the loan including the guarantee was received. This is also demonstrated by the 
mean value of 2.49 (standard deviation 0.831). Although the share of respondents 
that confirmed an intensification of the bank-borrower relationship is rather low, the 
following sections will analyse whether relationships between demographic factors 
and the creation of a lending relationship exist. It is expected that especially firms 
that are related to a higher probability of default had the opportunity to establish a 
better relationship to the bank to demonstrate their credibility. These firms would not 
have obtained this opportunity if the guarantee had not been provided. Therefore, it 
will be tested whether the guarantees established a basis for a sustainable reduction 
of credit restrictions for these firms. This follows the assumption that relationship 
lending can reduce information asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 2002) which are 
considered to be a main problem of restricted access to bank loans for SMEs (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). The expected relationships were tested by computing cross 
tabulations and chi-square tests. The answers to the question about the lending 
relationship were categorized. Firms that absolutely or rather agreed to the statement 
that the relationship had intensified were labeled under the category ‘intensified’. 
The category ‘not intensified’ contains those firms that did rather not or absolutely 
not agree to the statement.  
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guaranteed loan’  
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Relation between bank-borrower relationship and number of employees 
Smaller SMEs are associated with a higher probability of default (Creditreform, 
2012, 2009; Waschbusch and Straub, 2008) which might make banks more reluctant 
in providing loans to these firms. Therefore, the establishment of a lending 
relationship could be of a certain benefit for these firms. To test whether the loan 
including a guarantee from the guarantee bank fosters the creation of a bank-
borrower relationship for these firms, statistical tests were run. The results presented 
in Table 4.22 below demonstrate that the expected relationship cannot be confirmed. 
Table 4.22: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. number of employees (PIV, Q5) 
    Employees     
  ≤ 9 employees > 9 employees Total 
Relationship 
      Intensified 37 44.0% 25 41.7% 62 43.1% 
Not intensified 47 56.0% 35 58.3% 82 56.9% 
Total 84 100.0% 60 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=0.081; df=1; p=0.776; Sig.  ≥0.1           
 
Smaller firms did not indicate a stronger intensification of the relationship to the 
lending bank than bigger firms. For all firms, more than half of all respondents 
denied an intensification of the lending relationship.  
Relation between bank-borrower relationship and legal form 
A more intense relationship to the lending bank could be beneficial for firms with 
limited liability because these firms are associated to a higher risk for the bank. Table 
4.23 shows the results of the chi-square test and the contingency table which were 
run to test whether a relationship between the legal form and the creation of a lending 
relationship can be assessed. 
Table 4.23: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. legal form (PIV, Q1) 
  Legal form 
  Unlimited Limited Total 
Relationship 
      Intensified 31 44.9% 31 42.5% 62 43.7% 
Not intensified 38 55.1% 42 57.5% 80 56.3% 
Total 69 100.0% 73 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ²=0.087; df=1; p=0.768; Sig. ≥0.1         
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The presented results show no relationship between the legal form and the lending 
relationship. This indicates that the creation of a lending relationship was not related 
to the legal form of a firm.  
Relation between bank-borrower relationship and industrial sector 
Whether SMEs of industrial sectors which are associated to a higher risk show a 
stronger agreement with the statement about the intensification of the lending 
relationship is presented in Table 4.24. 
Table 4.24: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. industrial sector groups (PIV, Q3) 
  Industrial sector 
  Worse solvency Better solvency Total 
Relationship 
      Intensified 54 42.9% 9 42.9% 63 42.9% 
Not 
intensified 72 57.1% 12 57.1% 84 57.1% 
Total 126 100.0% 21 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ²=0.000; df=1; p=1.000; Sig. ≥0.1         
 
There is no perceivable difference between firms of industrial sectors that are riskier 
than the average and those which are less risky than the overall economy. Again, no 
relationship between the two variables was found.  
Relation between bank-borrower relationship and age of the firm 
To test whether young firms perceive an intensification of their lending relationship 
after they have obtained the loan, contingency table and chi-square test were run 
between these two variables. The results are illustrated in Table 4.25 below. 
Table 4.25: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. age of the firms (PIV, Q2)  
  Age of the firm 
  1-3 years 4-9 years >9 years Total 
Relationship 
        Intensified 5 41.7% 27 41.5% 31 44.9% 63 43.2% 
Not intensified 7 58.3% 38 58.5% 38 55.1% 83 56.8% 
Total 12 100.0% 65 100.0% 69 100.0% 146 100.0% 
χ²=0.168; df=2; p=0.919; Sig. ≥0.1             
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The results indicate that no relationship between the age of a firm and the creation of 
a lending relationship exists. Through all categories of firm age, the majority of all 
SMEs denied that the relationship to the bank had intensified.  
Relation between bank-borrower relationship and bank 
Whether the intensification of the bank-borrower relationship depends on the bank a 
SME received the loan from is presented in Table 4.26.  
Table 4.26: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. type of bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Bank  
  Savings bank Co-operative Private bank Total 
Relationship 
        Intensified 26 45.6% 31 42.5% 5 33.3% 62 42.8% 
Not intensified 31 54.4% 42 57.5% 10 66.7% 83 57.2% 
Total 57 100.0% 73 100.0% 15 100.0% 145 100.0% 
χ²=0.737; df=2; p=0.692; Sig. ≥0.1             
 
The results indicate that no relationship can be assessed.  
Relation between bank-borrower relationship and information behaviour 
It is worth analysing the relation between the information behaviour and the bank-
borrower relationship. The collection of information about the borrower helps banks 
to learn about the borrower’s creditworthiness and financial outlook. This 
information is considered to be crucial for making a lending decision (Berger and 
Udell, 2002; Diamond, 1984; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). Table 4.27 illustrates 
the results of the statistical tests. 
Table 4.27: Lending relationship (PII, Q3f) vs. information (PII, Q3c,d) 
    Amount information     
  More information Not more information Total 
Relationship 
      Intensified 43 60.6% 19 25.3% 62 42.5% 
Not intensified 28 39.4% 56 74.7% 84 57.5% 
Total 71 100.0% 75 100.0% 146 100.0% 
χ²=18.528; df=1; p=0.000; Sig. <0.01           
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Table 4.27            (continued)     
    Interval information     
  More regularly Not more regularly Total 
Relationship 
      Intensified 48 49.0% 15 32.6% 63 43.8% 
Not intensified 50 51.0% 31 67.4% 81 56.2% 
Total 98 100.0% 46 100.0% 144 100.0% 
χ²=3.409; df=1; p=0.065; Sig. <0.1           
 
The results confirm a relationship between the information behaviour and the bank-
borrower relationship. Firms that provided more information to their bank also 
indicated an intensification of the lending relationship. However, the positive 
association between the two variables is not very strong (0.356). Firms that stated 
that information was not provided more regularly after the loan was received also 
show a high agreement with the statement that the relationship to the bank has not 
intensified. The association between the two variables is very small (0.154). These 
results confirm the assumption that lending relationships can mitigate information 
asymmetries (Behr et al., 2011; Cole, 1998). 
Interim conclusion about bank-borrower relationships 
The results have not confirmed the assumption that SMEs which are related to a 
higher probability of default take the opportunity to create a more intense 
relationship to their bank after receiving the loan including a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. This was expected to be one mechanism to sustainably mitigate 
credit restrictions for SMEs. However, the results indicate that a positive relation 
between the information behaviour and the lending relationship exists. Accordingly, 
the provision of information can foster the relationship between a bank and a SME 
which is expected to have a positive impact on loan availability (Behr et al. 2011; 
Cole 1998).  
4.6  Mitigation of credit restrictions   
For facilitating the statistical analyses about whether guarantees from guarantee 
banks help to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs (proposition 4), the web survey 
contained a question about the need for a follow-up loan as well as a question about 
the need for a follow-up guarantee for this loan (Part II, Q 4 and 5). Out of 152 
respondent firms, 61 firms stated that they applied for another loan after they 
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received the initial loan including the guarantee. These 61 firms were asked to 
indicate whether they needed another guarantee for the follow-up loan. This question 
was designed to allow an assessment about the mitigation of credit restrictions. It 
was suggested that firms that needed no guarantee for the follow-up loan indeed have 
‘graduated’ to borrowers without a guarantee like presented in the framework about 
the learning process in Section 2.4. In the present sample, only 6 SMEs (9.8%) out of 
the overall 61 firms that applied for a follow-up loan needed a follow-up guarantee 
from the guarantee bank. Due to the fact that the sample size for bivariate statistical 
tests about the mitigation of credit restrictions reduced to 61 whereas only 6 
respondents needed a guarantee, representative status of statistical analyses cannot be 
achieved. This has to be considered when discussing the results. The main aim of this 
section is to find out whether the information behaviour and the lending relationship 
had an impact on the decision about the need for a follow up-guarantee. To test this, 
chi-square tests were conducted and will be presented. To complete the analyses, the 
relationships between the demographic variables and the need for a follow-up 
guarantee were also tested but no crucial relation was found. The results of these 
tests are shown in Appendix XI.  
Mitigation of credit restrictions and information 
Information asymmetries are considered to be one reason for credit restrictions 
(Graham, 2004; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, the investigation about the 
mitigation of credit restrictions starts by analysing whether those firms that needed a 
follow-up guarantee provided more or more regular information to their banks. One 
could assume that those firms that provided more/more regular information would 
not need a follow-up guarantee since asymmetric information could have been 
reduced. Table 4.28 presents the results of contingency tables run for the variables 
about the information behaviour and the need for a follow-up guarantee. 
Table 4.28: Follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. information (PII, Q3c,d) 
    Amount information     
  More information Not more information Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 4 12.9% 2 7.1% 6 10.2% 
No 27 87.1% 26 92.9% 53 89.8% 
Total 31 100.0% 28 100.0% 59 100.0% 
χ²=0.534; df=1; p=0.465; Sig. ≥0.01           
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Table 4.28            (continued)   
    Interval information     
  More regularly Not more regularly Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 5 13.2% 1 5.0% 6 10.3% 
No 33 86.8% 19 95.0% 52 89.7% 
Total 38 100.0% 20 100.0% 58 100.0% 
χ²=0.940; df=1; p=0.332; Sig. ≥0.01           
 
Within each contingency table, two cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 
5. Anyway, due to the very small number of SMEs that needed a follow-up loan, no 
definite statement can be made. Regarding the results above, it rather seems as if the 
information behaviour did not have any impact on the decision about whether a 
follow-up guarantee was needed. 
Mitigation of credit restrictions and lending relationship 
It is also assumed that a close bank-borrower relationship helps to overcome credit 
restrictions (Cole, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). To test whether the lending 
relationship had a positive impact on the reduction of credit restrictions, the relation 
between the need for a follow up loan and the bank-borrower relationship was tested. 
Table 4.29 shows the results of the analysis. 
Table 4.29: Follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. lending relationship (PII, Q3f)  
    Relationship     
  Intensified Not intensified Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 3 9.7% 3 10.3% 6 10.0% 
No 28 90.3% 26 89.7% 54 90.0% 
Total 31 100.0% 29 100.0% 60 100.0% 
χ²=0.007; df=1; p=0.931; Sig. ≥0.01           
 
Again, the number of those SMEs that needed a follow-up loan is too small to allow 
for reliable conclusions. Moreover, two cells (50.0%) within the contingency table 
have an expected count of less than 5. Those SMEs that reported an intensification of 
the relationship to their bank indeed needed follow-up loans. This suggests the 
assumption that no relationship is perceivable. 
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Interim conclusion about mitigation of credit restrictions 
No conclusion about the impact of the lending relationship or the information 
behaviour can be made due to the small sample size. However, as the vast majority 
of firms did not need a follow-up guarantee, one could assume that between the first 
loan application and the second some things must have changed. Otherwise, the 
banks would not have been willing to provide the future loans without a guarantee. 
However, it cannot be said that this was because of a reduction of information 
asymmetries or because of relationship lending. Other reasons could, for example, be 
that the firm had grown in the meantime and that for the follow-up loan sufficient 
tangible assets could have been provided for collateral. Thus, no concluding 
assessment about the ability of guarantees from the guarantee bank to mitigate credit 
restrictions in a sustainable way can be made at this stage.  
4.7  Cluster analysis of variables about existing relationships 
Further analyses were undertaken by clustering the respondent firms according to the 
bank-borrower relationship. Within the web survey, firms had to state how long the 
relationship to their bank already existed at the time they applied for the loan (part 
III, question 1), how often they were in contact with their bank (part III, question 2) 
and how often their bank-managers (=contact persons) changed in the past (part III, 
question 3). The answers to these questions allowed an assessment about the 
intensity and stability of the existing relationships between the banks and the 
borrowers.  
Hierarchical cluster analysis of the three variables was conducted by using Ward’s 
method. In the Ward’s procedure, means for all variables are calculated for each 
cluster. In a next step, the squared Euclidean distance to the means of the clusters is 
computed and the sums of the distances are built for all cases. Those clusters are 
merged that show the smallest growth of the squared within cluster distance. In the 
agglomerated schedule, the coefficient is the within cluster sum of squares at that 
step. Table 4.30 below contains the last twenty rows of the agglomerated schedule of 
the present cluster analysis. 
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Table 4.30: Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis  
Agglomeration schedule     
 Cluster combined  Stage cluster first appears  
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next Stage 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
127 4 49 28,721 118 113 143 
128 6 129 31,491 96 24 136 
129 2 9 34,467 112 85 137 
130 24 88 37,667 102 34 135 
131 3 15 40,900 116 123 140 
132 11 61 44,283 115 74 137 
133 13 18 47,697 119 121 142 
134 19 28 51,447 103 89 140 
135 10 24 56,839 81 130 145 
136 6 51 62,267 128 122 138 
137 2 11 69,392 129 132 139 
138 6 8 78,920 136 125 141 
139 2 5 89,762 137 124 143 
140 3 19 103,567 131 134 142 
141 6 17 121,911 138 126 145 
142 3 13 141,826 140 133 144 
143 2 4 163,013 139 127 144 
144 2 3 213,418 143 142 146 
145 6 10 272,214 141 135 146 
146 2 6 487,782 144 145 0 
 
The coefficients of the agglomerated schedule and the main branches of the 
dendrogram presented in Appendix IX show that different numbers of clusters were 
conceivable. To decide about the number of clusters that should be analysed, 
coefficients in the table can be considered (Norusis, 2009; Schendera, 2010; 
Malhotra, 2010). The highest distance between the clusters can be found between the 
stages 145 and 146. Therefore, the two-cluster solution was analysed in a first step. 
However, the results indicated that two clusters did not allow sufficient 
differentiation between the groups. The groups were not considered to be sufficiently 
heterogeneous among each other. Accordingly, a three-cluster solution was analysed 
in the second step. But again, the groups were not considered to be sufficiently 
heterogeneous among each other. After running analyses for the four-cluster solution 
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it became clear that the four-cluster solution was appropriate as the groups were 
sufficiently homogeneous as well as sufficiently heterogeneous among themselves. 
Regarding the results of Table 4.30, it becomes visible that between the stages 143 
and 144 the value increases by 50,000 points. This is the first ‘higher’ increase 
perceivable. Therefore, the decision for four clusters can not only be justified by the 
composition of these clusters but also by the distances at which the clusters are 
combined.  
To demonstrate the characteristics of the four clusters, chi-square tests were run for 
the ordinal variables used for the hierarchical cluster analysis. The results of two of 
them are presented in Table 4.31.  
Table 4.31: Clusters vs. relationship (PIII, Q1) and contact frequency (PIII, Q2)  
  Cluster        
  Cluster #1 Cluster #2 Cluster #3 Cluster #4 Total 
Duration bank-borrower 
relationship at the time of 
applying for the loan 
         No relationship  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 29 80.6% 23 85.2% 52 35.4% 
1-3 years 0 0.0% 5 11.9% 7 19.4% 4 14.8% 16 10.9% 
4-9 years 13 31.0% 15 35.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 28 19.0% 
> 9 years 29 69.0% 22 52.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 51 34.7% 
Total 42 100.0% 42 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ² = 138.027; df = 9; p = 0.000; Sig. < 0.01                
  Cluster        
  Cluster #1 Cluster #2 Cluster #3 Cluster #4 Total 
Contact frequency 
         No contact 1 2.4% 0 0.0% 6 16.7% 0 0.0% 7 4.8% 
1-2 times a year 25 59.5% 0 0.0% 20 55.6% 0 0.0% 45 30.6% 
3-5 times a year 16 38.1% 6 14.3% 10 27.8% 0 0.0% 32 21.8% 
> 5 times a year 0 0.0% 36 85.7% 0 0.0% 27 100.0% 63 42.9% 
Total 42 100.0% 42 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ² = 139.105; df = 9; p = 0.000; Sig. < 0.01                
 
More than 20% of the cells within the contingency tables have an expected count of 
less than 5. However, since the aim was to further characterize the four clusters, 
categorization of the variables was no option.  Table 4.31 illustrates that cluster #1 
and cluster #2 are characterized by longer bank-borrower relationships. The majority 
of all respondent firms within these clusters had a relationship to the lending bank of 
more than nine years. The opposite applies to cluster #3 and cluster #4. The vast 
majority of all firms within these clusters did not have an existing relationship to the 
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lending bank when they received the loan including the guarantee from the guarantee 
bank.  
Regarding the contact frequency, it becomes visible that the majority of the firms in 
cluster #1 and cluster #3 stated to have less frequent contact to their bank, whereas 
the firms of cluster #2 and cluster #4 stated to have more than 5 times contact to their 
bank. Consequently, the contact frequency is stronger for the firms of cluster #2 and 
cluster #4. 
Summarizing the results of the above presented tables allows characterizing and 
labelling the firms within the four clusters on the basis of the existing relationship to 
the bank when receiving the loan. Table 4.32 presents the categorization of the 
clusters. 
Table 4.32: Characteristics of the four clusters  
Cluster Duration relationship Contact frequency Label 
#1 > 9 year 1-2 times a year Reserved Old Hands 
#2 > 9 years > 5 times a year Present Old Hands 
#3 No relationship 1-2 times a year Reserved Rookies 
#4 No relationship > 5 times a year Present Rookies 
 
According to the existing or non-existing bank-borrower relationship the clusters 
have been labelled either ‘Old Hands’ or ‘Rookies’.  Rookies are those firms that had 
no relationship to the bank at the time they obtained the loan. These firms only just 
established a relationship to the bank by forging a first link. Old Hands, however, 
knew the lending bank for a long time and the bank knew them. Another 
differentiation in the labelling was chosen for the contact frequency. Firms that had 
more than five times contact to their bank were labelled with the affix ‘present’ as 
these firms seemed to be more present at their bank. Firms with 1-2 contacts per year 
were labelled with the affix ‘reserved’. This leads to four different groups according 
to the clustering: Present Old Hand, Reserved Old Hands, Present Rookies and 
Reserved Rookies. 
In the following, it will be tested whether crucial differences between the four groups 
exist concerning the variables known from the propositions tests of the prior sections.  
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Relations between clusters and demographic variables 
Whether differences between the four clusters and the number of employees exist 
can be seen in Table 4.33 below.  
Table 4.33: Clusters vs. number of employees (PIV, Q5)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Number of employees 
         ≤ 9 employees 22 53.7% 18 43.9% 27 75.0% 16 59.3% 83 57.2% 
> 9 employees 19 46.3% 23 56.1% 9 25.0% 11 40.7% 62 42.8% 
Total 41 100.0% 41 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 145 100.0% 
χ² = 7.879; df = 3; p = 0.049; Sig. < 0.05                
 
As the results indicate, Old Hands had a higher share of bigger firms. By contrast, 
Rookies tended to be smaller firms. Regarding the Present Rookies, three out of four 
of them had between 1 and 9 employees. Comparing the groups of Rookies and Old 
Hands among each other, the results demonstrate that those firms that indicated more 
contacts to their bank (denoted by the affix ‘present’) tended to be smaller firms. 
Consequently, it can be assumed that smaller firms were more often in contact with 
their bank. The results are statistically significant. The association between the two 
variables is low (0.233).  
To find out whether a relationship between the four clusters and the legal form for 
the groups exists, contingency table and chi-square test were run for these variables. 
The relationship expected in this context is that within both groups, the Rookies and 
the Old Hands, firms with limited liability would have more frequent contact with 
the bank (denoted by the affix ‘present’). This would be due to the higher risk 
perceived for these firms. One could assume that banks would be more interested in 
more frequent contact to obtain a deeper knowledge of the business success of these 
firms. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.34 below. 
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Table 4.34: Clusters vs. legal form (PIV, Q1)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Legal form 
         Unlimited liability 22 56.4% 10 23.8% 21 60.0% 13 48.1% 66 46.2% 
Limited liability 17 43.6% 32 76.2% 14 40.0% 14 51.9% 77 53.8% 
Total 39 100.0% 42 100.0% 35 100.0% 27 100.0% 143 100.0% 
χ² = 12.832; df = 3; p = 0.005; Sig. < 0.01                
 
The statistically significant results demonstrate that the expected relationship cannot 
be confirmed. By contrast, Present Old Hands as well as Present Rookies show a 
higher share of firms with unlimited liability compared to their ‘reserved’ 
counterparts. Consequently, the expected relationship cannot be confirmed. The 
association between the two variables is not very strong (0.300).  
Another relationship expected is between the contact frequency and the industrial 
sector of the firm. Again, this is associated with the risk perception of the banks. 
Firms in the industrial sector with a worse solvency than the average detected by the 
solvency index of Creditreform (Creditreform, 2010) are expected to have closer 
contact to their bank. Whether this applies for the firms of the sample can be 
gathered from Table 4.35. 
Table 4.35: Clusters vs. industrial sector groups (PIV, Q3)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Industrial sector 
         Worse solvency 37 88.1% 35 83.3% 33 91.7% 22 81.5% 127 86.4% 
Better solvency 5 11.9% 7 16.7% 3 8.3% 5 18.5% 20 13.6% 
Total 42 100.0% 42 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ² = 1.844; df = 3; p = 0.605; Sig. ≥ 0.1                
 
The findings illustrate that the vast majority of all four clusters were engaged in 
industrial sectors that were worse than the overall economy. However, no statistically 
significant relationship between the clusters and the industrial sector is found.  
As Rookies are new customers to the bank, a relationship between the age of a firm 
and the clusters can be expected. Regarding the contact frequency, it can be expected 
that younger firms would have closer contact to the bank because of the higher 
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perceived risk. Table 4.36 demonstrates the results of the statistical analysis about 
the expected relationships. 
Table 4.36: Clusters vs. age of the firms (PIV, Q2)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Age of the firm 
         1-3 years 2 4.8% 1 2.4% 3 8.3% 4 14.8% 10 6.8% 
4-9 years 14 33.3% 11 26.2% 26 72.2% 12 44.4% 63 42.9% 
> 9 years 26 61.9% 30 71.4% 7 19.4% 11 40.7% 74 50.3% 
Total 42 100.0% 42 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 147 100.0% 
χ² = 27.153; df = 6; p = 0.000; Sig. < 0.01               
 
The results can only be explained from a descriptive perspective since 33.3 per cent 
of the cells have a count of less than 5. While Old Hands contain a higher number of 
firms older than 9 years, Rookies show a higher share of younger firms. To further 
investigate these results, the purpose of the loan was analysed. Table 4.37 illustrates 
the relationship between the purpose of the loan (PII, Q1) and the clusters. The 
relationship is illustrated by a contingency table. Multiple answers were allowed. 
Therefore, results of the chi-square tests for all of the three options are demonstrated 
separately.  
Table 4.37: Clusters vs. purpose of the loan (PII, Q1)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Purpose of the loan 
         Investment 14 25.9% 14 27.4% 9 23.7% 8 27.6% 45 26.2% 
Start-up 22 40.7% 16 31.4% 25 65.8% 17 58.6% 80 46.5% 
Working capital 18 33.3% 21 41.2% 4 10.5% 4 13.8% 47 27.3% 
Total 54 100.0% 51 100.0% 38 100.0% 29 100.0% 172 100.0% 
Investment: χ² = .839; df = 3; p = 0.840; Sig. ≥ 0.1 
      Start-up: χ² = 8.653; df = 3; p = 0.034; Sig. < 0.05 
      Working capital: χ² = 19.421; df = 3; p = 0.000; Sig. < 0.01             
 
The results demonstrate that Rookies show a higher share of start-up loans while Old 
Hands more often received loans for financing working capital. Present Old Hands 
also show a relatively high share of start-up loans that might be used for mergers or 
acquisitions, for example. For the statistically significant relationships, Cramer’s V 
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was calculated. For start-up loans, the association is low (0.243). For working 
capital, the association is not very high (0.363), too. 
Finally, the relationship between the clusters and the type of bank an SME obtained 
the loan from was analysed. The results are highlighted in Table 4.38.  
Table 4.38: Clusters vs. type of bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Bank 
         Savings bank 21 50.0% 14 35.0% 11 30.6% 8 29.6% 54 37.2% 
Co-operative bank 18 42.9% 19 47.5% 20 55.6% 18 66.7% 75 51.7% 
Private bank 3 7.1% 7 17.5% 5 13.9% 1 3.7% 16 11.0% 
Total 42 100.0% 40 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 145 100.0% 
χ² = 8.459; df = 6; p = 0.206; Sig. ≥ 0.1                
 
To analyse the relationship between the duration of the relationship to a bank and the 
type of bank, the rows of the contingency table need to be considered. Overall 54 
SMEs (=100.0%) received their loans from savings banks. Out of these 54 firms, 19 
firms were Rookies. This is equivalent to 35.2 per cent. Out of the overall 75 firms 
that obtained the loan from a co-operative bank, 38 firms (50.7%) were Rookies. 
Regarding the customers of private banks, 37.5 per cent were Rookies. These figures 
demonstrate that SMEs that are looking for a new bank when applying for a loan 
tend to switch over to a co-operative bank. Old Hands also show high shares of co-
operative banks. It also becomes visible that Present Old Hands show the highest 
share of savings banks within the sample. However, due to the fact that 33.3 per cent 
of the cells had an expected count of less than 5, reliable statistical results cannot be 
generated.  
Relation between clusters and access to bank loans 
Regarding the relationship between the clusters and the access to bank loans it is 
expected that Rookies would report more difficulties in obtaining bank loans because 
these firms had to find a new bank to receive the loan that did not have any 
information about them. The results of the chi-square test are presented in Table 4.39 
below.  
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Table 4.39: Clusters vs. access to bank loans (PI, Q1) 
  Cluster 
 
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Difficulties in  
obtaining bank loans                 
Not severe 8 19.0% 5 11.9% 4 11.1% 1 3.7% 18 12.2% 
Neutral 9 21.4% 11 26.2% 8 22.2% 13 48.1% 131 29.9% 
Severe 25 59.5% 26 61.9% 24 66.7% 13 48.1% 12 59.9% 
Total 42 100.0% 42 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 143 100.0% 
χ²= 9.225; df = 6; p = 0.161; Sig. ≥ 0.1            
 
The table above indicates that the expected relationship cannot be confirmed. 
Rookies did not report more difficulties in obtaining bank loans than Old Hands. 
While Reserved Rookies show the lowest percentage of severe difficulties, the 
differences between the other clusters are only marginal. This leads to the conclusion 
that no crucial relationship between the clusters and the judgement about the access 
to bank loans exists. 
Relation between clusters and significance of guarantees 
Section 4.3 has demonstrated that a vast majority of all respondents in this sample 
confirmed a high significance of guarantees from the guarantee bank to obtain a bank 
loan. Whether this also applies for all four clusters is presented in Table 4.40 below. 
Table 4.40: Clusters vs. significance guarantee (PII, Q3e)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Significance guarantee 
         Guarantee was crucial 36 87.8% 35 89.7% 36 100.0% 24 88.9% 131 91.6% 
Guarantee was not crucial 5 12.2% 4 10.3% 0 0.0% 3 11.1% 12 8.4% 
Total 41 100.0% 39 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 143 100.0% 
χ² = 4.505; df = 3; p = 0.212; Sig. ≥ 0.1              
 
Within each contingency table, four cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less 
than 5. Anyway, the results show that guarantees are important for all four clusters.   
Relation between clusters and information behaviour 
Table 4.41 presents the contingency tables and chi-square tests of the analysis about 
the relationship between the four clusters and the provision of information. It is 
expected that Rookies would provide more information and more regular information 
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to their bank. As no relationship between the banks and these firms previously 
existed, one would assume that a reduction of information asymmetries would result.  
Table 4.41: Clusters vs. information behaviour (PII, Q3c,d)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Amount information 
         More information 19 46.3% 17 43.6% 18 50.0% 16 61.5% 70 49.3% 
Not more information 22 53.7% 22 56.4% 18 50.0% 10 38.5% 72 50.7% 
Total 41 100.0% 39 100.0% 36 100.0% 26 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ² = 2.217; df = 3; p = 0.529; Sig. ≥ 0.1                 
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Interval information  
         More regularly 28 70.0% 23 59.0% 24 70.6% 22 81.5% 97 69.3% 
Not more regularly 12 30.0% 16 41.0% 10 29.4% 5 18.5% 43 30.7% 
Total 40 100.0% 39 100.0% 34 100.0% 27 100.0% 140 100.0% 
χ² = 8.872; df = 3; p = 0.276; Sig. ≥ 0.1                 
 
The results demonstrate that Rookies indeed show a slightly higher agreement that 
they provided more information and more regular information to the commercial 
bank since they received the loan including a guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
However, the differences are not crucial and not statistically significant.  
One could assume that SMEs with a higher contact frequency (labelled by the affix 
‘present’) would also provide more information and more regular information to their 
banks. However, this is not completely confirmed by the results of the analysis. 
While Present Old Hands indeed show a higher agreement with both statements than 
Reserved Old Hands, Present Rookies show less agreement with the statements about 
the provision of information than Reserved Rookies.  
Relation between clusters and bank-borrower relationship 
Since Rookies had no relationship to their banks when receiving the loans, it is 
expected that these firms would show a higher agreement with the statement about 
the intensification of the bank-borrower relationship. Moreover, it is expected that 
Present Rookies as well as Present Old Hands would show a higher agreement as a 
positive relationship between the contact frequency and the intensification of the 
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relationship can be assumed. Table 4.4 shows the results of the analysis for testing 
the expected relationships. 
Table 4.42: Clusters vs. lending relationship (PII, Q3f)  
  Cluster        
  
Present  
Old Hands 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
Present  
Rookies 
Reserved  
Rookies Total 
Relationship 
         Intensified 17 41.5% 16 42.1% 15 41.7% 12 44.4% 60 42.3% 
Not intensified 24 58.5% 22 57.9% 21 58.3% 15 55.6% 82 57.7% 
Total 41 100.0% 38 100.0% 36 100.0% 27 100.0% 142 100.0% 
χ² = 0.069; df = 3; p = 0.995; Sig. ≥ 0.1              
 
The results of the table above show that the expected relationships cannot be 
confirmed. There is neither a sign for more intensification of the lending relationship 
for the Rookies nor an indication that the Present Old Hands or the Present Rookies 
show a higher agreement with the statement that the relationship to their bank 
intensified.  
Interim conclusion about clusters 
The clustering was based on the existing relationship between the SMEs and their 
banks at the time the SMEs received the loans including a guarantee from the 
guarantee banks. The analyses demonstrate that some interesting relationships 
between the existing bank-borrower relationships and the other variables exist. Old 
Hands were typically bigger and older firms while Rookies were smaller and 
younger firms. Rookies mostly received a guarantee for start-up loans. In most cases, 
these loans were provided from co-operative banks. Present Old Hands also received 
a high share of start-up loans. However, Old Hands in general and Reserved Old 
Hands in particular also show the highest share of loans for working capital. SMEs 
with a higher contact frequency were typically smaller firms with a legal form of 
unlimited liability. All firms indicated a high importance of guarantees from the 
guarantee bank for obtaining the bank loan. Regarding the provision of information, 
the results have demonstrated that Rookies tended to provide more information and 
more regular information to the lending banks from the time they received 
guarantees from the guarantee bank.   
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5 Interview results 
The qualitative analysis is guided by the theoretical framework derived from the 
literature review. The answers of the ten interviewees have been categorized and 
coded according to the propositions of this study. While the quantitative analysis 
covers the prospects of SMEs, the qualitative analysis is about the experiences and 
options of the banks.  Table 5.1 illustrates the characteristics of the ten interviewees 
sorted by the chronological order of the interviews.  
Table 5.1: Details about interviewees 
No. Bank Balance 
sheet total 
(2011) 
Position Number 
customers  
Segment Job 
experien-
ces 
Dura-
tion 
I1 
Savings 
Bank 
> 1 bn. € BCC 
160 
0.25-1.0 million € 
turnover 15 years 70 min. 
I2 
Savings 
Bank 
>1 bn. € Head of 
BCC 80 
>1 million € 
turnover 20 years 70 min. 
I3 
Savings 
Bank 
>3 bn. € BCC 
70 
2.5-250 million € 
turnover 14 years 80 min. 
I4 Private Bank 
<6 bn. € BCC 
80 
2.5-250 million € 
turnover 6 years 90 min. 
I5 Private Bank 
<6 bn. € Head of 
BCC & 
BCC 400 
>25 million € 
turnover 10/6 years 90 min. 
I6 
Co-
operative 
>1 bn. € BCC 
200 no segmentation 10 years 60 min. 
I7 
Co-
operative 
>1 bn. € Head of 
BCC 200 Volume >20,000 € 20 years 90 min. 
I8 
Savings 
Bank 
>1 bn. € BCC 
No statem. Solely start-ups 14 years 70 min. 
I9 
Co-
operative 
>6 bn. € BCC 
No statem. Venture capital 15 years 70 min. 
I10 
Co-
operative 
>1 bn. € BCC 
130-150 
Volume 
 >100,000 € 14 years 50 min. 
 
The first column of Table 5.1 contains the number of each interviewee. These 
numbers insure anonymity and will be used in the direct citations of the interview 
analysis. The second column illustrates at which bank the interview partner works. 
The annual reports of the guarantee bank Hesse have demonstrated that within the 
years 2003 and 2008 most guarantees were provided by either savings banks or co-
operative banks. These two bank types provided a more or less equal number of 
loans that included a guarantee from the guarantee bank and provided around 90 per 
cent of the overall loans that required a guarantee. The share of all guarantees 
provided for loans from private banks was relatively stable with 10%. These 
proportions are reflected as the choice of four interviewees from a savings bank 
(40%), four interviewees from a co-operative bank (40%) and two interviewees from 
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a private bank (20%). To provide an impression about the size of the banks the 
interviewees work for, column three contains the balance sheet total of the year 2011. 
To ensure maximum anonymity, the exact balance sheet total is not included. 
Therefore, only rough amounts are illustrated. Column four contains the job titles of 
the interviewees. All of them were either Business Client Consultants (BCC) or Head 
of the Business Client Consultants. However, even the Heads of BCC were actively 
engaged in consulting, and all had provided loans including a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. The majority of all interviewees were males. Only I8 and I10 were 
females. Column five and six contain the number of customers (=firms) a bank 
manager is responsible for as well as the segment of the customers. The number of 
customers a single bank manager is responsible for normally is related to the amount 
of work connected to the customers of certain segments. As the table above 
demonstrates, the number of firms the interviewees are responsible for vary from 70 
up to 400. In German banks, business clients are usually divided into several 
segments. Segmentation can be defined by business turnover, special types of 
financial instruments or the overall volume (assets and liabilities) of the firms. Most 
banks in the sample show segmentation according to the firm’s turnover. One 
interviewee was responsible for special kinds of financing (I9). Interviewee I6 was 
from a rather small bank. At this bank, no segmentation was made due to the 
manageable number of business clients. Only two banks within the sample show 
segmentation according to the overall transaction volume at the bank which includes 
all loans and money investments (I7 and I10). Column seven demonstrates the 
working experience of the interviewees. As it can be seen, all interviewees can be 
considered as highly experienced in SME financing. Finally, the last column contains 
the duration of each interview in minutes. 
The analysis of the interview results is structured as follows: Section 5.1 analyses the 
answers of the interviewees about the reasons for denying loans to SMEs. Why 
guarantees from the guarantee bank can make loans available to SMEs is analysed in 
Section 5.2. Section 5.3 analyses the impact of guarantees on the costs and the 
profitability of banks. Section 5.4 is about the information banks require or obtain as 
a consequence of the provision of loans including guarantees from the guarantee 
bank. Section 5.5 highlights the impact of guarantees on the relationship between the 
borrowers and the banks. Finally, section 5.6 is about the ability of guarantees from 
guarantee banks to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. Every section starts with 
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presenting the proposition that was considered and the questions of the interview 
guide (demonstrated in Appendix VII) that were asked of the interviewees. Where 
suitable and helpful, tables are presented that show the interviewees’ answers 
categorized by the three types of banks. To underline the conclusions of the answers, 
some of the interviewees’ responses are included in every section. Every section ends 
with an interim conclusion of the findings. 
5.1  Reasons for denying a loan 
All bank managers were asked about the reasons for difficulties in obtaining bank 
loans for certain SMEs. This was intended to find out whether proposition 1, (SMEs 
have difficulties in obtaining bank loans because of a higher default risk and lack of 
collateral) applies.  
To find this out, all interviews started with the question about the reasons for 
insisting on a guarantee (part A, question 1). Another question that was typically 
asked in the beginning of the interview was about the existence of any exclusion 
criteria which impeded the provision of loans to SMEs even when a guarantee would 
be provided (part A, question 5). Table 5.2 shows the answers of the ten interviewees 
sorted by their banks. The table contains the absolute number of respondents as well 
as the share of the answers of all respondents within one banking group. 
Table 5.2: Principles of making a loan decision 
  
Savings 
banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private  
banks Total 
Business project is 
decisive 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 10 100.0% 
No general exclusions 
exist 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 1 50.0% 9 90.0% 
 
The interviews revealed that the business project is a decisive factor when making a 
loan decision. All ten interviewees answered that the most important factor for 
making a loan decision is the business idea of the firm. They all mentioned that it is 
important that the SME that applies for a loan has a viable and promising business 
project. The response below demonstrates that it is very important that the bank 
believes in the future success of the business project. 
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“If the concept fails in the forehand, (…) a loan will not be provided. (…) The 
concept has to be convincing. And we want to do that because we believe that it has 
a chance on the market, it has a future.” [I2] 
One difficulty at this stage is to define what makes a business project viable and 
promising for a bank. The interviewees said they considered the competition in the 
respective market, the experiences of the business owner, the infrastructure and the 
location of a business. This is demonstrated by the following statement: 
“Well, I always consider the region. That is a huge advantage simply because I have 
the market information. I know at which location other businesses previously failed. 
I have been business client consultant for around 15 years now and have watched a 
lot of businesses open and close. (…) For me, it is always important to see whether 
the business owner knows the market situation and the local characteristics. At the 
end of the day, it is solely the concept or the idea that has to convince me. And then, 
we can figure out how to collect sufficient collateral.” [I8] 
Since certain firm characteristics (e.g. the industrial sector) are related to higher 
probabilities of default and, therefore, to higher risk for the banks (Creditreform, 
2012), it was intended to find out whether any general exclusions exist that preclude 
SMEs from obtaining bank loans. Nine banks out of ten stated to have no general 
exclusion. The only exception is the experience of the business owners. If the 
business owner is not qualified enough and this loss of expertise cannot be covered 
by another person in the business, banks will have no confidence in the business 
success. However, this can also be the case for firms that are engaged in very 
successful industrial sectors. The following passage demonstrates the meaning of the 
viability of the business project and the qualification of the business owner.  
“The industrial sector alone is not an exclusion factor when the business project is 
feasible. It is slightly different with the qualification of the business owner. If he or 
she has no business experiences and will not employ someone who has these 
qualifications, but the business idea requires these qualifications, then the loan will 
most likely not be provided. Because then, we don’t believe in the success of the 
business project.” [I1] 
The next quotation illustrates the openness of banks concerning industrial sectors. It 
demonstrates the awareness of banks of the existence of good borrowers even in bad 
industrial sectors and the existence of bad borrowers in good industrial sectors. The 
decisive factor is a good business concept, which is examined very carefully. 
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“Well, it is actually not important whether he is already a client, how long and 
which industrial sector he is engaged in. This is something we examine very 
thoroughly. We don’t even have a general exclusion of industrial sectors. We prefer 
the good firms of bad industries rather than the bad firms of good industries. Well, 
we examine this very detailed and make our decision, then.” [I3] 
That some industrial sectors are indeed not as attractive for banks as others is 
demonstrated by the response of interviewee I7. However, this does not necessarily 
leads to the denial of a loan.  
“Well, there are indeed some difficult industrial sectors after which we don’t mourn. 
But we have no general exclusions. We also would never say just because of a 
certain industrial sector we have to include a guarantee. Every industrial sector has 
good firms. This is something we examine individually.” [I7] 
One private bank indeed confirmed general exclusions. This bank is very profit-
oriented, and financing SMEs is not considered profitable enough. This becomes 
visible in the statement of the interview partner. 
“Exclusion criteria are e.g. the personal creditworthiness, lack of equity capital, 
qualitatively or quantitatively inadequate documents, weak business projects, high 
liabilities and certain industrial sectors.” [I5] 
This quotation impressively illustrates the different business strategies of private 
banks and public banks like savings banks and co-operative banks. The latter are 
more oriented towards supporting SMEs and the region they are engaged in. For 
these banks, no general exclusions exist. This is surely due to the regional limitation 
of these banks (see Section 1.2). 
An interim conclusion is that there are some difficulties perceivable in SMEs 
obtaining bank loans. These difficulties are mainly related to the feasibility of the 
business project. If the business idea is not promising, the bank will most likely not 
provide a loan. However, for the vast majority of banks no general exclusions exist. 
The role of collateral that has already been mentioned by some of the statements 
above will be examined in detail in the following section. 
5.2 The meaning of guarantees 
The interviewee responses included in Section 5.1 have illustrated that, first of all, 
the business project has to be convincing. If the business project is not convincing 
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and the bank does not believe in the success of the business, the bank will most likely 
not provide the loan. When the concept is convincing, banks take a deeper look into 
the inherent risk of a potential loan provision. This is demonstrated by the next 
statement. 
“We would never say we have grave doubts about the business concept and we just 
want to share the risk. That is not our business. (…) The concept is decisive. Well, 
the concept is determining. And in a second step we then look for the risk that we 
have to take on and whether this fits with our business intention.” [I3] 
Section 2.6 has illustrated that the overall default risk of a loan is defined by the 
expected loss and the unexpected loss. The expected loss is calculated by multiplying 
the probability of default with the exposure of default and the loss given default. The 
probability of default is defined by the creditworthiness of the borrower. A higher 
probability of default means a higher expected loss and, therefore, a higher default 
risk for the lending bank (Schulte and Horsch, 2004). Thus, when the risk related to 
the probability of default of a borrower appears to be too high, banks have to find a 
way to reduce the risk. This can be done by including collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Berger and Udell, 1990; Stefanovic, 2009). The following statement underlines 
these mechanisms. The interview partner talked about financing start-ups. 
“This is the most risky business for a bank. And when the customer has a good idea 
and I believe in the success of the business but no collateral can be provided, we 
look for an external partner.” [I6] 
These statements imply that banks accept higher probabilities of default when they 
are convinced of the business concept and can find someone who pledges additional 
collateral, thus takes on a certain amount of the risk. These are interesting statements 
that can help to explain why and when guarantees from the guarantee bank are 
needed and whether moral hazard on the part of the banks can occur. 
The literature review has demonstrated that collateral can be used to reduce risk for 
the lender (Berger et al., 2011b; Gonas et al., 2004). According to proposition 2a 
guarantees from the guarantee bank act as substitute for collateral and, therefore, 
make loans available to SMEs that could not provide sufficient valuable collateral of 
their own. In this section, the statements of the interviewees will be analysed to find 
out why exactly the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank facilitates the 
provision of a loan (part A, question 2). All interviewees referred to the lack of 
161 
 
collateral when being asked about in which cases they insist on the inclusion of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank (part A, question 1). As Table 5.3 demonstrates 
this is something all ten interviewees noted as the main reason for contacting the 
guarantee bank.  
Table 5.3: Impact of guarantees on loan provisions 
  
Savings 
 banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
The guarantee facilitates 
the provision of a loan as 
it acts as substitute for 
collateral 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 10 100.0% 
 
According to the statements of the interviewees, guarantees from the guarantee bank 
are required when the firms do not have enough valuable assets to pledge as 
collateral. When this is the case, the loss given default and, therefore, the expected 
loss is considered as too high for the bank and partners to share the risk are needed. 
The importance of collateral to reduce the default risk for the lender becomes again 
clear in the following statement: 
“The guarantee bank is brought in when the business concept is plausible and all 
formal requirements for providing the loan are met but not enough collateral is 
available. So the guarantee reduces the risk for the bank. The aim is to finance 
liquidity and not risk. Therefore, risk consideration is very important.” [I5] 
The higher the probability of default is, the higher are the requirements for collateral 
to reduce the loss given default to an amount that leads to an acceptable expected 
loss for the bank. This is what the interview partner meant above when he referred to 
the risk consideration. The significance of the guarantee for reducing the loss given 
default which otherwise would be too high for the given probability of default is also 
confirmed by the statement below. 
“Well, we draw on the guarantee bank in those cases in which collateral is 
insufficient. (…) Apart from that, there are no cases in which we say that we insist 
on the guarantee. Well, where we can’t provide financing otherwise. Normally, it’s a 
question of collateral.” [I7] 
The statements of the ten interviewees have demonstrated that guarantees from the 
guarantee bank can be considered as substitutes for collateral. Based on the answers 
of the interviewees that have been analysed so far, Figure 5.1 has been created which 
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illustrates the process of deciding whether a guarantee from the guarantee bank is 
needed for the provision of a loan to a SME or not. 
Figure 5.1: Decision making processes 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Guarantees from the guarantee bank were mostly included for start-ups. These firms 
often do not have enough assets to pledge for collateral since business has just 
started. Moreover, these firms are often related to a higher probability of default 
(Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998; Columba et al., 2010). The 
following statement illustrates the meaning of guarantees from the guarantee bank 
for start-up financing. 
“We mostly include guarantees for start-ups. When we say, it’s a start-up or also the 
merger of an acquisition of an existing firm where we can only get little collateral... 
when we see that the firm has no further collateral, our share in blank is too high,… 
than we include the guarantee bank.” [I10]  
However, existing firms may also suffer from a lack of sufficient collateral. This is 
mostly the case when a firm wants or needs to grow, and the existing assets are 
Is the business project viable 
and promising? 
Yes 
What is the PD of the loan? 
Is sufficient collateral available  
to accept the PD? 
Yes 
Loan can be provided without 
guarantee. 
No 
Guarantee from guarantee bank is required 
to provide the loan. 
No 
No loan will be 
provided. 
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already pledged for collateral for older loans. Since the overall risk increases with 
any additional loan, additional collateral is required to cover that risk. 
“Support from the guarantee bank is also needed when we want to support growth. 
This means when a firm plans to grow, financing is needed, and the question for 
collateral and appropriate risk sharing arises. Then we look at how to hedge this. 
Can the firm manage this out of their own assets or do we have to include a risk 
partner?” [I8] 
The overall amount of risk is always a topic for including a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. This is especially the case for smaller banks. Concerning the risk 
perception of banks, the size of a bank seems to be pivotal. Some savings banks and 
co-operative banks stated that higher loan amounts are related to higher risk and 
therefore the loan amount a SME applies for determines how much collateral is 
required to reduce the risk to a supportable extend.  
“We have always brought in the guarantee bank when the risk was too high for our 
bank. In fact, too high in terms of our risk-bearing ability. When we get an 
application for multiple million euro e.g. we check, does this fit to our risk strategy 
especially against the backdrop of our risk bearing ability? When we see, o.k., which 
collateral has the applicant, nothing or just a few, than we look for a partner to share 
the risk. We principally take on the guarantee bank when the collateral is 
insufficient. (…) Well, we can’t provide 30 million euro in blank. The default of 
such a loan would activate a small earthquake here. For that reason, we look for an 
additional partner.” [I3] 
The smaller the bank is the smaller its risk-bearing ability. This is a consequence of 
the banking supervision law and is demonstrated by the statement of interviewee I6. 
The balance sheet total of the bank he works for is much lower than the balance sheet 
total of the other interviewee. As a consequence, the following interviewee referred 
to a critical loan amount that is much lower than the critical loan amount referred to 
by interviewee I3 above.  
“Well, we heavily take into account the collateral. (…) We are rather a small bank. 
For us, 50,000 in blank is an entirely different category than for the bigger banks. 
And then you indeed search for how to mitigate that somehow.” [I6] 
Other banks did not refer to any specific loan amount that is considered to be too 
high but also referred to the size of the firm that is determining the risk-bearing 
ability of the bank. 
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“We are a relatively small bank, and we don’t want to run too high of a risk. This is 
why we most often involve the guarantee bank. When we say, o.k., that makes 
sense, that fits, everything is feasible but the collateral doesn’t fit. And then we 
forward this to the guarantee bank.” [I10] 
The statements cited in this section impressively illustrate that the guarantee bank is 
a very important partner to reduce the expected loss of a loan. This especially applies 
to smaller banks. According to the answers of the interviewees it seems not to be 
such an issue for the private banks or bigger savings banks and co-operative banks.  
For an interim conclusion, it can be said that guarantees from the guarantee bank are 
included when loan applicants show a promising business concept and have a 
probability of default that is acceptable for the bank under the condition that 
additional collateral is provided. Without the provision of sufficient valuable 
collateral, the expected loss would be too high for the given probability of default. 
The provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank will reduce the loss given 
default and, therefore, the expected loss to an acceptable amount for the lending bank 
and the loan can be provided. These relations are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. 
Figure 5.2: Effect of guarantees from the guarantee bank on SME loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Viable business concept with a given creditworthiness and a certain probability of default (PD) 
for the lending bank. 
Given PD requires a certain collateralisation to reduce the loss given default (LGD) to reach an 
acceptable expected loss (EL). 
SME cannot provide sufficient own collateral. 
LGD is not reduced and loan cannot be 
provided because EL is too high. 
Guarantee bank provides a guarantee which 
acts a substitute for collateral. 
LGD is reduced by the guarantee. 
EL is reduced by the reduction of LGD. 
Loan meets the risk bearing ability of the bank 
and can be provided. 
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One could assume that the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank could 
produce moral hazard for the borrower as well as for the banks. If the borrower 
knows that in case of default the guarantee bank will pay, it might be that a default is 
not considered to be that bad. Moral hazard on the part of the lending bank might 
occur when banks accept a higher probability of default when they know that the 
guarantee bank provides a guarantee (Uesugi et al., 2010). To find out whether moral 
hazard occurs, the interviewees were asked whether differences of the default rate 
between loans with guarantee from the guarantee bank and loan without guarantee 
from the guarantee bank are perceivable (part E, question 19). Five banks stated that 
they could not estimate this. Obviously, there is no official method to evaluate how 
loans in default were securitized. Out of the remaining five banks four answered that 
the default rate is the same whether a guarantee is included or not. The reason for this 
is that firms always have to pledge private collateral when they want to obtain a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank. The guarantee bank always requires personal 
liabilities when providing the guarantee. Therefore, a default will also have a 
negative impact on the personal financial situation of the firm or the firm owners. 
This reduces the risk of moral hazard to a minimum on the part of the borrowers. 
This is demonstrated by the statements below. 
“As a rule, the guarantee bank requires a guarantee of the customer when providing 
a guarantee. Even for a GmbH (author’s remark: Ltd.) we had the case where a firm 
received a guarantee of about 60 per cent of the working capital and the guarantee 
bank required a personal guarantee of the executive partner. Well, as a rule, the 
customer is involved anyway. So far, I have not a case where no personal guarantee 
was required from the owner of the business executive. (…) I can´t say that loans 
with a guarantee from the guarantee bank are better or worse serviced or more often 
or less often in default.” [I6] 
Interview partner I10 also referred to the personal securities borrowers typically have 
to provide when applying for a guarantee from the guarantee bank. This, indeed, 
seems to have a positive impact on the repayment behaviour. 
“Loans with a guarantee commonly work well. So far, I have not had a loan in 
default due to the fact that the customers are always involved personally. Everything 
they have for security they have provided.” [I10] 
Interview partner I7 confirmed that the guarantee does not play any role in the 
default rate. 
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“For the default rate, the question of guarantee yes or no is not a topic.” [I7] 
Another interview partner referred to moral hazard on the part of the banks and the 
assessment of three parties when a guarantee is provided. First of all, the bank 
assesses the application. When the business project seems to be viable and the bank 
believes in the success of the firm but not enough collateral can be pledged, the 
guarantee bank is asked to provide a guarantee. To decide whether a guarantee can 
be provided or not, the guarantee bank makes its own assessment. For this 
assessment, the guarantee bank requires a report of a chamber. In this report, the 
chamber also assesses the viability and the risk of the project. This demonstrates that 
three parties have to make an independent assessment about the risk related to a loan 
and the probability of default. Only if all three parties are convinced of the success of 
the project, the guarantee and therefore the loan will be provided. According to the 
quotation below, loan applications are assessed very thoroughly and defaults only 
occur when the market situation changes. As these changes can happen to any firm, 
no matter if a guarantee is included or not, there is no difference perceivable between 
loans with and loans without guarantee. 
“For my cases you can’t compare this. Normally, I have assessed it and the chamber 
and the guarantee bank have also assessed it. Defaults arise when influences from 
the outside occur. Therefore, one cannot say whether this is more or less. The 
markets determine this.” [I8] 
The influence of possible shifts of the marked is not considered by another 
interviewee who also referred to the different assessments. This person attributes a 
lower default rate to loans with guarantee due to the three assessments. However, the 
above statement seems to be more realistic as market changes can have a negative 
impact on every borrower, and even loans that have been assessed three times can 
default. 
“The amount of loans in default is lower than for comparable loans without 
guarantee. This is because of the more intense assessments in the forefront.” [I2] 
Only five interviewees out of ten made a statement about the default rates of loans 
that included guarantees from the guarantee bank. The others stated that they could 
not make a statement about this. This is either an indication of the business client 
consultants’ knowledge about higher default rates that they did not want to reveal or 
an indication of their lack of knowledge about the default rates. Those that made a 
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statement indicated that no official statistics are available that differentiate between 
the collateral pledged for loans that were in default. The interviewees’ statements 
have provided some hint on their acceptance of a higher probability of default when 
the guarantee bank provides a guarantee. However, no definitive statement about this 
topic can be made at this point.  
Whether the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank has an impact on costs 
and profits of the banks will be analysed in the following section. 
5.3  Impact of guarantees on costs and profitability of banks  
Since proposition 3a is about the impact of guarantees from the guarantee bank on 
the profitability of banks, all interviewees were asked about this topic. Part E of the 
interview guideline contained several questions concerning costs and profitability of 
banks. The questions were about the impact of the inclusion of a guarantee on the 
profitability of the loan for the bank (question 15), the meaning of the influence on 
equity costs (question 16), cross-selling aspects (question 17) and the support of the 
region (question 18). The cost components that influence the pricing of a firm loan 
are the market interest rate for the refinancing of the bank, a risk premium, costs for 
administration, capital costs and a required profit margin. 
The answers of the interviewees are highlighted in Table 5.4 below. All questions 
and the related answers will be discussed in more detail in the following.  
Table 5.4: Impact of guarantees on costs and profitability 
  
Savings 
 banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
Loans become more 
profitable 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Higher effort related to 
loans with guarantee 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 10 100.0% 
Reduction of equity 
costs is known 2 50.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 8 80.0% 
Reduction of equity 
costs is not decisive 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 10 100.0% 
Cross-selling is decisive 3 75.0% 2 50.0% 1 50.0% 6 60.0% 
Support of the region is 
important 3 75.0% 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 5 50.0% 
Influence on default rate 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 10.0% 
 
168 
 
The interviewees were asked about the influence of the inclusion of a guarantee from 
the guarantee bank on the profitability of the loan (part E, question 15). The idea was 
that the inclusion of a guarantee reduces the risk for the lender and enhances 
profitability. Existing literature about Credit Guarantee Schemes have revealed some 
at least theoretical assumptions about how the schemes can enhance the profitability 
of banks. One was that banks can save costs by transferring the screening and 
monitoring of the loans to the scheme (Green, 2003). 
All ten interviewees indicated that a loan does not become more profitable. They 
referred to a higher amount of work related to the applications which are completed 
together with the potential borrower. The commercial bank also forwards the 
application forms to the guarantee bank. Additional costs also arise from subsequent 
monitoring and regular reporting to the guarantee bank. This is reflected by the 
statement below: 
“First of all, we have the work load. The work load is much higher” [I7] 
The following statement confirms the higher amount of work and also indicates that 
profitability is not an issue for including a guarantee from the guarantee bank.  
“Due to the guarantee, the loans do not become more profitable. It is a question of 
whether one is convinced by the project, not a question of profitability. Anyway, the 
profitability rather decreases because the amount of work increases.” [I1] 
Interviewee I6 gave a short description of the additional work that arises. This 
description illustrates that banks in Germany do not transfer the screening and 
monitoring to the guarantee bank. 
“It involves a higher work load. One could thrust the application form into the hand 
of the customer and say: fill out. But this doesn’t work. Most of the times, you sit 
together with him and hold his hand. (…) Especially for public funding we have a 
higher amount of work for the application and for the monitoring. We have to 
furnish a usage list, have to prove that the money is exactly used for the purpose 
stated. Well, this is not only a higher work load with the application. Even when the 
money is provided, very often the legwork starts for reminding the customer to 
provide invoices for example. In the overall view, this is a higher amount of work.” 
[I6]  
Higher workloads are always related to higher administrative costs. This is 
confirmed by the following statement:  
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“The costs for administration slightly increase because the work load is a bit higher, 
especially the amount of work for the documentation.” [I10] 
The statements above demonstrate that the amount of work increases and the 
administrative costs increase when a guarantee is included. This has a negative 
impact on the profitability of the loan.  
Another issue that was considered was the reduction of capital requirements, as a 
result of Basel II and Basel III, due to the reduction of the credit risk when including 
a guarantee from the guarantee bank. All banks were explicitly asked whether the 
potential reduction of the capital requirements and, therefore, the equity costs is 
considered when deciding about whether a guarantee should be included or not (part 
E, question 16). Two interviewees indicated that they do not see the direct impact of 
the inclusion of guarantee on the costs when calculating the loan. However, the other 
interviewees stated that they do, indeed, see how the guarantee influences the cost-
side of the loan when calculating the loan.  
“I definitively make a pre-calculation. I input the collateral and with a guarantee 
from a guarantee bank I definitively have another risk which reduces my risk costs 
and finally reduces my equity costs. (…) I include the guarantee because it is a 
secure security, not because it reduces the costs of equity. It reduces the interest rate 
for the customer. The price advantage is passed on to the customer one-to-one. 
That’s why the guarantee does not reduce the costs for the bank.” [I3] 
When collateral is included in the calculation, the expected loss reduces, according to 
the intrinsic value of the security. Guarantees of the guarantee bank are considered to 
be so-called secure securities. This is illustrated by the response of interviewee I8.  
“The equity requirements are not an issue for deciding to include a guarantee. For 
making the pricing I have to indicate what kind of collateral I have. So I specify this 
indeed. But the system does not make any difference about whether we have a 
guarantee or a mortgage for example. Well, there is no distinction between a 
guarantee and a mortgage. Both are secure securities.” [I8] 
It seems as if the main point is that secure securities can be provided. According to 
the standard approach of Basel II, the risk weight (RW) of the collateral taker 
quantifies the regulated capital. Since guarantee banks can be considered as banks, 
the RW of a guarantee from the guarantee bank is 20 per cent and therefore requires 
only 1.6 per cent regulated capital (Brost et al., 2008). This significantly reduces the 
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costs for tied-up equity. For those SMEs that cannot provide a mortgage, a guarantee 
of the guarantee bank can act as a substitute. 
However, which kind of secure security is provided seems to be secondary since 
most interviewees stated they do not consider the individual cost components when 
calculating a loan. In the end it is decisive that the required profit margin is met as 
demonstrated by the quotation below. 
“This is something I directly see in my calculation when I enter the loan. Well, how 
the individual costs are constituted. But actually, we rather look at what gets out in 
the end. What do we earn? How the individual positions, processing costs, risk 
costs, average costs,… shift, is something we don’t pay any attention. We have a 
fixed guideline for what we want to earn and then it doesn´t make any difference 
whether it is a loan with or without a guarantee.” [I10] 
These statements show that, at least for the interviewees, equity requirements or the 
reduction of equity costs do not play a decisive role when deciding whether a 
guarantee has to be included or not. The smaller banks especially do not calculate the 
equity costs for every single loan separately but include a fixed cost component. The 
main point is the provision of collateral and the reduction of the expected loss. The 
inclusion of a guarantee, indeed, reduces the expected loss for the lending banks and, 
therefore, the risk margin. Theoretically, the provision of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank can reduce the capital costs. This cost reduction can end up in an 
increase of the profit for the loan when the previously fixed profit margin is not 
adopted. However, the answers of the interviewees indicate that when a cost 
advantage arises by including a guarantee, this is passed on to the SME directly. This 
means that the decrease of risk and equity costs is passed over one to one by 
adopting the profit margin. This behavior can be explained by the strong competition 
in the German banking market. Banks that are limited to a certain region within 
Germany also have a limited number of existing and potential clients. These banks 
are stronger engaged in providing services to corporate customers or private persons 
and less engaged in investment banking (Detzer et al., 2013; Koetter, 2013). 
Moreover, since German SMEs have more than one house bank (Becker et al., 2013; 
Hummel, 2011; Hackethal and Gleisner, 2006) they can easily switch to another 
bank when it provides services to more favourable conditions. Consequently, banks 
have to struggle for their customers and take advantage of the opportunity to reduce 
the costs for the customers when a guarantee is provided. The chance to enhance 
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profitability by demanding a higher margin is not taken as the statements below 
demonstrate.  
“When I calculate without guarantee and note that I need a margin of two per cent 
and then include a guarantee and note that I have a margin of only one per cent, I 
pass the one per cent on to the customer.” [I3] 
The statement of interviewee I4 again underlines the role of guarantees from the 
guarantee bank as secure securities and explains why the profitability will not 
increase. 
“Of course, the risk of the loan reduces enormously due to the guarantee. Well, this 
is clear. Because we have the creditworthiness of the guarantee bank or the Federal 
State. But the costs for the bank are by no means reduced. The risk costs decrease 
but we pass this on one-to-one. Because the customer already pays the 1.5 per cent 
charge for the guarantee bank. I improve regarding the equity requirements. But 
since we have a risk-adjusted pricing, we pass this completely on. Otherwise, I 
would boost the interest rate for the customer to a point that I would say, o.k., then I 
don’t need the guarantee anymore. Well, as a client.” [I4] 
This statement reveals the reason for passing on the cost advantage. The cost 
sensitivity of firms and the high competition between banks in Germany requires the 
adaption. This is also confirmed by the quotation below. 
If we say, o.k., now we have collateral, now we can switch to price range A, B or C, 
but we demand price range D, then there is always an associated margin. And the 
margin is higher for a higher price range than for a lower price range. But this is not 
the rule because we pass this on to the customer. (…) Conceptually, this would be 
an approach for a bank to generate a higher return. But we don’t pursue this 
approach.” [I6] 
The results so far indicate that a potential reduction of costs or increase of the 
profitability is not influencing the decision for or against the inclusion of a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank. The main point is the reduction of the expected loss as a 
consequence of the provision of collateral. This is illustrated by the statement 
interviewee I2 gave when he talked about whether the equity requirements are 
important: 
“No, definitely not. The firm has to present a convincing business concept. And we 
want to provide a loan because we believe that the project has a chance in the 
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market, has a future. The problem is how to make it because there is no collateral. 
Then we contact the guarantee bank. That’s the only prime mover.” [I2] 
The provision of the guarantee of course can reduce the risk costs and the capital 
costs. But this is not explicitly calculated by the banks. Moreover, when calculated, 
this is passed on to the customer because of the strong competition. The answers of 
the interviewee, however, revealed some indirect impacts on the profits of the banks 
that are related to the provision of the loans. By providing additional services to the 
same customer (cross-selling), additional profits can be generated. The question 
about the meaning of cross-selling (part E, question 17) was added to the interview 
guide after the first two interviewees both referred to that topic when asked about 
profitability. Cross-selling means that besides the initial loan other services will be 
provided that increase the profit of the lending bank. Interviewee I2 admitted that 
loans including a guarantee from the guarantee bank may have a profit of zero. 
However, the bank is willing to provide the loan when additional services can be 
offered and the overall profit of the customer will become positive.  
“First of all, the margin reduces due to the additional efforts. Therefore, it is an 
investment in the future. The bank wants to deepen or extend a relationship or start a 
new relationship. And in the future we can provide additional services and finally 
have a benefit out of a long-term relationship. Well, first of all we have to invest. 
Partly with…when we calculate exactly…a profit of zero for the bank. But in the 
long run it’s an investment in the future. Future customers, future firms.” [I2]   
This is underlined by the quotation of interviewee I5 who also referred to additional 
services to make the loan profitable. 
“In a second step, the cross-selling potential is also important. If the calculation 
reveals that additional revenues can be generated besides the costs and the 
relationship to the customer becomes profitable in a relatively short period of time, 
the initially higher costs can be accepted. The cross-selling plays in important role 
since the final decision is made on the basis of the data about the return. If the loan 
is admittedly supportable by the expected risk, but it would not yield a good return, 
this would end in the denial of the loan.” [I5] 
The question below also demonstrates that banks explicitly inform their customers 
about the intention to provide additional services besides the loan. Moreover, he also 
mentioned that the loan might be denied when not enough potential for cross-selling 
can be seen. 
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“In the overall view this is an extra effort. For that reason, especially for start-ups, 
who have a corresponding need for insurances and so forth, we attach great 
importance to also do this when we provide the loan. This is something we 
communicate very clearly from the start. And it may be that we deny the loan when 
we don’t come to an agreement on that point.” [I6] 
Overall, six banks described the cross-selling potential as an important issue when 
deciding about the inclusion of the guarantee. The other banks answered more 
generally. According to them, the cross-selling potential is always important but not 
related to the additional costs for including a guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
“We regularly talk with the customer about his plans for the future, and this 
naturally includes cross-selling. (…) But I don’t calculate which costs I have and 
which revenues I will most likely have and make my decision in the basis of these 
information.” [I8] 
Another interviewee said: 
“We have to do this anyway. This has nothing to do with the guarantee bank that we 
have to cover additional costs. This is common practice.” [I10] 
These statements demonstrate that banks always look to solidify a relationship with 
their customers. When the loan and the potential additional services are considered to 
not be profitable, the loan would most likely not be provided. Since the inclusion of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank rather seems to have a subordinate direct impact 
on the profit of the banks, cross-selling seems to play an important role in indirectly 
enhancing the overall revenues. Another point that was mentioned by the 
interviewees from savings banks and co-operative banks was the central aim of these 
banks to support the region in which they are located (Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005; 
Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007). Section 1.3 has illustrated the special characteristic 
of savings banks and co-operative banks to have a limited operating area. These 
banks can only provide services to customers within their respective region. 
Therefore, the economic vitality of their region is of enormous importance for 
savings banks and co-operative banks. A question about the meaning of the region 
(part E, question 18) was also included into the interview guide after the first two 
interviews were conducted. Five out of the eight savings banks or co-operative banks 
stated that the support of the region also plays a role when deciding whether or not to 
provide to loan.  
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“We are engaged in that region. We only have that region. We only can be engaged 
in this region not anywhere else in Germany or the world. Insofar, we depend on 
giving advice and support to truly interesting start-ups, attractive investments of 
established businesses. This is always connected to jobs. The employees of these 
firms are also customers at our bank, have their mortgage here and so on. Well, we 
only have this region and insofar we are very engaged in that region. We have 
always been in the lead here regarding guarantee banks and public funding. This is 
simply the key for the future. Is we spoiled this we would most likely not be where 
we are today. The inclusion of the guarantee bank is obviously an investment in the 
future.” [I2] 
Providing a loan to a firm in the region is always connected to jobs in the region. 
Since the employees often come from the same region, they might also be customers 
at the bank. This is also referred to in the next quotation.  
“Our region is out market. Well, it is not as easy for us as for e.g. a high street bank 
to say we go belly-up. Well, this is difficult for us. Especially for a bigger employer 
in the region who provides many jobs. The employees are also customers at our 
bank. This is certainly another strategy then for a private bank that is hundreds of 
kilometres away. We can only develop in our market here.” [I6] 
The concentration of one certain region is one of the crucial differences between 
savings banks or co-operative banks and private banks in Germany. Savings banks 
and co-operatives to a wider extend consider the welfare of an overall region 
(Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2007; Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005). For savings banks 
and co-operative banks, it seems as if much effort is made to make loans available 
that are considered to be promising and good for the region. Guarantees from the 
guarantee bank therefore provide a useful instrument to make loans available. 
“Our mission is to support the region and of course we try to pull out all the stops to 
provide a loan that seems to be reasonable. That can be said without any restrictions. 
It is not the case that I can further pick out my customers. We simply have a limited 
number of customers.” [I7] 
These statements show the reliance of savings banks and co-operative banks on their 
region. Guarantees from the guarantee bank provide an important means to enable 
banks to provide loans to SMEs that they otherwise would probably not obtain. 
Consequently, it is an effective means to support the region and to save the basis for 
the existence of regional acting banks.  
175 
 
Figure 5.3 has been derived from the interviewees’ answers. It shows the impacts on 
the profitability of SME loans when a guarantee from the guarantee bank is included. 
Positive impacts on the overall profitability are marked by a ‘+’, negative impacts by 
a ‘-‘. The broken lines mark indirect impacts on the profit of a SME loan. These 
impacts are not directly caused by the loan but by external factors. 
Figure 5.3: Impacts on the overall profitability of SME loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
As an interim conclusion it can be said that the inclusion of a guarantee has no direct 
positive impact on the profit of the banks. This is because of the additional amounts 
of work helping the borrower with the application and monitoring and reporting to 
the guarantee bank. This all leads to an increase of the loan’s administrative costs. 
By including the guarantee which acts as substitute for collateral, the expected loss 
for the lender can be reduced. This reduces the risk costs. The provision of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank can reduce the capital buffer of the banks and, 
therefore, reduce capital costs. The answers of the interviewees have shown that the 
reduction of the capital costs is not decisive for insisting on a guarantee. Regardless, 
banks stated that they directly pass on the cost advantages to their borrowers when 
these are calculated. This is most probably caused by the strong competition among 
the German banks and the cost sensitivity of customers. For making additional 
profits, cross-selling plays an important role for banks. To increase the overall profit, 
banks aim for providing additional services like payment transactions or insurances, 
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for example. If the chance for making additional services is not given, banks will 
sometimes even deny the provision of a loan including a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. Besides the cross-selling potential of the borrower, savings banks 
and co-operative banks consider the welfare of the overall region when making a 
loan decision. One of their main targets is the support of their region. As these banks 
can only act in a certain region, they also consider the impact of a loan denial on the 
whole region and on their own bank as well. The provision of a loan to a firm can 
save or create jobs in the region. Since the employees probably come from the same 
region, they might be customers of the bank who have current accounts, money 
investments or loans from the bank. This means that the provision of a loan to a firm 
indirectly might have a positive impact on the profits of other customers as well. The 
statements of the interviewees have demonstrated that this, indeed, is considered 
when making a loan decision. In this respect, the inclusion of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank might enable the bank to provide the loan in a first place.  
5.4  Acquisition of information 
In this section the answers of the interviewees about the information obtained from 
the borrowers are analysed. Since proposition 3b is about the amount and the 
regularity of information provided by borrowers that received a loan including a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank, every interview partner was asked whether more 
or more regular information is received due to the inclusion of the guarantee (part B, 
question 7 and question 8). The proposition was derived from the theoretical 
framework. The idea within the theoretical framework was that asymmetric 
information can be reduced due to the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank. Since the provision of the guarantee allows providing a loan to SMEs that 
these otherwise would not have obtained, banks have the opportunity to collect 
information about the firms and, therefore, might reduce information asymmetries 
(Craig et al., 2008; Kramer, 2008; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). This 
can only be the case when additional information is obtained from the borrower as a 
consequence of the guarantee. Even though every provision of valuable information 
reduces information asymmetries, of particular interest is the question of whether the 
inclusion of the guarantee is especially helpful for overcoming asymmetric 
information.  
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The answers of the interviewees are summed up in Table 5.5 below and will be 
discussed in more detail in the following. 
Table 5.5: Assessment of information gathering 
  
Savings 
 banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
More valuable 
information is received 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Information is received 
more regularly  2 50.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 8 80.0% 
 
Regarding the amount of information the answers are very conclusive. All ten 
interviewees generally denied obtaining more information after the inclusion of the 
guarantee. They mentioned that the bank and the guarantee bank have the same 
interest in information as demonstrated by the following statement: 
“The guarantee bank does not require any information we do not require as well. 
Both banks have the same information interest. There is no difference.” [I1] 
This is confirmed by the citation of interviewee I3 who also referred to the 
requirements of the guarantee bank. 
“As a rule, we require the same information as the guarantee bank. And I am not 
under the impression that the guarantee bank bosses us around because it has 
stronger information requirements…stronger requirements than we have so that we 
have to contact the firms permanently.” [I3] 
The assessment of the application and the information that is required is the same 
independently of whether a guarantee is included or not. 
No. We assess the application very comprehensively and thoroughly. We don´t 
forward any additional information to the guarantee bank. We assess the application 
as if we would not include a third party. There is no difference.” [I9] 
Interviewee I10 confirms the same requirements. She also mentioned that some 
differences in the information requirements exist based on whether a start-up or an 
existing customer applied for a loan.  
“Well, I would not say that we get more information. Especially when the guarantee 
bank is included for a start-up or an acquisition, then we need the information that is 
also required by the guarantee bank. A CV, budget figures…the information is 
congruent. It’s not more or less information.” [I10] 
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For existing customers, banks might require less information than the guarantee 
bank. Since the bank already knows the customers and their business, it clearly has 
an information advantage over the guarantee bank. The guarantee bank in contrast 
has to understand the business first and needs information about the success and the 
financial performance of the previous years. As the statement below shows, this is 
something the bank itself would not require. However, the bank will not obtain more 
information in these cases even if the guarantee bank needs additional information.  
“Well, it could be that we don’t require the same information when we provide the 
loan alone. This is absolutely possible. Since, in part, we already have the 
information at our disposal. The same applies for the budget figures or the business 
plan. I would not ask for them again. But for a new investment, I would ask for them 
in any case. This is clearly always important for the guarantee bank. They firstly 
have to understand it completely. Well, we especially have a difference for existing 
customers. For start-ups, the required information is the same except the assessment 
of the chamber.” [I7] 
Concerning the information demand it can be said that banks have fixed 
requirements for information when assessing a loan application. They all run a credit 
scoring for every applicant. The extent of information needed is determined by 
different factors. This is demonstrated by the following statement: 
“The credit scoring is arranged in a staggered manner according to the size of the 
firm. The smaller the firm, the less detailed are the questions. The bigger the firm, 
the more detailed are the questions. What is always important is the assessment of 
the annual report, the profit situation, the cash-flow and the equity. What is also 
always considered is the account processing.” [I2] 
Another distinction can be made based on whether it is a start-up or an existing firm.     
“In our rating system we have different segments. Well, start-up have a separate tool 
because you don’t have any historical data. You don’t have any balance sheet 
figures. For these firms you can only decide on the basis of some indicators of the 
business plan in the end. That means that all the hard facts have only a marginal 
influence. We stress more on soft facts. (…) Then, we have the normal rating for 
typical business customers and for large customers we have, based on that rating, 
some additional and more detailed questions.” [I8] 
Every interviewee has been asked about their bank’s rating tools (part B, question 9) 
to get a sense of the information that is required to make a loan decision. The 
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answers show that all banks have different rating tools for different size classes or 
start-ups and existing customers. The bigger the firm, the more detailed information 
is required. However, this is not in contrast to the information demanded by the 
guarantee bank. Therefore, no crucial difference between the required information 
can be assessed.  
The statements so far indicate that banks do not require additional information just 
because of the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank. The demand of 
information is determined by the size or the age of the firm not by the kind of 
collateral that can be provided. Even if the guarantee bank requires information from 
the SME that the bank would not require because it is an existing customer, this does 
not result in additional information for the bank. However, some SMEs said they had 
provided more information since they received the loan including the guarantee. The 
reason can be seen in the assessment of the chamber the guarantee bank requires. For 
making a decision about whether to provide a guarantee or not, the guarantee bank 
always asks for an assessment from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce or other 
comparable local organization. The SMEs have to talk to the members of these 
organisations who also visit the firm to make the assessment. This is something the 
banks do not require from existing customers. They normally do not even get the 
reports as the statement below demonstrates.  
“The guarantee bank renders its own opinion by including the local organizations. 
Such an assessment is not made or required by us. We normally don’t even get that 
report. Anyway, it does not contain any additional valuable information for us. 
Beyond that, the guarantee bank and we require the same information.” [I5] 
Consequently, banks cannot generate additional information out of the assessments. 
This illustrates that the report does not reduce information asymmetries for the 
banks. Beside the assessment, no additional information or documents are required 
which the bank does not ask for. 
“Except the report of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the guarantee bank 
does not require any additional documents.” [I8] 
However, for the SMEs, this is related to a provision of additional information. They 
have to speak to the members of the visiting organisation and answer many 
questions. The need for the chamber’s assessment from the standpoint of the 
guarantee bank is explained in the quotation below.  
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“What we don’t require is the assessment of a local organization. This is something 
we trust ourselves to do. But this is related to our good knowledge of our region. A 
guarantee bank provides guarantees to firms within the whole federal state. Insofar, I 
think that is the reason why they need the report. But beyond that I cannot imagine 
anything the guarantee bank additionally needs.” [I8] 
The guarantee bank does not necessarily know the region and its infrastructure and 
even does not know the customer and its market potential. This is something, the 
guarantee bank needs to evaluate before a decision can be made. The bank, in 
contrast, often has this knowledge and, therefore, does not need an additional 
assessment. 
Besides the amount of information provided, another question was whether SMEs 
provided more regular information to their bank after they received the guarantee 
from the guarantee bank. The following quotation shows that SMEs have to provide 
documents in a fixed rhythm which is more or less the same for the guarantee bank.  
“I don’t get further additional value of information and the rhythm is also the same. 
Depending on the creditworthiness we make quarterly business assessments or 
biannual business assessments. The annual report has to be provided nine month 
after completion. When the guarantee bank has another rhythm, for whatever 
reasons, we adopt this. Otherwise we have our rhythm. For the one or other loan we 
have a monthly rhythm. But this is just for being near the mark in the beginning.” 
[I4] 
As the interview partner mentioned, sometimes information has to be provided more 
regularly. The answers of the other interviewees indicated that this especially applies 
to new customers or start-ups. Since the bank does not know much about the firm 
and its business success, information is demanded more regularly to monitor the 
firm. However, this is independent from the requirements of the guarantee bank and 
not directly attributable to the inclusion of the guarantee. 
“It is rather the case that the bank requires information more regularly. Especially in 
the beginning we often demand monthly business assessments whereas the 
guarantee bank demands quarterly business assessments.” [I5] 
The reason for insisting on a more regular provision of information might arise from 
a lack of knowledge about the firm and its business success (Berger and Udell, 
1998). However, it might also arise from moral hazard on the part of the banks when 
they are willing to accept a higher probability of default when a guarantee is 
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provided (Uesugi et al., 2010). The demand for a more regular provision of 
information is motivated by the need for up-to-date information for monitoring the 
development of the firm. Especially for start-up or young firms it is important for the 
banks to perceive potential irregularities or problems in the early stage. This enables 
the banks to support the firm in taking countermeasures and trying to prevent a 
default. For start-ups or young firms, banks have no way to predict their managerial 
ability (Columba et al., 2010; Craig et al., 2008). When information is required more 
regularly in the beginning of the relationship this offers the opportunity to the banks 
to quickly learn about the ability of the firm owners. This is normally not necessary 
for existing customers as these are known by the banks. This is also highlighted by 
the following quotation: 
“Well, for start-ups we indeed try to be closer to the customer. Even for smaller loan 
amounts like up to 100,000 euro maybe, it can happen that we require information 
quarterly. For an existing customer I would most likely not require information 
quarterly. For those customers biannually or annually would be sufficient. (…) But I 
can’t see any difference to the guarantee bank.” [I6]  
While I4 mentioned that it can also happen that the guarantee bank has shorter 
rhythms, there was only one other interviewee who indicated that the guarantee bank 
sometimes requires information more regularly. 
“Well, principally it’s the same. What is different is that the guarantee bank requires, 
indeed, quarterly provision of information. Here, we distinguish a little bit according 
to the size of the engagements. According to § 18 KWG7,  we have to disclose. But 
this is broadly defined. We have made our own business decision and have 
established smaller limits. But most of my start-ups are below these limits. This 
means that they normally are not required to disclose during the year. They only 
need to present their profit assessment once a year. Well, and for the guarantee bank 
they, indeed, have to provide it quarterly. That’s the reason why it is more.” [I8] 
The disclosure requirements of the Banking Act were also mentioned by three other 
interviewees. Because some firms answered on the web survey that they did provide 
more regular information, all interviewees that denied obtaining more information or 
more regular information were asked for their thoughts about the firms’ conflicting 
                                                 
7 The KWG is the Banking Act of the Federal Republic of Germany. In § 18 the disclosure 
requirements are regulated. §18 requires the disclosure of loans of more than 750,000 euro 
respectively 10 per cent of the liable equity of the bank.  
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claims (part B, question 8). Five of them had no idea, but three of them referred to 
the Banking Act.  
“Well, I could imagine that this is because of the scale of the loan. We have §18 and 
its disclosure requirements. When a customer is below that limit and the bank does 
not require documents and the customer gets over that limit with the new 
investments and the bank suddenly requires information. This could be the reason.” 
[I3] 
By exceeding the limit for disclosure, SMEs might have to provide more and more 
regular information than before. This is not due to the inclusion of the guarantee 
from the guarantee bank. However, the firm has to provide more information. This is 
also referred to as one possible reason for the answers of the survey respondents by 
another interview partner. 
“I would explain this to the effect that the overall loan amount exceeds and, 
therefore, the disclosure requirements automatically increase. Well, this is my 
estimation. That this has nothing to do with the guarantee bank but with the 
volume.” [I6] 
This might be a reason for the answers of the firms who responded to the web 
survey. One of the other two interviewees explained the answers of the respondent 
firms with the additional work amount of applying for the guarantee to the guarantee 
bank.  
“The requirements catalogue of the guarantee bank for applying for a guarantee is 
enormous. (…) I think, it is due to the application to the guarantee bank.” [I4] 
The other interviewee could not understand the answers of the respondent firms at 
first. However, then he explained it by the additional assessment of the chamber. As 
mentioned before, this, indeed, is related to the provision of more information to the 
borrower. 
“I can’t understand it. Maybe the additional information is required for the 
assessment of the chamber. This always also involves an inspection of the firm. 
Considering the figures, banks require more and more information by this time. 
Business assessments, current confidential information and so on. But I think this is 
more related to the credit scoring than to the guarantee bank. Maybe this applies for 
existing customers when these have to provide a CV or target figures. This is 
something we would not require again.” [I10] 
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In the second part of his statement, the interview partner refers to the guarantee 
bank’s need for more information when a bank’s existing customer applies for a 
guarantee. This has nothing to do with the rhythm of information provided but rather 
with the amount of information, which has already been discussed above.  
This all demonstrates that there are, indeed, reasons why sometimes information is 
provided more regularly to the bank. However, the central aim was to find out 
whether information asymmetries can be reduced due to the provision of a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank. The demand for the provision of information on a more 
regular manner is not directly related to the inclusion of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank but has to do with the need of the bank to learn about a new 
customer. However, indirectly it is related to the provision of the guarantee. Since 
the loan would most likely not have been provided without the guarantee, the bank 
would not have to learn about the firm and require information.  
Summing up the results about the acquisition of information and the ability of 
guarantee banks to reduce asymmetric information for banks, it can be said that 
banks do not receive additional valuable information about the SMEs due to the 
inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank. The guarantee bank itself requires 
more information than needed by the banks since it requires a report from the 
chambers or local organizations. However, this report is normally not forwarded to 
the banks. In those cases where a report was forwarded to the banks, the interviewees 
stated that it did not include any new or valuable information for the borrower. For 
existing customers, guarantee banks require more information than banks do for 
assessing the loan application. The banks already know the customers and have had 
experiences with the dependability of the firm owner and its previous business 
success. For the guarantee bank, on the contrary, the customer is new and absolutely 
no information exists about his or her reliability or its past business experiences. It 
can be said that the higher information requirements of the guarantee bank are 
supposed to compensate the information disadvantages of the guarantee bank than to 
reduce information asymmetries of banks. Regarding the rhythm of providing 
information, the majority of all interviewees denied that the guarantee bank requires 
information more regularly. Most interviewees even stated that compared to the need 
of the guarantee bank the bank requires information more often. This is especially 
true for start-ups or new customers and might be an indication for moral hazard on 
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the part of the banks. The intention of the banks is to learn about the reliability of the 
borrower and the managerial abilities very quickly. This, indeed, helps to overcome 
information asymmetries. However, this is not directly related to the inclusion of the 
guarantee from the guarantee bank since the information is not needed on behalf of 
the guarantee bank. However, it can be said that the guarantee bank indeed supports 
the reduction of information asymmetries by making available the loans in the first 
place. Without the guarantee, the loans would probably not have been provided. The 
provision of the loans, however, provides the basis for the collection of information 
and having experiences with the customers. Therefore, the guarantee bank can be 
considered as an effective instrument to initiate the reduction of information 
asymmetries. 
5.5  Lending relationships  
Based on the theoretical framework derived from the literature review, the collection 
of information is interrelated with the establishment of a lending relationship (Behr 
et al., 2011; Cole, 1998). Whether lending relationships can be created or intensified 
as a consequence of the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank in a loan 
should be tested according to proposition 3b: ‘The more intense provision of 
information supports the creation of a bank-borrower relationship’.  
The answers about the acquisition of information have shown that the banks do not 
necessarily receive more information as a direct consequence of the inclusion of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank. However, due to the fact that the guarantee 
provides the basis for the provision of the loan, the banks have the opportunity to 
provide additional services, to collect additional information and to build confidence 
in the borrower when he or she proves his or her credibility in the course of the credit 
period. During the interviews all participants were asked to judge the impact of the 
inclusion of the guarantee on the establishment or the intensification of lending 
relationships (part C, question 10 and question 11). All interviewees confirmed a 
positive impact of the guarantee on the lending relationship which is demonstrated 
by Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Impact of guarantees on the lending relationship 
  
Savings 
banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
The provision of  a 
guarantee has a positive 
impact on the lending 
relationship 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 10 100.0% 
 
Albeit, the main reason for the positive impact is not the creation of more 
information but the fact that the loan can be provided in the first place.  
“Well, if the loan could not be provided without the guarantee bank, a relationship 
would not be achieved. And if we can provide the loan because of the guarantee 
bank, this will go down well with the customer. And this is the cornerstone for a 
relationship in the first place.” [I3] 
The central point is the provision of the loan. This is also confirmed by the following 
statement: 
“The basis for the establishment of a relationship is that we can provide the loan in 
the first place. That we get the opportunity to reduce the risk for our bank.” [I4] 
This applies for start-ups or new customers as well as for existing customers who 
need additional collateral for obtaining a loan. For the former, the provision of the 
loan including the guarantee provides a chance to establish a new lending 
relationship, while for the latter it provides the opportunity for intensifying an 
existing relationship. What is always important for the establishment or the creation 
of a long-lasting lending relationship is building confidence. Seven out of ten 
interviewees explicitly referred to the importance of trustworthiness for the lending 
relationship. This is demonstrated in Table 5.7 in more detail. 
Table 5.7: The role of trust in relationship lending 
  
Savings 
banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
Trust is an important 
factor for building a 
relationship 2 50.0% 4 100.0% 1 50.0% 7 70.0% 
 
The role, trust plays for establishing or deepening lending relationships is described 
in the following statement: 
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“If it has to do with new customers or start-ups who would not have got a loan 
without the guarantee bank, then it (author´s remark: the provision of a guarantee 
from a guarantee bank) pioneers the contact to the customer. And in the course of 
years, which hopefully do exist, we can acquire positive experiences. The same 
chance exists for existing customers who plan an expansion investment. We can 
accompany them, too. We can deepen our relationship and collect additional 
experiences in the course of the years, deepen our bond of trust. Credit business is 
always trust. Trust in the person. Obviously, when I know a person for several years 
then I either have the trust or not, I can assess this appropriately. This is not the case 
for new customers or start-ups. Insofar, the guarantee bank is clearly the key to 
realize loans and to develop and deepen a relationship over the course of years.” [I2] 
Trust is important for the whole lending relationship. It is not the duration of a 
relationship that creates bonds between a bank and its customers but the question of 
whether the two parties trust each other. To build trust, information and experience 
about the borrower are very important.  
“The relation is important, of course. I need to have trust in the person, trust in the 
entrepreneur, in the products and their abilities to even manage difficult situations. If 
someone has successfully managed a firma for fifteen or twenty years and then finds 
himself in a bad situation for whatever reasons one day we as his house bank will 
never let him fall but accompany him further on. This is out of the question. And 
insofar it plays a role. Do I know a customer and what experiences have we had so 
far? When we have a customer who has not the interest of full disclosure, who did 
not lay it on the line… such a customer will have a rough ride. Insofar, the 
experiences we have had in the past are an important factor.” [I2] 
During a lending relationship, borrowers can demonstrate their reliability. This is an 
enormous advantage when applying for a loan (Zimmermann, 2006; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). The trustworthiness a borrower has signalled, by timely repayment of 
previous loans, for example, can act as valuable asset for the decision about the 
provision of a loan. As the statement above shows, this is indeed related to the 
provision of information. Information is needed to learn about the ability of the 
entrepreneur to manage his or her business and to learn about the financial situation 
of the borrowers. This all helps to evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower 
which is important for making a loan decision. 
“This is very important as this is the general creditworthiness. I need to have trust in 
the entrepreneur. At the end of the day, when we make our decision, there always 
remains some risk for the bank no matter if a guarantee is included or not. And we 
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are only willing to bear the risk when we can estimate it. And for this estimation, the 
economic side as well as the personal side of the entrepreneur is important. And 
when I have no trust in his ability to be successful, I can’t provide the loan.” [I9] 
As the answers of the interviewees show, trust is important for providing loans. 
Customers can build trust by repaying back loans but also by providing all 
information necessary and in time to the bank. This is also demonstrated in the 
following statement: 
“I know how successful the customer was in the past and how he manages his firm. 
Partly, we also know his clients. This provides us with a very comprehensive 
picture. We need to get an impression of his financial circumstances.  This has much 
more validity when we have obtained this information for a long time. Assume 
someone with a new concept or a new market applied for a loan. Then, I may not 
have the impression that this could be a good thing. Or I get into it but do not really 
have a feeling for it. This is much easier with an existing customer. There, we have a 
lot of information. And information creates trust.” [I7]  
All the statements above have demonstrated the importance of a trustful relationship 
for a positive credit decision. For new customers or start-ups, the provision of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank builds the basis for the creation of a lending 
relationship. To get the chance to build a trusting relationship, the underlying 
circumstances play a crucial role. This means that the bank can prove its expertise 
and provide the services that are desired by the customer, as seen in the following 
statement.     
“It is definitely a chance when we make the loan possible thanks to the guarantee 
bank. Yes, indeed, it certainly is. Without the guarantee bank such relationships 
could not be achieved. If you give the customer the opportunity to get to know the 
bank and if we present our bank as we aspire to, then a relationship of trust can start 
out of this in a relatively early phase. Yes, this is a very good way to begin a 
relationship.” [I9] 
Four of the ten interviewees mentioned that the creation or the deepening of a 
lending relationship is not a fast-selling item. Besides the basic provision of the loan, 
it is important that the clearing and settlement goes off without any problems and the 
customer is content with the bank and finds the bank cooperative and pleasant. 
Moreover, the bank gets the opportunity to provide additional services to the 
customer. These are key factors for establishing a long-lasting relationship. 
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“We could provide the loan only because the guarantee bank substituted collateral 
and, therefore, reduced the risk. The fact that the bank could consequently realize 
the loan can have a positive impact on customer loyalty and gratitude. Important for 
that is that we as bank work well. That following services like the payment 
transactions are processed without any problems and the customer appreciates the 
collaboration with the bank. In those cases, long-time lending relationships can be 
established by the door opener guarantee bank.” [I5] 
The statement illustrates that lending relationships are characterized by reciprocity. 
Both the bank and the customer have to prove themselves to be trustworthy and 
reliable partners. Only then can long-lasting lending relationships be generated.  
“Well, I really think that is like this. When we include the guarantee bank and 
everything is positive, the customer is very confident for the following years and 
committed himself to the house. And the contract would not have been happened 
without the guarantee bank. (…) Accordingly, one has to admit that, especially for 
start-ups and business takeovers, when the guarantee bank is included and 
everything goes well, the customer is very thankful and most often a long-lasting 
relationship can be established.” [I10] 
The guarantee from the guarantee bank is the door opener. Since the inclusion of the 
guarantee enables the provision of the loan in the first place, most borrowers are very 
thankful at that stage. This also provides a good basis for cross-selling. When 
everything goes well in the following month or years, a trustful relationship can be 
established as demonstrated by the quotation below: 
“When we as a bank provide access to the loan for a customer in that package, he 
will appreciate this for a whole lifetime as long as nothing goes wrong. Insofar, the 
guarantee bank makes a major contribution when a guarantee is provided and the 
provision of the loan is made possible. And then, we get access to the customer. 
Definitely.” [I3] 
For summing up the answers about the relation between the provision of a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank and the creation or deepening of lending relationships, it can 
be said that the provision of a guarantee acts as a cornerstone for the establishment of 
a bank-borrower relationship. The loan would not have been provided without the 
guarantee. When the guarantee and, therefore, the loan are provided, the bank has the 
opportunity to make its own relationship with the borrower. It can collect 
information about the managerial experiences of the business owner and the success 
of the business project. Information is always needed to learn about the borrower. 
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Insofar, the statements of the interviewees have demonstrated that information is, 
indeed, important for the establishment or deepening of a lending relationship. Most 
of them referred to the importance of trust in this context. A stable and long-lasting 
lending relationship can only exist when the borrower provides valuable information 
to the bank which enables the bank to assess current situation and the potential 
success of the borrower. The creation and adherence of a trustful relationship is not 
only in the hands of the borrower. The bank for its part has to work well and has to 
provide its services to the satisfaction of the borrower. When the borrower is 
confident he or she will probably also be willing to provide all necessary information 
in return. This is what constitutes a trusting lending relationship. Trust in the 
reliability of the borrower can also reduce the risk of moral hazard on the part of the 
borrower. When banks know their customers for a long time and borrowers have 
proved to be reliable and honest, the risk of shifting to more risky projects after 
receiving the loans seems to be rather small. Moreover, a steady exchange of 
information which defines a good lending relationship would result in the detection 
of the moral hazard. Thus, the provision of the guarantee from the guarantee bank 
builds the basis for a trustworthy relationship. But it is up to the behaviour of the 
bank and the borrower to let the relationship grow. 
5.6  Mitigation of credit restrictions 
Finally, it shall be assessed whether guarantee banks help to overcome credit 
restrictions for SMEs (proposition 4). To evaluate this, the interviewees were asked 
whether credit restrictions can be mitigated by the instrument guarantee bank (part D, 
question 13). Eight of them gave an assessment. The others stated not being able to 
assess this. As Table 5.8 shows, they all confirmed the ability of the guarantee bank 
to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. 
Table 5.8: Ability of the guarantee bank to mitigate credit restrictions 
  
Savings 
banks 
Co-operative 
banks 
Private 
 banks Total 
Due to the guarantee 
bank credit restrictions 
can be mitigated. 2 50.0% 4 100.0% 2 100.0% 8 80.0% 
 
They all argued that some loans indeed would not have been provided without the 
guarantee bank.  
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“The guarantee bank opens the door to customers that one otherwise could not have 
opened. The guarantee bank gives an opportunity to customers, to purposes, to 
firms, to obtain a loan, to establish or deepen a business contact that otherwise 
would not have been possible. And it opens the door for making profit in the future.” 
[I2] 
While the interviewee above referred to the additional profit that can be generated in 
the course of the credit period and the succeeding customer relationship, another 
interview partner mentioned the jobs that can be created or saved due to the 
provision of the loan. This underlines the overall importance of the guarantee bank to 
support firms and a whole region as already discussed in Section 5.3. 
“If the guarantee bank did not exist, many loans would not have been provided and, 
therefore, many jobs would not have been generated. And I think it is worth fighting 
for every job. Especially for us as a medium-sized bank, the guarantee bank is an 
important instrument.” [I3] 
The guarantee bank is considered to be an important instrument to foster the 
provision of loans to SMEs. The interviewees indeed mentioned concrete cases in 
which the guarantee bank was crucial for providing the loan. 
“Well, I, indeed, recall some examples where it was on a knife edge, and we could 
rescue the firm with the help of the guarantee bank.” [I6] 
This is also confirmed by the following statement: 
“In those cases in which it is not possible otherwise, it is a very beneficent 
instrument. And this absolutely should be fostered further on. (…) It is one 
possibility to make loans just available. It is a very useful instrument.” [I7] 
However, the statements also underline the assumption that the provision of 
guarantees by the guarantee bank leads to a provision of loans that are related to a 
higher default risk. That the guarantee bank enables the provision of loans in the first 
place is again demonstrated by the statement below. 
“I am very glad about the existence of the guarantee bank because there are some 
loans that we could not have provided without the guarantee bank.” [I10] 
How decisive the inclusion of the guarantee is for providing the loan can be deduced 
from the answers of the interviewees about the consequences of a negative decision 
of the guarantee bank. The interviewees were asked whether a loan would have been 
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provided anyway and under which circumstances (part A, question 4). All 
interviewees answered that the loans will not be provided as the following quotation 
demonstrates. 
“That depends. I would say that we most likely will not provide the loan. That ought 
to be such an awesome and promising concept that we would take the risk 
consciously. But as a rule, when we have decided to provide the loan when a 
guarantee is provided and the guarantee will not be provided,…then there must be a 
reason for the denial. And then we have to ask ourselves why the guarantee bank 
does not provide the guarantee. Well, for us, this is an evidence for not providing the 
loan then.” [I6]  
This shows that the assessment of the guarantee bank, indeed, serves as some kind of 
reassurance for the bank. When the guarantee bank does not provide the guarantee, 
the expected loss is too high for the bank, and the loan will most likely not be 
provided. This is again an indication for the willingness of banks to accept higher 
probabilities of default when the guarantee bank provides a guarantee. For a given 
probability of default, the provision of the guarantee reduces the expected loss for the 
bank. When no guarantee is provided, the expected loss is not reduced. This ends up 
in an overall default risk that is too high for the bank.   
Regarding the refusals of the guarantee bank, the answers have revealed that the 
guarantee bank rarely or never rejects an application. This is demonstrated by the 
following statement: 
“Should the guarantee bank reject the provision of the guarantee, we will not 
provide the loan. But this has never happened so far.” [I5]  
This is also confirmed by the following statement: 
“Fortunately, a rejection of the guarantee bank is very rare. I have checked that for 
the last two years. During this time we’ve had no rejection. Basically, we agree upon 
the collateralisation with the customer in advance. And it is important for us that we 
reach this collateralisation. If we don’t achieve that, we will have to reject the loan.” 
[I9] 
The low number of refusals by the guarantee bank is related to the intensive 
assessment of the loan application of the bank. Only if the bank believes in the 
success of the concept it will apply for a guarantee. This has already been discussed 
in Section 5.1 and is underlined by the following citation: 
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“So far, I have not had a rejection. They have backed everything so far. But this is 
something you can judge from the beginning on. When we as a bank see, that the 
whole project makes no sense we will not send an application to the guarantee bank. 
Well, we, indeed, prove whether the application makes sense or not.” [I10] 
Moreover, the contact between the guarantee bank and the banks seems to be very 
close. The following statement illustrates the relation between the close cooperation 
and the low rate of rejection. 
“So far, I haven’t had the case where the guarantee bank has rejected a guarantee. I 
work very closely with the colleague from the guarantee bank. Everything that could 
be critical is discussed in advance on the phone. I do this because I think it makes no 
sense for the customer to pay money for the application when the guarantee bank is 
not generally interested.” [I8] 
The close relationship between the guarantee bank and the banks is certainly one 
central key for the success of the instrument. Only when the collaboration is 
perceived as being uncomplicated and pleasant will banks get in contact with the 
guarantee bank to include a guarantee. The answers of the interviewees demonstrated 
that many questions can be cleared up in a straightforward manner through official 
channels. This facilitates the decision of the banks to ask for a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank when they have a loan for a promising business project but not 
enough valuable collateral.  
Another question that arises is whether credit restrictions can be mitigated 
sustainably due to the guarantee bank. The idea behind this is that a SME that needs 
a guarantee for an initial loan gets the opportunity to provide information and 
establish a lending relationship with the bank (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 2003). In 
this way, asymmetric information can be reduced. As a result, it does not need a 
guarantee again when applying for another loan later on (Vogel and Adams, 1997). 
Asked about this (part D, question 14), all ten interviewees denied such a 
relationship. When a SME applies for a follow-up loan, the banks assess the business 
project and the creditworthiness of the firm again. Only when a firm has developed 
successfully, sufficient collateral can be provided and the default risk is acceptable 
for the bank can the loan be provided without the inclusion of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. However, this is not dependent on the former provision of the 
guarantee or the relationship that has been established as the following quotation 
demonstrates.   
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“If the collateral or the assets e.g. due to the growth or the necessary investments, do 
not grow in an equal ratio, it can by all means be that a guarantee is again needed, 
especially when innovations or new products have to be developed. This takes time.  
In these cases it is a conventional practice to include the guarantee bank again.” [I2] 
This is underlined by the other interviewees that also referred to the importance of 
the current situation of the firm as being decisive for the decision. 
“The profitability of the customer is always decisive. For every follow-up 
application we again make a new credit scoring. And when the customer can 
demonstrate a good profitability and has enough valuable collateral, then a loan can 
be provided without a guarantee from the guarantee bank.” [I5] 
The financial and economic situation and, therefore, the creditworthiness of the firm 
need to have changed since the initial loan had been provided. When the borrower 
shows the same probability of default then at the time of the initial loan application, 
the expected loss will again be considered as being too high. When this is the case, a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank will again be needed to reduce the expected loss 
and, therefore, the default risk for the bank to an acceptable level. This is illustrated 
by the following statement: 
 “We can only abandon a guarantee when the economic situation has ameliorated in 
such a way that totally different financial qualities can be presented and collateral 
has been built up that we now can consult. If the situation is equal to the situation at 
the time of the first application, we would include a guarantee again.” [I7] 
Thus, it is absolutely unimportant whether a guarantee from the guarantee bank was 
included in the initial loan or not. The starting situation is the same. The bank 
assesses the business project and the probability of success of the planned 
investment. When the concept seems to be promising, the risk for the bank and the 
collateral that can be provided to reduce the expected loss are assessed. When the 
borrower cannot provide enough valuable collateral to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable amount according to the risk bearing ability of the bank, a guarantee from 
the guarantee bank will be required again to provide the loan. 
“The decision is independent of the initial guarantee. We have to assess what is the 
customer planning and how can I best finance this. How can I best finance this under 
the aspects of risk and profitability?” [I8] 
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The answers indicate that information that can be collected and relationships that can 
be established since the provision of the initial loan including a guarantee are not 
determining the decision of whether to include a guarantee again or not. It is rather a 
question of collateral, the financial or economic situation respectably the 
creditworthiness and the expected loss at the current state.  
Summing up the interviewee responses, it can be said that guarantees from the 
guarantee bank, indeed, help to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. The guarantees 
act as substitute for collateral and allow loans to SMEs that they would otherwise not 
have obtained. Without the loan, businesses could not have been founded or 
continued and jobs could not have been generated or saved. Therefore, banks 
consider the guarantee bank to be an efficient instrument to support SME financing. 
The answers of the interviewee have underlined the high importance of the guarantee 
bank for SME loans. They stated that those loans that include a guarantee would 
most likely not have been provided if the guarantee bank had rejected the provision 
of the guarantee. Without the guarantee the expected loss and, therefore, the default 
risk for the lender would have been perceived as too high. However, related to a very 
close and unproblematic cooperation between the guarantee bank and the banks, 
applications for a guarantee are rarely or never refused. This is related to the 
thorough assessment of the loan application by the bank in the forefront. Only when 
a concept seems to be promising is the application for the guarantee submitted. 
Moreover, banks often discuss the loan application with the guarantee bank before 
they apply for the guarantee. This helps to answer questions and assess the 
probability of success of the application. Only when an application seems to be 
promising will it be forwarded to the guarantee bank.  
The provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank for an initial loan has no 
impact on the provision of a follow-up loan. For every loan application, the banks 
assess the concept and the financial and economic situation of the firm. When a 
concept seems to be promising, the creditworthiness has increased and enough 
collateral is available to reduce the default risk to an amount that is consistent with 
the risk-bearing ability of the bank, the loan can be provided without the need for a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank. If the business project may be promising but the 
borrower’s creditworthiness has not increased, a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
will again be needed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provision of a guarantee 
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from the guarantee bank mitigates credit restrictions in a sustainable way for SMEs. 
This is always dependent on the business project, the current situation of the firm and 
its ability to pledge assets for collateral.   
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6 Merging survey and interview results 
This section is about the implications of the survey and interview results for the 
propositions and research questions. To allow comparison, the quantitative and 
qualitative findings were merged (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Plano Clark et al., 
2010).  In Sections 4 and 5 above, the two data sets have been analysed separately, 
according to the order of the research questions and respective propositions. The 
results of each data set are briefly presented in Table 6.1. The table contains the 
research questions as well as the corresponding propositions and the associated 
quantitative and qualitative results.  
Table 6.1: Results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
Research 
Question 
Propositions Results web survey Results semi-structured 
interviews 
For what 
reasons and 
in which 
situations are 
guarantees 
from the 
guarantee 
bank 
important for 
the provision 
of loans to 
SMEs? 
P1: SMEs have 
difficulties in 
obtaining bank 
loans because of 
a higher default 
risk and lack of 
collateral. 
Difficulties in 
obtaining bank loans 
can be confirmed 
(Sections 4.2). 
SMEs without viable business 
projects have problems in 
obtaining bank loans (Section 
5.1). 
No clear differences 
between the 
demographic variables 
associated with higher 
default risk and the 
access to finance can 
be found (Section 4.2). 
No general exclusions for e.g. 
certain industrial sectors exist 
(Section 5.1).  
P2a: Providing a 
guarantee acts 
as a substitute 
for collateral 
and allows 
SMEs to receive 
a bank loan. 
The enormous 
importance of 
guarantees from 
guarantee banks for 
SMEs can be 
confirmed (Section 
4.3). 
Guarantees from the guarantee 
bank act as substitute for 
collateral and reduce the default 
risk for the lenders. This 
enables banks to provide loans 
to SMEs that these otherwise 
could not provide (Section 5.2). 
A significant 
relationship to the size 
of the firms has been 
found (Section 4.3). 
P2b: Including a 
guarantee from 
a guarantee 
bank makes 
SME loans more 
profitable for 
banks. 
- Guarantees rather reduce the 
profit for the lender because of 
increasing processing costs. The 
reduction of capital costs and 
risk costs is passed on to the 
customers and therefore has no 
impact on the profitability. The 
overall profitability can be 
increased by indirect impacts 
like cross-selling effects and the 
support of the region (Section 
5.3).  
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Table 6.1       (continued) 
Research 
Question 
Propositions Results web survey Results semi-structured 
interviews 
Can the 
provision of 
a guarantee 
from a 
guarantee 
bank help to 
reduce 
information 
asymmetries 
between the 
lending bank 
and the 
borrower? 
P3a: SMEs 
provide more 
information and 
more regular 
information to 
their bank as a 
consequence of 
obtaining the 
guarantee from 
the guarantee 
bank. 
SMEs tend to provide 
information more 
regularly but not 
necessarily more 
information (Section 
4.4). 
SMEs may provide more 
information for the assessment 
required by the guarantee bank. 
However, the information is not 
valuable for the banks (Section 
5.4). 
Significant 
relationships between 
demographic factors 
and the provision of 
information were 
found (Section 4.4). 
A more regular provision of 
information is possible but is 
not necessarily a consequence 
of the inclusion of the guarantee 
(Section 5.4). 
Has a new 
lending 
relationship 
been created 
due to the 
loan with 
guarantee? 
P3b: Increased 
information 
supports the 
creation of a 
bank-borrower 
relationship. 
The majority of all 
SMEs denied that the 
relationship has 
intensified (Sections 
4.5). 
The fact that the loan can be 
provided in the first place 
makes the creation of lending 
relationships possible (Section 
5.5). 
Significant 
relationship between 
information and 
lending relationship 
was found (Section 
4.5). 
Do German 
guarantee 
banks help 
to overcome 
credit 
restrictions 
for SMEs? 
P4: Guarantee 
banks help to 
mitigate credit 
restrictions for 
SMEs. 
No concluding 
assessment possible, 
due to the small 
number of firms that 
did not need a follow-
up guarantee (Sections 
4.6). 
The guarantee bank indeed 
helps to overcome credit 
restrictions by making available 
loans to SMEs in the first place. 
However, it does not help to 
sustainably overcome credit 
restrictions (Section 5.6). 
Source: Own illustration 
The table facilitates the direct comparison of the results. It becomes visible whether 
the results of the two different data sets are similar or different from each other. 
Except proposition 2b, all other propositions have been analysed using data from the 
web survey and the semi-structured interviews. These results have to be merged to 
provide a complete picture of the opinions and experiences of SMEs as well as of 
commercial banks. Since both data sets are considered to be equally important within 
the present research, it was decided to not follow a predetermined order for 
comparing the results. The comparison of the results follows the order of the research 
questions. Section 6.1 contains the merged results about the driving forces of 
including a guarantee from the guarantee bank. Section 6.2 combines the results 
about the amount and frequency of providing information since a loan with guarantee 
from the guarantee bank was provided. The quantitative and qualitative results about 
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the impact of the relationship between the borrowers and the banks are merged in 
Section 6.3. Finally, Section 6.4 combines the results about the ability of the 
guarantee bank to mitigate credit restrictions of SMEs.  
6.1  Driving forces for the inclusion of guarantees 
The first research question is about the reasons and situations in which the provision 
of a guarantee from the guarantee bank becomes necessary. To evaluate the reasons 
commercial banks insist on the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank, 
three different topics derived from the framework have been investigated: difficulties 
in obtaining bank loans for SMEs, the role of collateral and risk, and the profitability 
of SME loans for banks. According to these topics, three propositions have been 
built.  
Starting with proposition 1, “SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank loans because 
of a higher default risk and lack of collateral”, the central aim was to determine 
whether and why some SMEs have difficulties in receiving bank loans. The answers 
of the respondent SMEs have demonstrated that difficulties indeed exist (Part I, Q 1: 
mean value 3.68, standard deviation 1.020). No significant relationship has been 
found from analysing the relationship between the presence of difficulties and 
demographic factors that are widely associated with higher default risks like age, 
size, industrial sector and legal form. These results are consistent with the findings of 
the KfW-medium sized panel 2011 (Reize, 2011) which exclusively analysed the 
link between demographic factors and loan availability for SMEs and also found no 
relationships. Moreover, the findings are consistent with the interview results. All 
interviewees were asked to specify the general exclusions that exist for SME loans 
(part A, question 5). Nine of them (90.0%) denied the existence of general 
exclusions. According to these answers, the demographic factors are not decisive for 
accepting a loan. However, the answers of the interviewees demonstrated that the 
business project is a decisive factor when deciding about the provision of a loan. If a 
business concept is not convincing and the bank does not believe in the future 
success of the firm, a loan will not be provided. These results demonstrate that at 
least the first part of proposition 1 can be confirmed at this stage. The present 
research findings have confirmed that some SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank 
loans. This is consistent with the results of the annual surveys of enterprises 
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conducted by the KfW (Bauer and Zimmermann, 2010; Schwarz and Zimmermann, 
2012; Zimmermann and Steinbach, 2011). Additionally, the semi-structured 
interviews revealed a reason for loan denials of commercial banks which is 
independent from the demographic factors. The answers of the interviewees have 
demonstrated that restricted access to bank loans for SMEs often arises from 
weaknesses of the presented business projects. SMEs with weak business projects 
will not receive a loan independent of whether the guarantee bank will provide a 
guarantee or not. In this respect, the interviews provided another reason for credit 
restrictions for SMEs which has not been recognized by the above cited surveys. 
The role of collateral for the provision of a bank loan is considered in proposition 2a: 
“Providing a guarantee acts as substitute for collateral and allows SMEs to receive a 
bank loan”. This proposition examines why commercial banks insist on the provision 
of a guarantee from the guarantee bank. Proposition 2a implies that the main role of 
the guarantee bank is to provide additional collateral. This assumes that the expected 
loss would otherwise be too high for the commercial bank. In such a situation, the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank means additional collateral for the 
bank. This reduces the expected loss and the loan can be provided (Daldrup, 2005). 
To evaluate this, the bank managers were asked about the role guarantees from the 
guarantee bank play in providing loans to SMEs (part A, question 2). All of them 
(100%) stated that guarantees from the guarantee bank are required when the 
potential borrowers cannot pledge enough valuable collateral. In these cases, 
guarantees act as substitutes for collateral and the answers of the interviewees 
confirmed proposition 2a and the findings of existing literature about that topic 
(Menkhoff et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2011b). The answers have also confirmed the 
importance of collateral for SME access to bank loans and are in line with existing 
literature (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009). Additionally, the 
answers of the interviewees have revealed another interesting point: the relationship 
between the size of a bank and the collateral requirements. The answers have 
demonstrated that the size of a bank is related to the risk-bearing ability of the bank. 
According to the answers of the interviewees, the risk-bearing ability is positively 
correlated to the size of a bank. Consequently, smaller banks have a lower risk-
bearing ability. A lower risk-bearing ability often leads to a higher requirement 
concerning the value of collateral even for smaller loan amounts. Due to the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank, the banks attain a security that 
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reduces the expected loss to an acceptable amount, and the loans can be provided. 
The situation that not enough own collateral can be provided can arise for both, start-
ups and existing SMEs. Start-ups often just have not enough valuable assets to 
pledge since they are in the beginning of their business. For existing firms, collateral 
is often already pledged for other loans. If an additional loan is needed for financing 
growth, for example, additional collateral will be needed. This is when guarantees 
from the guarantee bank can be helpful for obtaining bank loans.  
These statements might provide a first indication for the acceptance of higher 
probabilities of default when a guarantee from the guarantee bank is provided and, 
therefore, the risk of moral hazard on the part of the lending banks. The provision of 
a guarantee from a guarantee bank lowers the inherent risk of a loan to an acceptable 
level for the bank. Without the guarantee, the risk would be considered too high and 
the loan could not be provided. The provision of a guarantee, therefore, might result 
in the acceptance of higher basic risks of a borrower (Uesugi et al., 2010; Levitsky, 
1993). To further analyse the occurrence of moral hazard, the interviewees were 
asked about the default rates of loans for which a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
was obtained. A higher default rate could be a signal for moral hazard related to the 
provision of the guarantee from the guarantee bank. All interviewees have been 
asked to compare the default rate of loans including a guarantee with loans without a 
guarantee (part E, question 19). Not all of them felt able to estimate this. Out of those 
that answered (50.0%), the majority (80.0%) denied any difference between the two 
groups. Since the guarantee bank always also requires personal collateral from the 
borrowers, a default of the loan would also have personal consequences for them. 
This is considered to reduce at least the risk for the occurrence of moral hazard on 
the part of the borrower as discussed in the literature review (Uesugi et al., 2010; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, the existence of moral hazard could neither be 
excluded nor confirmed; further research about this topic is needed.  
The great importance of guarantees from the guarantee bank for obtaining bank loans 
is confirmed by the responses to the web survey. Overall 86.0% of all respondent 
SMEs indicated that they absolutely agree or rather agree to the statement that the 
guarantee from the guarantee bank was crucial for obtaining the loan (Part II, Q 3e). 
The only statistically significant relationship was found between the significance of a 
guarantee and the size of a firm. However, the judgement of the firms about the 
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significance of guarantees from the guarantee bank for obtaining loans and the 
answers of the interviewees lead to the conclusion that proposition 2a can be 
confirmed. A guarantee from the guarantee bank provides additional collateral to the 
banks which reduces the expected loss and is crucial for a positive loan decision. 
The last driving force for the inclusion of guarantees from the guarantee bank in 
SME loans that has been analysed is the impact on the profitability for the lending 
banks. One reason that is often mentioned for credit restrictions of SMEs is high 
costs related to relatively small loan amounts SMEs often apply for (Beck et al., 
2010; Bosse, 2009; Riding et al., 2007). In the literature, Credit Guarantee Schemes 
are considered to be an effective means to reduce these costs for the lending banks 
(Green, 2003; Levitsky, 1997a). Proposition 2b tests the impact of guarantees on the 
overall profitability of SME loans: “Including a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
makes SME loans more profitable for banks”. Information about the profitability of 
banks can only be answered by commercial banks themselves and not by the SMEs. 
Therefore, profitability was a topic of the semi-structured interviews. The 
interviewees’ answers have demonstrated that the direct impact of guarantees for 
SME loans on the banks’ profit is rather negative. The inclusion of a guarantee from 
the guarantee bank increases the amount of work for the initial application as well as 
for ongoing monitoring and reporting. This was stated by all ten interviewees (part E, 
question 15: 100.0%). These results conflict with the conceptual literature of Green 
(2006) and Levitsky (1997a). Since the guarantee bank is backed up by counter 
guarantees of the federal states and the federal government, guarantees from 
guarantee banks are considered as being secure securities (Schmidt and van Elkan, 
2006). The inclusion of such a guarantee reduces the equity requirements according 
to Basel II and later Basel III. This reduces the capital costs for the banks. The 
provision of additional collateral also reduces the expected loss for the lending banks 
and, therefore, the risk costs. However, all ten interviewees denied that the costs are 
a decisive factor for requiring the guarantee (part E, question 16: 100.0%). The 
reduction of capital costs and risk costs has a direct impact on the pricing of the loan. 
It reduces the required margin of the bank. However, the German banking sector is 
highly competitive. Regional banks have only a limited number of customers and are 
less engaged in investment banking than private banks. Consequently, providing 
services to corporate clients and private customers is of great importance (Koetter, 
2013; Detzer et al., 2013). Due to the limited number of potential customers and the 
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fact that German SMEs can chose between services of more than one house bank 
(Hummel, 2011; Hackethal and Gleisner, 2006), banks do not take the opportunity to 
enhance the overall profitability of a loan. The interviewees stated that due to the 
high cost sensitivity and the market competition the cost advantage is fully passed on 
to the borrower. Therefore, the reduction of costs does not increase the bank’s 
profitability; therefore, proposition 2b cannot be confirmed by the present research. 
Regarding the options for indirectly increasing profitability, six interviewees 
mentioned that the cross-selling potential plays an important role (part E, question 
17: 60.0%). When additional services can be provided, this opens up the possibility 
for enhancing the long-term profit potential of a customer. A lack of cross-selling 
potential might lead to a denial of a loan even if the guarantee bank agrees to provide 
a guarantee. Cross-selling has not been considered in the reviewed literature and 
provided a new area for evaluating the profitability of loans including a guarantee 
from a guarantee bank. Another indirect impact on the profitability was mentioned 
by all three interviewees from savings banks and two out of three interviewees from 
co-operative banks (part E, question 18: 50.0%). This was the support of the region. 
Savings banks and co-operative banks are limited to act in a certain region. When the 
inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank enables the provision of a loan to a 
SME, this provides an opportunity to support a firm in the region and to save or 
create jobs. When the lending bank also provides current accounts, money 
investments or loans to the employees of the supported firms, the overall profit of the 
bank can be positively influenced. This can be considered as an indirect consequence 
of the provision of the loan. It also has an indirect impact on the bank’s profitability. 
This was also not mentioned in the reviewed literature about guarantee banks or 
Credit Guarantee Schemes. However, it offers another incidence for the occurrence 
of moral hazard on the part of the lending banks. To ensure the economic vitality of 
their region, savings banks and co-operative banks might accept higher probabilities 
of default when the guarantee bank reduces the expected loss. The role of cross-
selling and the support of the region as well as the impact on moral hazard on the 
side of the banks have not been analysed in detail in the present research and provide 
promising areas for further investigation. Summing up, proposition 2b can only be 
confirmed with restrictions. The results have demonstrated that direct increases of 
the bank’s profitability are hardly achieved by the inclusion of a guarantee. This is 
caused by the higher amount of work for the banks which is related to the application 
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for the guarantee and the monitoring and the reporting to the guarantee bank. 
However, commercial banks, indeed, consider additional services that can be 
provided. This offers potential for cross-selling and, therefore, for additional profits. 
These profits are indirectly relatable to the inclusion of a guarantee. This is the case 
when the loan would not have been provided without a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank. In such a situation, the additional services would not have been provided as 
well. Another indirect impact of the overall profitability of a bank can arise out of the 
limitation of savings banks and co-operative banks to a certain region. However, this 
can also lead to moral hazard on the side of the banks.  
6.2  Ability to reduce information asymmetries 
The second research question is about the ability of the guarantee bank to reduce 
asymmetric information. For evaluating the impact of the guarantee bank on 
information asymmetries between the lending bank and the borrower, the amount 
and the frequency of information provided by SMEs after obtaining a loan with 
guarantee was examined. In this context, proposition 3a tested whether “SMEs 
provide more and more regular information to the lending bank as consequence of 
obtaining the guarantee from the guarantee bank”. This proposition has been 
evaluated by asking SMEs as well as by interviewing bank managers about the firms’ 
provision of information. Since it is not only a question of how much or how often 
information is shared but also of the quality of the information, all interviewees have 
additionally been asked about the value of information that is provided by the 
borrowers.  
The interviewees stated that no additional information about the borrowers will be 
collected as a direct consequence of the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank in a SME loan (part B, question 7: 100.0%). The central reason for insisting on 
the guarantee is the lack of collateral and not necessarily a lack of information. If not 
enough information is available to thoroughly evaluate the business idea and the 
future prospects of a firm, a loan will probably not be provided. This confirms 
existing literature about the role of information in bank lending (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Grunert and Norden, 2012; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). The 
interviewees all stated that the inclusion of a guarantee does not enhance the 
information flow because the guarantee bank demands the same information for their 
204 
 
assessment as the commercial banks do. However, some interviewees, indeed, 
mentioned that the guarantee bank requires more information because it demands an 
assessment report from a chamber or other organization. However, these reports 
contain no additional valuable information for the commercial banks. The answers of 
the interviewees have demonstrated that in some cases the guarantee bank needs 
additional information about existing customers of the commercial banks. As 
opposed to the guarantee bank, commercial banks already have information about the 
SME’s management, financial situation, credit history and past success. The 
guarantee bank commonly does not know the customers and, therefore, needs 
additional information to assess the application. Thus, in these cases, borrowers 
provide more information than required by the commercial banks because of the 
inclusion of the guarantee. However, since the commercial banks still have the 
information, it does not mean additional valuable information for them. These results 
are in contrast to the conceptual literature about the ability of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes to foster the creation of additional information (Craig et al., 2008; Kramer, 
2008; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). However, the answers of the 
interviewees have demonstrated that the provision of the guarantee often provides the 
basis for the provision of a loan. This, in turn, builds the basis for an exchange of 
information between the lending bank and the borrowers over the course of time. In 
this regard, interviewees argued that guarantee banks can, indeed, be considered to 
be helpful institutions to reduce information asymmetries. Without the guarantee, a 
loan would probably not have been provided and the opportunity to generate further 
information would not have occurred. Consequently, the above mentioned literature 
can be confirmed. The provision of a guarantee generally provides the opportunity to 
the lending banks to collect information about a borrower over time. 
Regarding the answers of the SMEs, 49.0 per cent confirmed to provide more 
information to the commercial bank after they have received the loan including a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank (Part II, Q 3c: mean value 2.39, standard 
deviation 0.917). Considering the demographic factors, a statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of information provided and the size of a firm was 
found (p=0.021, Sign. <0.05). While the majority of small firms indicated to provide 
more information, the majority of bigger firms denied to provide more information 
after the loans including a guarantee were received. Since smaller firms especially 
are related to information asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Behr and Guettler, 
205 
 
2007; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008) this result indicates that the provision of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank is beneficial to overcome credit restrictions for 
these SMEs. For smaller firms, the assumption expressed in existing studies that 
more information is provided as a direct consequence of the inclusion of a guarantee 
from a guarantee scheme (Craig et al., 2008; Kramer, 2008; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel 
and Adams, 1997; Green, 2003) can be confirmed.  
Considering the answers about the interval of information provided, the majority of 
all respondents (68.3%) confirmed to provide information more regularly since the 
loan with guarantee was obtained (Part II, Q 3d: mean value 2.03, standard deviation 
0.866). The analyses of the relationship among the demographic factors and the 
interval of information provided demonstrated that younger firms provided 
information more regularly after the loans including a guarantee were obtained (p = 
0.056; Sig. < 0.1). Additionally, smaller firms provided information more regularly 
after the loans including a guarantee were obtained (p = 0.078; Sig. < 0.1). These 
firms are especially related to be informational opaque (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Behr and Guettler, 2007; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). Consequently, the results 
have demonstrated that for these firms, guarantees from the guarantee bank can be 
considered as beneficial instrument to mitigate information asymmetries. The 
quantitative results are consistent with the qualitative results. Eight out of ten 
interviewees answered that information is required more regularly after the loan is 
provided (part B, question 7, 80.0%). This is especially true for new customers or 
start-ups. Commercial banks know nothing about these customers and have to learn 
quickly about their ability to manage a business. They monitor the firms more 
regularly to identify undesirable developments as soon as possible and to be able to 
react in time. The results of the statistical analysis have also demonstrated that 
Present Old Hands (long-lasting customers that are often in contact with their bank) 
show significant agreement with the statement about providing information more 
regularly (70.6%). The interviewees explained this with the regulations of the 
German Banking Act. Firms that exceed a certain loan amount have to provide 
information more regularly. Existing customers often already have other loans when 
applying for the loan that is provided with a guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
When the limit mentioned above is exceeded by this loan, they have to provide 
information more regularly by law (§18 KWG, see Section 5.4). However, in these 
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cases, the more regular provision of information is not directly related to the 
inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank itself. 
This all demonstrates that sometimes indeed more information is provided by 
borrowers that have obtained a loan including a guarantee. However, the results have 
also demonstrated that this often is not a direct result of the guarantee from the 
guarantee bank as supposed by the conceptual literature (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 
2003; Kramer, 2008; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). However, this 
cannot necessarily lead to a rejection of proposition 3a. The research findings have 
demonstrated that the provision of the guarantee from the guarantee bank is crucial 
for providing the loan. Consequently, the provision of the guarantee helps to 
overcome information asymmetries. Without the guarantee from the guarantee bank, 
no loan will be provided, and the borrower and the lending bank will not have the 
opportunity to exchange information and reduce information asymmetries.  
6.3  Impact on the relation between borrower and bank 
The third research question is about the ability of Credit Guarantee Schemes to create 
lending relationships. Out of this research question, proposition 3b was derived: “The 
more intense provision of information supports the creation of a bank-borrower 
relationship”. To evaluate this, all interviewees were asked whether lending 
relationships can be created that would not have been created without the guarantee 
from the guarantee bank (part C, question 10). All ten of them (100.0%) confirmed 
this. According to their answers, the provision of the guarantee was a precondition 
for the provision of the loans, and the provision of the loan was the precondition for 
the creation of a lending relationship. This means that the provision of the guarantee 
from the guarantee bank can act as cornerstone for the establishment of the bank-
borrower relationship. Without the guarantee, the bank would not have provided the 
loan. Now the bank has the opportunity to learn about the borrower. As time goes by, 
a lending relationship can grow and deepen. Regarding the survey results, 42.9 per 
cent of all respondents agreed with the statement that the relationship with the bank 
has intensified since they have received the loan with guarantee from the guarantee 
bank (Part II, Q 3f: mean value 2.49, standard deviation 0.831). No significant 
relationship has been found between the impact of the loan with guarantee on the 
lending relationship and the demographic variables. For testing whether the answers 
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of existing customers differ from those of new customers, the cluster results have 
been analysed. However, these results were again not statistically significant (p = 
0.995, Sig. ≥ 0.1). A significant relationship that has been determined is between the 
lending relationship and the amount of information provided (p = 0.000; Sig. < 0.01). 
SMEs that confirmed that they provide more information to their bank after receiving 
the loan also answered that the relationship has intensified. Firms that did not 
provide more information denied the creation of a lending relationship. This 
confirms proposition 3b. Since the loans would not have been provided without the 
guarantee from the guarantee bank and the provision of the loan allows the collection 
of information in the first place, it can be said that the guarantee bank facilitates the 
creation of bank-borrower relationships. 
Summing up the qualitative and quantitative results, a relationship between the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank, the collection of additional 
information and the creation of lending relationship has been confirmed. Existing 
literature has confirmed a positive impact of lending relationships on the loan 
availability for SMEs (Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Cole, 1998; Behr et al., 2011). 
The connection between the provision of a guarantee from a Credit Guarantee 
Scheme and the creation of a lending relationship has never been tested. Therefore, 
the present research has confirmed a positive relationship between these two topics, 
at least for the guarantee bank in Hessen. 
6.4  Overcoming of credit restrictions 
Following the fourth research question, proposition 4 is: “Guarantee banks help to 
mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs”. The aim of this proposition is to test whether 
guarantee banks can reduce credit restrictions for initial loan provisions as well as for 
follow-up loans which means on a long-term perspective.  
To analyse the impact of a guarantee on an initial loan application, all interviewees 
were asked whether guarantees from the guarantee bank help to overcome credit 
restrictions (part D, question 13). Eight of them confirmed this (80.0%). Since a 
guarantee acts as a substitute for collateral for the lending banks, it allows providing 
loans to SMEs for viable business projects when the expected loss would otherwise 
be too high. Without guarantees, the loans would not have been provided. The 
findings are consistent with those of Menkhoff et al. (2012). This effect has been 
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demonstrated in Figure 5.1 above and shows how the provision of a guarantee from 
the guarantee bank can reduce credit restrictions for SMEs in individual cases. The 
major importance of reducing the default risk for the lending banks is also underlined 
by the statements of the interviewees about the consequences of a denial of the 
guarantee bank to provide a guarantee (part A, question 4). All of them answered that 
in case of a negative decision of the guarantee bank the loan would not be provided. 
Additionally, these findings are confirmed by the results of the web survey. All 
SMEs have been asked about the significance of the guarantee for obtaining the bank 
loan (Part II, Q3e). Their answers supported the high significance of the provision of 
a guarantee from the guarantee bank for the availability of a bank loan (mean value 
1.46, standard deviation 0.705). 
To test the impact of guarantees on the sustained access to bank loans, all SMEs 
were asked whether they needed a follow-up loan after they have received the loan 
including a guarantee from the guarantee bank and whether they needed a guarantee 
for the later loan (Part II, Q 4 and 5). Out of the 157 respondent firms 61 applied for 
a follow-up loan (40.1%). From these 61 firms, only 6 (9.8%) needed a follow-up 
guarantee. This low number, indeed, indicates that something must have changed 
between the initial and the following loan application. However, these results did not 
allow a proper statistical analysis for several reasons. First of all, this number is too 
low to allow a representative analysis. Besides this, no statistically significant 
relationships between the firms that needed a follow-up guarantee and the 
demographic factors have been found (see Appendix IX). Moreover, the reasons for 
the need of the guarantee for the follow-up loan could not be analysed by the web 
survey.  
To assess the ability of the guarantee bank to mitigate credit restrictions in the long 
term, all interviewees were asked whether the fact that a guarantee was included in 
an initial loan facilitates the provision of a follow-up loan (Part D, Q 14). They all 
denied this (100.0%). The answers of the interviewees have demonstrated that each 
loan application will be assessed in the same way, independently of the inclusion of a 
guarantee for the initial loan. Whether a guarantee will be needed is again dependent 
on the probability of default of the borrower and on whether the bank needs a third 
party to take on a certain amount of risk. The information that might have been 
collected during the credit term of the initial loan and the relationship and trust that 
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might have been built during that time, of course, facilitate the loan decision. In this 
respect, the provision of the guarantee plays an important role since it enabled the 
provision of the first loan and acted as cornerstone for the collection of information 
and the building of a lending relationship. These findings are in line with the 
conceptual studies presented in the literature review (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 2003; 
Vogel and Adams, 1997). However, the guarantee has no direct impact on the 
decision about whether a follow-up loan can be provided and, if so, whether it can be 
provided with or without guarantee from the guarantee bank. For this decision, only 
the business project and the default risk are decisive factors.  
Summing up, it can be said that proposition 4 can only be confirmed partly. 
Regarding a single credit decision, guarantees from guarantee banks indeed can 
mitigate credit restriction. However, credit restrictions cannot necessarily be reduced 
in a sustainable way by guarantee banks. This depends on the collateral that can be 
provided by the firm and the inherent risk of a follow-up loan.    
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7 Conclusions and recommendations 
This section contains the main findings, limitations and implications of the present 
research. Section 7.1 starts with highlighting how the present research contributes to 
the existing literature, transfers the research findings to the framework of the learning 
process and explains the extent to which the research objective has been fulfilled. 
Section 7.2 describes a typology of firms that have been supported by the guarantee 
bank. Section 7.3 makes practical implications for further research to capture and 
integrate the new findings of the present thesis, to overcome existing limitations and 
to broaden the research about German guarantee banks.  
7.1  Main findings 
The present research makes some contributions to the debate about the efficiency of 
the German Credit Guarantee Scheme. German guarantee banks are supported by the 
state. Since the federal government and the states take on a major amount of risk 
when a guarantee is provided, it is important to consistently monitor the efficiency of 
the guarantee banks. This is crucial for making sure that the desired aim to make 
available loans to SMEs with promising business concepts but not enough collateral 
is achieved. The provision of loans enables SMEs to start or carry on a business. This 
has an enormous impact on the overall economy. It is important that the “right” firms 
are supported. This means that firms that are too risky should not be supported and 
firms that are promising should receive financial support. In this context, it is 
important to ensure that guarantees are allocated to those firms that are really 
promising and guarantees are not only used to realize more risky loans or generate 
additional profits. Existing studies have already demonstrated that guarantee banks 
have a positive impact on the access to bank finance for SMEs (Kramer, 2008; 
Langer and Schiereck, 2002) and are economically beneficial due to the creation of 
jobs and having a positive impact on the GDP (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2010; 
Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). The present research picks up on some additional 
issues. It connects a range of research approaches which have not been interrelated 
so far and adapts them to the German guarantee scheme. The basis of the present 
research is built from conceptual papers about the ability of Credit Guarantee 
Schemes to alter the lending behaviour of banks (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 2003; 
Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). These papers refer to a reduction of 
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information asymmetries between SMEs and lending banks which can be achieved 
by the inclusion of a guarantee from a guarantee scheme in a SME loan. Information 
asymmetries are considered as being one significant cause of the restricted access 
SMEs have to bank loans (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). 
However, it is not the only reason for which banks deny loans to SMEs. Existing 
literature about credit restrictions have also referred to related risk (Beck et al., 2010; 
Waschbusch and Straub, 2008; Gudger, 1998), lack of collateral (Harhoff and 
Körting, 1998; Berger and Udell, 1998; Columba et al., 2010) and relatively higher 
costs and lower profitability of SME loans (Bosse, 2009; Levitsky, 1997a; Riding et 
al., 2007). Therefore, the research started with evaluating the reasons for the 
requirement of a guarantee from a guarantee bank when a loan decision is made by 
commercial banks. In a next step, the research concentrated on the role the guarantee 
plays for the provision of a SME loan. It was assumed that guarantees from the 
guarantee bank are required when the borrower cannot provide their own collateral to 
reduce the risk for the lending bank. This expectation was derived from general 
literature about the role of collateral in bank lending (Bester, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Gonas et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2011a). So far, only one study has 
been found that tested the relation between guarantees from a Credit Guarantee 
Scheme and the significance of collateral for SME loans (Menkhoff et al., 2012). 
This study is not concentrated on the German guarantee banks (but on the scheme in 
Thailand). Therefore, the adaption of collateral issues to the analysis of German 
guarantee banks within the present thesis is an innovative contribution to existing 
research. Moreover, the present research examined existing papers about market 
imperfections as one rationale for the existence of Credit Guarantee Schemes 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Grunert and Norden, 2012; Van Caneghem and Van 
Campenhout, 2012; Akerlof, 1970). Here, again, only one study has been found that 
concentrates on the relation between information asymmetries and Credit Guarantee 
Schemes so far (Uesugi et al., 2010). This study analysed the creation of moral 
hazard of the Japanese guarantee scheme. Additionally, the present research includes 
the impact of German guarantee banks on the creation of lending relationships. 
Existing literature has demonstrated that lending relationships help to overcome 
credit restrictions (Behr et al., 2011; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998). However, no research about the impact of the inclusion of a 
guarantee from a guarantee scheme in a SME loan on the establishment of a lending 
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relationship has been found so far. Finally, the literature review has demonstrated 
that existing studies did not explicitly analyse the impact of guarantee schemes on 
mitigating credit restrictions for SMEs in a sustainable way which is considered to be 
desirable.  
The use of different fields of research which had not been applied to Credit 
Guarantee Schemes and the focus on German guarantee banks present an innovative 
research framework which is much more complex than many existing studies. The 
complete framework is illustrated in Section 2.6. The mentioned literature was never 
combined in a comparable way and the above explained relationships were never 
tested for the German guarantee banks or another Credit Guarantee Scheme in the 
world. In this context, the present research provides a new research approach for 
analyzing Credit Guarantee Schemes in general and the German guarantee banks in 
particular.  
The research has partly confirmed existing research findings. However, it has also 
presented contradictory findings includes some limitations. Moreover, some 
additional or new aspects have been discovered which underline the contributions of 
the existing research. Table 7.1 illustrates the allocation of the present research 
findings according to the respective research proposition. References to confirming 
results refer to those studies whose results have been confirmed. References to 
contradictory results refer to those studies with differing results. 
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Table 7.1: Research findings 
Proposition 1: SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank loans because of a higher default risk 
and lack of collateral. 
Confirmation of existing research 
Survey results have confirmed that SMEs have difficulties in obtaining bank loans (Reize, 2011).  
Survey and interviews have revealed no relationship between demographic factors and difficulties in 
obtaining loans (Schwarz and Zimmermann, 2012; Zimmermann and Steinbach, 2011; Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 2010). 
New/additional findings 
Interviews have revealed the importance of the viability of the business project for loan decisions. 
Interviews have demonstrated that weak business projects result in loan denials independent of 
guarantee provision. 
Proposition 2a: Providing a guarantee acts as a substitute for collateral and allows SMEs to 
receive a bank loan. 
Confirmation of existing research 
Survey and interview results have confirmed the significance of guarantees and collateral for 
receiving a SME loan (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006; Stefanovic, 2009). 
Interviews have revealed that guarantees act as substitute for a lack of collateral and make available 
bank loans for SMEs (Menkhoff et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2011b). 
New/additional findings 
The interviews have revealed a relationship between the size and the risk-bearing ability of a bank and 
its collateral requirements as well as the meaning of a guarantee from a guarantee bank for providing a 
bank loan. 
Limitations 
Answers of the interviewees have shown some indications for the potential existence of moral hazard 
on the part of the commercial banks but this could not be proved.  
Proposition 2b: Including a guarantee from the guarantee bank makes SME loans more 
profitable for banks. 
Contradictory findings 
Contrary to existing literature the interviews have demonstrated that the inclusion of a guarantee from 
a guarantee bank produces a higher amount of work and higher costs for the banks (Green, 2003; 
Levitsky, 1997a). 
New/additional findings 
Interviews have revealed a connection between the expected cross-selling potential and the decision 
about providing a loan that includes a guarantee from a guarantee bank. 
Interview results have shown that cross-selling prospects and the support of a certain region might 
lead to commercial banks taking a greater risk (moral hazard). 
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Table 7.1         (continued) 
Proposition 3a: SMEs provide more information and more regular information to their bank as 
a consequence of obtaining the guarantee from the guarantee bank. 
Confirmation of existing research 
Smaller and younger SMEs provided more information and/or more regular information to the 
commercial banks after they have received the loans including guarantees from the guarantee bank 
(Levitsky, 1997a; Green, 2003; Craig et al. 2008).  
Contradictory findings 
Survey and interviews demonstrated that the inclusion of a guarantee from a guarantee bank itself 
does not necessarily generate additional valuable information for the commercial banks but, indeed, 
builds the basis for reducing information asymmetries (Craig et al., 2008; Kramer, 2008; Levitsky, 
1997a; Vogel and Adams, 1997). 
Proposition 3b: Increased information supports the creation of a bank-borrower relationship. 
New/additional findings 
Survey and interview results have disclosed that the provision of a guarantee helps to improve the 
relationship between bank and borrower. 
Proposition 4: Guarantee banks help to mitigate credit restrictions for SMEs. 
Confirmation of existing research 
Survey and interviews confirmed that the provision of a guarantee enables the provision of an initial 
loan for SMEs (Craig et al., 2008; Green, 2003; Vogel and Adams, 1997). 
Limitations 
Survey and interviews could not provide evidence for a reduction of credit restrictions in a sustainable 
way. 
 
In Section 2.6 the key factors that are assumed to have an influence on the access to 
bank loans for SMEs in the considered context and their predicted role within the 
framework of the present research have been presented. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
established framework according to the research findings which have been presented 
in Section 6 and summed up in Table 7.1. It becomes obvious that some relationships 
can be confirmed while others have to be rejected. The analysis also revealed 
additional factors that play a role in the overall process. These have been added. For 
some relationships however, no definitive statement can be made due to data 
limitations. The findings are discussed in detail below. 
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Figure 7.1: Main findings about the predicted learning process 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
The research findings have confirmed that risk, lack of collateral and information 
asymmetries can lead to credit restrictions for SMEs. It has also been confirmed that 
the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank mitigates these credit 
restrictions since it lowers the default risk for the lending bank by providing 
additional collateral. Therefore, the present research has confirmed a positive impact 
of the guarantee bank on the access to bank loans for SMEs. A provision of a 
guarantee enables SMEs without adequate collateral to receive a bank loan that 
otherwise would not have been provided. In this respect, the existence of the 
guarantee bank seems to be justified.  
Regarding the costs and the profitability of commercial banks, the research findings 
have demonstrated that a guarantee from the guarantee bank does not directly reduce 
costs and improve profitability for the lending banks. By contrast, the research 
findings have shown that the inclusion of a guarantee means greater amount of work 
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for the lending banks and, therefore, reduces the profitability. Hence, the cost aspects 
mentioned by Green (2003) and Levitsky (1997a) have not been confirmed. 
However, the research findings have revealed how guarantees from guarantee banks 
indirectly impact the profitability of lending banks and the access to bank loans: 
cross-selling and the support of the region. Since existing literature has not 
considered these factors so far, this will be explained in more detail in the following 
section. 
The research findings have also demonstrated that guarantees from guarantee banks 
are useful instruments when the risk-bearing ability of a bank would normally not 
allow the provision of a loan. Up to now, the relation between the inclusion of a 
guarantee from a guarantee bank in a SME loan and the risk-bearing ability of the 
lending bank has not been evaluated. Making this relation known is another 
contribution of the present research, and additional investigation of this area should 
be considered for further research.  
The research findings have demonstrated that the presentation of a viable business 
project is important when applying for a bank loan. The interview partners stated that 
they consider the competition in the market, the experiences of the business owner 
and the infrastructure and the location of a business when assessing the viability of 
the project. SMEs that cannot provide a convincing business project will probably 
not receive a bank loan. In these cases even the provision of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank will not mitigate credit restrictions. Consequently, the business 
project has been added to the research framework.  
Concerning the ability of the guarantee bank to reduce information asymmetries, the 
research findings have demonstrated that the provision of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank enables the provision of a loan in the first place. This offers the 
opportunity to the commercial banks to collect information and, therefore, to mitigate 
information asymmetries over time. This confirms the existence of a learning process 
initiated by the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank as expected by 
existing literature (Green, 2003; Craig et al., 2008; Levitsky, 1997a; Vogel and 
Adams, 1997). However, the research has demonstrated that additional information is 
not consequently generated by the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
but the provision of the guarantee indeed builds the basis for a more intense 
exchange of information that might result in reducing information asymmetries.  
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The research findings have revealed another factor that fosters the reduction of 
information asymmetries and that has not been analysed before: the creation of 
lending relationships. The present research has demonstrated that lending 
relationships can be generated and intensified as a consequence of the provision of a 
SME loan which could not have been provided without the support of the guarantee 
bank. This unique finding underlines the importance of the guarantee bank for SME 
lending.  
However, the present research did not find evidence for a direct relation among the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank, the reduction of information 
asymmetries, the building of a lending relationship and the reduction of credit 
restrictions for SMEs in a sustainable way. The research findings have demonstrated 
that even if the provision of a guarantee leads to a reduction of information 
asymmetries and an intensification of the relationship between the lending bank and 
the borrower, this will not necessarily result in a long-lasting mitigation of credit 
restrictions. Every loan application will be assessed thoroughly, and the final 
decision will be dependent on a range of other factors including the risk of a loan and 
the ability of a firm to provide their own valuable collateral. Therefore, further 
research is needed to evaluate the relationship between the provision of a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank and the mitigation of credit restrictions for SMEs in a 
sustainable manner. 
At this stage, a final statement can be made about whether the present research has 
fulfilled the initial research objective which was: 
Research objective: 
To reveal whether the provision of a guarantee from a German guarantee bank can 
initiate a learning process on the side of the commercial bank which helps to mitigate 
existing information asymmetries concerning SMEs, supports the building of a long-
term customer-bank relationship and helps to overcome credit restrictions.  
Referring to the research objective, it can be said that the present research has indeed 
found evidence for the ability of the guarantee bank to initiate a process of learning 
for the commercial banks by providing the opportunity to collect information and 
create lending relationships. This is caused by the fact that the provision of a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank enables the provision of loans that otherwise 
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would not have been provided since guarantees from the guarantee bank compensate 
for the borrower’s insufficient collateral and reduce the risk for the lending banks. 
Therefore, the guarantee bank can directly reduce credit restrictions for SMEs. This 
leads to the conclusion that the guarantee bank is a useful instrument to facilitate the 
access to bank loans for SMEs.  
The literature review has demonstrated that the central aim of all Credit Guarantee 
Schemes in the world is to support SMEs receiving bank loans. Using the example of 
the guarantee scheme in Germany, the present research has demonstrated that these 
schemes can initiate the expected process of learning. Consequently, the research 
provides evidence for the ability of guarantee schemes to mitigate credit restrictions 
and build the basis for reducing information asymmetries and creating lending 
relationships.  
However, to evaluate whether Credit Guarantee Schemes help to overcome credit 
restrictions in a sustainable manner and not foster moral hazard on the side of the 
lending banks could not be proved by the present PhD thesis. To evaluate this, a 
longitudinal study seems to be appropriate.  
7.2  Types of supportable firms  
The findings of the web survey and the semi-structured interviews allowed the 
development of a classification of those firms that are typically benefitting from the 
existence of the guarantee bank. Section 1.6 has highlighted the formal prerequisites 
that exist for obtaining a guarantee from a guarantee bank. These are minimum 
standards firms have to fulfill to qualify for receiving a guarantee from a guarantee 
bank like being a SME corresponding to the definition of the European Union and 
being engaged in particular business sectors (Schmidt and van Elkan, 2006). In 
analyzing those firms that have already received a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank, the research has revealed some additional features which can be considered as 
being characteristic. These features allowed the creation of a typology of firms that 
receive a guarantee from the guarantee bank. Such a typology dealing explicitly with 
the characteristics of firms that are eligible for a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
is a new contribution to the research about guarantee banks. SMEs that are credit 
restricted and fulfill the formal prerequisites can use this typology to ascertain 
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whether an application for a guarantee from the guarantee bank can be an option to 
improve their access to bank loans.  
In general, the research findings have demonstrated that firms that receive a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank typically are small SMEs. Regarding the legal 
form, most SMEs that receive a guarantee from the guarantee bank are sole 
proprietors or limited companies. An important requirement for obtaining a 
guarantee is the viability of the business project.  Moreover, guarantees are typically 
provided to SMEs that cannot provide enough of their own valuable collateral.  
Besides these general characteristics, a more detailed distinction can be made 
according to the existing relationship between the lending bank and the borrower at 
the time the firm has applied for the loan. The cluster analysis discussed in Section 
4.7 has demonstrated that it can be distinguished between firms that have already 
been customers to the lending banks before they have received the loan including the 
guarantee and firms that become new customers to the bank when receiving a loan. 
Firms with an existing relationship have been labelled Old Hands and SMEs that had 
no relation to the bank were labelled Rookies within the present thesis. Additionally, 
Old Hands and Rookies have been subdivided according to the contact frequency 
with their bank. Firms with only few contacts to the lending bank received the 
notation reserved, firms with frequent contact obtained the notation present. The 
research results have demonstrated that this classification can also be used for 
creating the typology. This allows firms seeking a bank loan and facing credit 
restrictions without the support of a guarantee bank to identify the particular 
beneficial characteristics for obtaining a guarantee depending on their current 
relationship and their contact frequency to the bank. The respective typology is 
subdivided into typical demographic characteristics including the purpose of the loan 
and the type of the lending bank. 
Old Hands 
Old Hands are typically SMEs that have been customers to the lending bank for more 
than nine years at the time they have applied for the loan. This implies that the 
lending bank had some knowledge about the firms and the business success. The 
following can be considered as being characteristic for these firms: 
 
220 
 
Main demographic factors: 
Old Hands typically have existed for more than nine years at the time the loan 
including a guarantee from the guarantee bank was obtained. Old Hands contain 
SMEs of all sizes. According to the contact frequency a distinction can be made for 
the legal forms of the firms. While Present Old Hands more often have a legal form 
of unlimited liability, Reserved Old Hands more often have a legal form of limited 
liability.  
Purpose of the loan: 
Present Old Hands often received the guarantee for a start-up loan. Since Old Hands 
are firms that have already existed for a range of years, the loan is not needed for the 
foundation of the firms but for mergers and acquisitions for example. Reserved Old 
Hands more often received the loan for financing working capital and therefore for 
bridging liquidity shortages rather than for financing growth. 
Lending bank: 
Most of the loans for Present Old Hands are provided by savings banks while 
Reserved Old Hands obtain the majority of their loans from co-operative banks. This 
implies that it is most promising for these firms to apply for a loan at savings banks 
or co-operative banks. 
Rookies 
Rookies are firms that had no contact to the lending bank before they applied for the 
loan. Hence, these SMEs were new customers for the lending banks and the banks 
usually did not have any information about these firms at the time they applied for 
the loan.  
Main demographic factors: 
Rookies are micro firms with 1-9 employees. Moreover, Rookies are younger than 
Old Hands. Considering the legal form, it can again be distinguished between Present 
Rookies and Reserved Rookies. The legal form of Present Rookies is typically one 
with unlimited liability. As opposed to this, Reserved Rookies are typically firms 
with limited liability. 
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Purpose of the loan: 
Since Rookies are new customers to the banks, they typically apply for a start-up 
loan. This applies for both, Present and Reserved Rookies.   
Lending bank: 
The majority of all Rookies received their loan from a co-operative bank. This 
applies for Present Rookies as well as for Reserved Rookies. This implies that for 
those SMEs that need a start-up loan, an application at a co-operative bank seem to 
be promising.  
Table 7.2 provides a complete overview about the typology derived from the 
research findings of the present PhD thesis.  
Table 7.2: Typology of supported firms 
 Present  
Old Hands 
(overall 42 
firms) 
Reserved  
Old Hands 
(overall 42 
firms) 
Present  
Rookies   
(overall 36 firms) 
Reserved 
Rookies     
(overall 27 firms) 
Size 1-49 employees 1-49 employees 1-9 employees 1-9 employees 
Legal form Unlimited 
liability 
Limited liability Unlimited 
liability 
Limited liability 
Age > 9 years > 9 years 
 
Young/middle 
age 
Young/middle 
age 
Purpose Start-up Working capital Start-up Start-up 
Bank type Savings-bank Co-operative 
bank 
Co-operative 
bank 
Co-operative 
bank 
Source: Own illustration 
This typology allows SMEs that are credit restricted to check whether applying for a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank can be an option. It is designed to provide 
information for situations in which a guarantee from the guarantee bank can facilitate 
bank lending for otherwise credit-restricted firms. This shall be demonstrated by two 
examples: 
A SME that already exists for a couple of years and already has received some loans 
from a bank with which it has a long-lasting relationship suffers from a liquidity 
shortfall. It needs a loan for working capital but knows that it will not be able to 
provide additional collateral. The typology demonstrates that the provision of a 
guarantee from a guarantee bank can typically help these firms to obtain a bank loan 
by providing the missing collateral. The typology, therefore, would encourage the 
firm to apply for a guarantee from the guarantee bank and the bank loan.  
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The same applies for an entrepreneur who wants to establish a new business. So far, 
he does not have any contact to a commercial bank. Even if the start-up is related to a 
higher risk for lending banks and not enough collateral can be provided, the typology 
demonstrates that a loan will not necessarily be denied. The inclusion of a guarantee 
from the guarantee can substitute the missing collateral. The typology also 
demonstrates that it will be most promising to apply for the loan at a co-operative 
bank since co-operatives have already provided loans in comparable situations.  
In this regard, the typology that has been developed from the research findings 
provides a practical guideline for SMEs that have a viable business project but have 
to face credit restrictions because of a lack of collateral. 
7.3  Further research and limitations 
The discussion of the research findings has revealed the need for further research. 
This is mostly true for those factors that have been exclusively disclosed by the 
research findings. However, the need for further analysis is also related to some 
limitations of the present research. Consequently, the thesis is finished with 
providing some concrete recommendations for further investigation. 
The analysis of the interviews has demonstrated that an important prerequisite for 
obtaining a bank loan is the viability of the business project. The interviewees stated 
that they consider the competition in the respective market, the infrastructure, the 
location of the business and the experiences of the business owner when assessing a 
business project. However, to provide SMEs with recommendations about how to 
successfully apply for a bank loan (either with or without a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank), a deeper analysis about what makes a business project viable for 
commercial banks seems to be important. Since the viability acts as the fundamental 
prerequisite for obtaining a bank loan, SMEs need to learn more about the criteria 
commercial banks use to determine a project’s viability. This can best be done by 
conducting additional semi-structured interviews with bank managers engaged in 
SME lending which may be combined with case studies for obtaining concrete 
statements.  
The interview results have illustrated that the inclusion of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank increases costs for the lender and, therefore, does not directly 
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increase the overall profit for the lending banks. However, interviewees referred to 
two other areas that might indirectly increase the banks’ profits. One of these is the 
cross-selling potential that can accrue from providing a loan to a SME. When 
additional services can be offered to the firm that receives the loan with a guarantee 
from the guarantee bank, these services will generate additional profits for the 
lending bank. This can make the overall customer relationship profitable even if the 
loan itself will generate no profit. The cross-selling potential can also be included in 
the loan pricing by reducing the required risk margin for a loan (Brost et al., 2008). 
In this case, a loan that might not have been profitable with the inclusion of the 
guarantee might become profitable due to cross-selling. Another direct impact on the 
profits of a bank can be generated by supporting the region. As mentioned earlier, 
savings banks and co-operative banks are limited to a certain region. In contrast to 
private banks, these banks cannot operate outside their region in Germany. Making 
available a loan to a firm with the support of the guarantee bank might save or create 
jobs in the region. When employees are also customers of the bank, this might 
generate profits that are indirectly related to that loan. The relation between the costs 
and the profit of SME loans, the decision about whether to include a guarantee from 
a guarantee bank in a loan and the expected cross-selling potential respectively the 
support of the region have not been analyzed so far. The present research provided 
the first indication for a close connection. To further evaluate this, more semi-
structured interviews with bank managers are needed. A questionnaire approach is 
not considered to be suitable since it does not allow further questioning. The 
interviews should explicitly focus on the importance commercial banks ascribe to 
additional profits related to cross-selling and the regional economy and whether 
banks consider these indirect profits when making a loan decision.  
Related to the assumption that cross-selling and the support of the region enhance the 
profit of the lending banks, the question arises of whether the banks’ knowledge 
about indirect improvement of the overall profits provides some indication for moral 
hazard on the part of the banks. The provision of a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank allows providing a loan to a firm that normally would not have received a loan 
due to a higher probability of default. When positive external effects are expected to 
be generated by the support of such firms, banks might be willing to accept the 
higher probability of default under the condition that the guarantee bank provides a 
guarantee. The provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank provides collateral 
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to the lender that reduces the loss given default for the bank. Consequently, the 
provision of a guarantee from the guarantee bank ends up in a reduction of the 
expected loss. If a bank has a fixed maximum expected loss it is willing to accept8, 
the inclusion of the guarantee might lead to a provision of a loan for a SME with a 
worse credit scoring and therefore a higher probability of default when the guarantee 
reduced the loss given default. Thus, the provision of a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank has a direct impact on the access to bank finance for SMEs.  
The answers of the interviewees that stated that the provision of the guarantee from 
the guarantee bank was the only way to realize a loan, gave some indication for the 
willingness to accept a higher probability of default when the guarantee bank is 
included. This also holds true for the statements of some interviewees about the risk 
bearing ability of the commercial bank. The interviewees of smaller banks mentioned 
that sometimes loans could normally not be provided because the inherent risk will 
not meet the requirements of the risk-bearing ability of the bank. However, the 
inclusion of a guarantee from a guarantee bank lowers the default risk which offers 
the possibility to provide a loan. These statements also provided some evidence for 
moral hazard. With the present research, the existence of moral hazard on the part of 
the banks cannot be evaluated extensively. However, considering the possibilities for 
the existence of moral hazard, further analysis about this topic is needed.  
To evaluate whether moral hazard occurs when a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
is included in a loan provision, information about default rates is necessary. Higher 
default rates of SME loans that included a guarantee from the guarantee bank 
compared to those of SME loans that did not include a guarantee from the guarantee 
bank would be an indication for moral hazard. Another way to analyse moral hazard 
on the part of the banks is to compare the probability of default of loans with 
guarantees from the guarantee bank with those without a guarantee. When loans that 
included a guarantee show higher probabilities of default than the others, this could 
be an indication that banks are willing to accept a higher probability of default under 
the precondition that the provision of the guarantee reduces the loss given default by 
the same amount and the expected loss would not increase. This can also provide 
some additional information about the impact of the regional limitation on moral 
                                                 
8 The determination of the maximum expected loss is part of the risk strategy of a bank and defined by 
banking supervisory standards (Schierenbeck et al., 2008).  
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hazard. To evaluate this, two data sets are needed. One data set including SME loans 
with guarantee from the guarantee bank and one without guarantee from the 
guarantee bank. To obtain those data sets is very challenging in Germany. The 
present research has demonstrated that data about SMEs that obtained guarantees 
from the guarantee bank is hardly available and no official data exists that contains 
information about guarantees from a guarantee bank. Therefore, the best way to get 
access to the data needed would be to cooperate with one or more commercial banks. 
At this stage it would be wise to use the existing contacts of those banks that already 
participated in the semi-structured interviews. These banks have proven their 
willingness to share information. However, the present research has also 
demonstrated that banks are very reluctant to provide data about their customers due 
to the German banking secrecy. If the required data was available, the next challenge 
would be to find suitable peer groups within the data sets which are really 
comparable (regarding the size and the age of the firm, the loan volume, available 
own collateral and the time the loan was received). The problems of data availability 
and the complexity of the related research might be the reason why no study has 
evaluated the relationship between moral hazard and the provision of guarantees 
from the guarantee bank until today. However, for an extensive analysis about 
whether the existence of guarantee banks is justified, it is important to make sure that 
it does not foster the creation of moral hazard on the side of the lending banks.  
The willingness to accept a higher probability of default when the guarantee bank 
provides a guarantee must not necessarily be considered as being disadvantageous. 
The decisive factor is the success of these firms after having received the loan. To 
evaluate whether firms that obtained a loan including a guarantee performed well, an 
analysis of the business development is needed. Therefore, further research can be 
conducted by asking the firms of the present sample or other SMEs that have 
received loans including a guarantee from a guarantee bank to provide financial key 
figures of the previous years starting with the year in which the loan was obtained. If 
the results show that firms have grown and can be considered as sound, the decision 
to provide the loans will be deemed appropriate. This would also mitigate the threat 
that is perceived to arise from moral hazard. 
Analyzing financial key figures is also expected to be a suitable research approach 
for a further evaluation of the ability of guarantee banks to reduce credit restrictions 
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in a sustainable way. The question of whether a long-lasting mitigation of credit 
restrictions can be achieved by the existence of guarantee banks could not be 
answered by the present research. Therefore, additional research is needed. 
According to the research framework about the process of learning, credit restrictions 
are considered as being mitigated in a sustainable way when SMEs have graduated to 
borrowers without guarantees (compare Section 2.6). There are various reasons why 
no guarantee would be needed for a future loan. The provision of the initial loan can 
activate the learning process which can lead to a reduction of asymmetric 
information and the building of a lending relationship that have a positive impact on 
a firm’s application for future loans. However, firms that could not provide enough 
collateral for the initial loan might have grown by the time and be able to pledge 
enough of their own collateral to receive a follow-up loan without the need for a 
guarantee. Additionally, the probability of default might have decreased in the 
meantime because of better financial figures, for example, which leads to a better 
creditworthiness of the firm. To achieve an expected loss that meets the requirements 
of the bank, less collateral might be demanded. When the firm can pledge enough 
collateral, a guarantee is not needed. Thus, another suggestion for further research is 
to analyse financial data and data about the available assets to be able to assess the 
development of the firm. This might provide evidence for the role of the guarantee 
bank for later loan applications. The development of the firms that received a 
guarantee from the guarantee bank may also act as an indicator for the inherent risk 
of these firms and may refute the existence of what Cowling (2010) called a type 1 
error (that the decision to deny the loan turns out to be right in the end).  
First, it is important to evaluate whether a guarantee was needed again for a future 
loan. Second, a comparison of the key financial figures at the time of the initial loan 
application and the time of the application for a future loan would show if the 
financial situations of the firms had changed. It is expected that firms that do not 
need a guarantee for a future loan would have grown since the initial loan 
application. This supposes that these firms are able to provide enough valuable 
collateral for the second loan and, therefore, have graduated to borrowing without 
guarantees. If this is the case, it can be confirmed that guarantee banks help to 
overcome credit restrictions in a sustainable way.  
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Moreover, a deeper analysis of what kinds of collateral (business and personal 
collateral) have been pledged and what kinds of collateral are required by the banks 
would be helpful to fully understand that relationship between collateral and the 
necessity for a guarantee. Additionally, it would be helpful to ask SMEs about what 
collateral was available at the time of the initial loan application and what collateral 
was available at the time of the application for the future loan. Since financial key 
figures do not contain information about collateral that has been provided for a loan, 
the analysis of financial data has to be combined with semi-structured interviews of 
the respective SMEs. This would reveal which collateral was available and which has 
been pledged. The analysis would allow two things: to evaluate the growth of firms 
as well as to find out which collateral is needed to obtain bank loans. The analysis of 
growth is expected to provide additional evidence for the ability of guarantee banks 
to mitigate credit restrictions in a sustainable way. A detailed analysis about 
collateral is anticipated to help SMEs to learn more about the collateral requirements 
of commercial banks. When SMEs know which collateral is considered as being 
sufficiently valuable the firms can concentrate on acquiring the required assets over 
time. This can also help to facilitate access to bank loans for SMEs. 
Summing up, the present research has provided some interesting areas for further 
investigation. As mentioned above, for further research, established contacts should 
be used and broadened. Since the present research was limited to the federal state of 
Hessen, the research should be extended to the other federal states of Germany to 
provide a complete evaluation of German guarantee banks. This implies that firms 
from other federal states should be contacted and included for further analyses. 
Future research can be based on the existing guidelines for semi-structured 
interviews as well as the existing web survey of the present thesis, each expanded by 
the respective goals of the research project. A detailed overview about the proposed 
further research approaches is presented in table 7.3 below. Combined with the 
existing findings of the present thesis, these research approaches are expected to 
allow a comprehensive evaluation of the ability of German guarantee banks to 
mitigate information asymmetries, foster the creation of lending relationships and 
reduce credit restrictions for SMEs. If this is the case and if the occurrence of moral 
hazard can be excluded, this will result in providing a real justification for the 
existence of guarantee banks and the risk taking of the federal government and the 
federal states in Germany.  
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Table 7.3: Practical implications for further research 
Proposed research Data Relevance 
Analysis of the definition of a 
viable business project. 
Semi-structured 
interviews with bank 
managers, case studies. 
Allows learning about what is 
considered as being a viable business 
project by commercial banks to qualify 
for obtaining a bank loan. 
Evaluation of the relationship 
between cross-selling 
potential/support of the region 
as well as the risk-bearing 
ability of the bank and the 
inclusion of a guarantee from 
a guarantee bank in a loan to a 
SME. 
Semi-structured 
interviews with bank 
managers. 
Allows further analysis of the issues 
revealed by the interviews and helps to 
evaluate the occurrence of moral hazard. 
Comparison of default 
rates/probability of defaults 
between SMEs that received a 
guarantee from a guarantee 
bank and those that did not 
receive a guarantee from a 
guarantee bank.  
Analyses of bank data 
about SME loans that 
have been provided. 
Higher default rates or probabilities of 
default will provide evidence for moral 
hazard on the side of the lending banks 
if default rates/probabilities of default 
are lower or equal to peer groups that 
did not need a guarantee for obtaining a 
loan, moral hazard can be excluded.  
Analyses of performances of 
firms that received guarantees 
from a guarantee bank. 
Analyses of financial key 
figures of SMEs that 
obtained loans with 
guarantees from a 
guarantee bank.  
Weak performances will provide 
indication for moral hazard on the side 
of the banks; good performances will 
reduce the suspicion of moral hazard. 
Analysis of the growth of 
SMEs between the time of the 
initial loan provision with 
guarantees and the time of the 
application for a future loan. 
Analyses of financial key 
figures of SMEs that 
obtained a loan and data 
about available assets to 
pledge as collateral. 
Firm growth and no need for a guarantee 
for a future loan will confirm the ability 
of guarantee banks to overcome credit 
restrictions in a sustainable way. 
Analysis of the assets 
available to pledge as 
collateral at the time of the 
initial loan provision for 
which a guarantee was needed 
and the time of the application 
for a future loan. 
Semi-structured 
interviews with SMEs. 
Accumulation of assets to pledge for 
collateral and no need for a guarantee 
for a future loan will confirm the ability 
of guarantee banks to overcome credit 
restrictions in a sustainable way. A 
detailed analysis of collateral will help 
to provide some indication to SMEs for 
which collateral is needed to obtain a 
bank loan and allow a better 
understanding of the relation between 
collateral and the need for a guarantee.  
Source: Own illustration 
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Appendix I: Web survey 
This appendix consists of screenshots of every questionnaire page followed by a 
translation in English.  
 
Welcome! 
The present survey is part of an empirical investigation within the context of a PhD 
thesis at Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen University of Applied Sciences. The 
thesis is concerned with bank lending to SMEs. We kindly ask you to invest 10 
minutes of your time to answer the survey. By doing so, you will support our efforts 
to identify possible reasons SMEs encounter when trying to obtain bank loans. Based 
on your answers, we may find strategies to mitigate these problems. 
We kindly ask you to answer each question only about the loan for which you 
obtained a guarantee from the guarantee bank when completing the survey since we 
want to concentrate our study on the function and influence of guarantee banks.  
We assure you that we will keep your answers anonymous and confidential at all 
times. Thank you for your cooperation. If you are interested in the survey results, 
please send an email to: Anke.Valentin@w.th-mittelhessen.de. 
Enjoy answering the survey! 
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Prof. Dr. Birgit Wolf & Anke Valentin 
Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen 
THM Business School 
Financial Services 
Wiesenstr. 14 
35390 Gießen 
 
 
Part I: Access to bank finance 
At the beginning we want to learn about your opinion concerning the access to bank 
finance for SMEs and to inform us about your previous experiences with guarantee 
banks. 
How severe are the difficulties for SMEs to obtain bank loans according to your 
estimation? 
Not severe     Severe 
Have you ever obtained a guarantee of a guarantee bank? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Part II: Loan provision and guarantees of a guarantee bank 
The questions of this part will provide an indication about the impact of guarantees 
from guarantee banks on the access to finance of SMEs. Analyzing the answers will 
show if and how guarantee banks facilitate the access to bank loans. 
 
1. For which purpose did you apply for a bank loan?  
(Multiple selection allowed) 
  Investment 
  Start-up 
  Working capital  
  Other: 
 
2. Why have a guarantee been integrated in the loan? 
o The bank advised me to apply for a guarantee of the guarantee bank. 
o I myself applied for a guarantee before talking with the bank. 
o I asked the bank about integrating a guarantee. 
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Filter question when respondent himself applied for a guarantee before talking to a 
bank: 
 
Where did you know the services of the guarantee bank from? 
(Multiple selection allowed) 
  Internet 
  Newspapers/Radio/TV 
  IHK (Chamber of Industry and Commerce) 
  Chamber of Trade 
  Management-consultant 
  Tax accountant 
  Friends 
  Other: 
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3. Please assess the following statements: 
 I  
absolutly 
agree 
I 
rather 
agree 
I rather 
not 
agree 
I absolutly 
not agree 
a) My bank officer has 
comprehensively informed me of 
the business activities of the 
guarantee bank and the 
application process. 
    
b) The guarantee bank required more 
resp. more detailed information 
about my firm than the bank. 
    
c) Since I have received the 
guaranteed loan I provide more 
information about my business to 
my bank. 
    
d) Since I have received the 
guaranteed loan I provide more 
regularely  information about my 
business to my bank. 
    
e) The guarantee was crucial for 
obtaining the loan. 
    
f) The relationship to my bank has 
intensified since I have received 
the guaranteed loan. 
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4. Have you applied for another bank loan after 
receiving the guarantee of the guarantee bank? 
o Yes 
 N  
5. Did you need a guarantee of the guarantee bank for 
obtaining the loan again? 
o Yes  
o No 
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Part III: Bank-borrower relationship 
Many studies assume that the relationship beween a bank and a borrower has an 
important impact on the access to finance. The following questions will help to 
figure  out the actual impact, the duration and strength of a lending relationship has  
on the bank’s decision to provide a loan. Please always refer to the loan for which 
you received a guarantee of the guarantee bank in Hessen when answering the 
following questions.  
1. How long did the relationship to your bank already exist  when you 
applied for the loan? 
o 0 years (no prior relationship) 
o 1 – 3 years 
o 4 – 9 years 
o more than 0 years 
2. How often have you been in touch with your bank within the past? 
o No contact 
o 1- 2 times a year 
o 3 – 5 times a year 
o More than 5 times a year 
3. How often did your contact person in the bank change in the past? 
Never     Very often 
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4. How often do you provide the following information to your bank? 
 Annual Biannual Quarterly Monthly Never 
Annual accounts      
Business assessment      
Liquidity details      
Investment planning      
Capital budgeting      
Information about business 
strategy 
     
Information about risk 
management 
     
Information about human 
resource management 
     
Information about order of 
succession 
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5. Please state your bank: 
o Savings Bank 
o Cooperative   
o Private bank 
o Other: 
 
 
Part IV: General information about the firm 
Conclusively, we want to ask you about general information about your firm. We 
will treat these information as confidential.  
1. Please state the legal form of your firm: 
o Sole proprietorship 
o Partnership 
o GmbH (Limited company) 
o GmbH & Co. KG (Limited partnership with a limited company as 
general partner) 
o AG (Public limited company) 
o Other: 
2. How old is your company? 
o Less than one year 
o 1 – 3 years 
o 4 – 6 years 
o 6 – 9 years 
o More than 9 years 
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3. To which industrial sector does your firm belong? 
o Trade industry 
o Retail industry 
o Gardening 
o Manufacture 
o Hospitality industry 
o Other trade 
o Freelance professionals 
o Services 
o Wholesale and foreign trade 
4. Please classify the average turnover of your firm within the last three 
years: 
o Heavily increased (more than +8 per cent) 
o Increased (between +5 and +8 per cent) 
o Slightly increased (0 to +5 per cent) 
o Slightly decreased(0 to -5 per cent) 
o Decreased (between -5 and -8 per cent) 
o Heavily decreased (more than -8 per cent) 
5. How many employees does your firm have:  
o 1 – 9 employees 
o 10 – 49 employees 
o 50 – 249 employees 
o 250 – 500 employees 
o more than 500 employees 
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6. Please state your own position within the firm: 
o Executive board 
o Assistant executive board 
o Executive employee 
o Employee financial department 
o Other: 
7. Please state your qualification: 
(Multiple selection allowed) 
 
o Technical training 
o Business management training 
o Technical studies  
o Business studies 
o Other: 
o No qualification 
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Thank you for your participation! 
Prof. Dr. Birgit Wolf and Anke Valentin 
Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen 
THM Business School 
Email: Anke.Valentin@w.th-mittelhessen.de 
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Appendix II: Cover letter 
This appendix consists of the cover letter send out in May 2011 to invite SMEs to 
attend the research by answering the questionnaire. A rough translation is attached. 
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Dear Sir or Madam, 
Today, we contact you to ask for your assistance with a very interesting research 
project which is conducted by the Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen in 
cooperation with the guarantee bank Hesse.  
As part of her PhD thesis, Anke Valentin is evaluating the impact of the guarantee 
bank on SME access to bank finance. The aim is to find out to what extent the 
guarantee bank can facilitate the access to bank finance for SMEs. The main part of 
the research is the empirical evaluation of the experiences of SMEs. Therefore, we 
would like to ask all firms that have received a guarantee from guarantee bank Hesse 
between 2003 and 2008 to answer an online questionnaire. Your experiences as a 
customer of the guarantee bank Hesse are of great importance for this research 
project. For this reason, we sincerely ask you to spend ten minutes of your time to 
complete the questionnaire which is available online at our webpage.  
You can find the link directly in the header of our webpage http://www.bb-h.de/. To 
get access to the questionnaire, please insert the password Umfrage_THM. We 
ensure your anonymity; all answers will be treated confidentially. 
We thank you for your kind support. If you are interested in the research results, 
please contact Anke Valentin (anke.valentin@w.thm.de).   
With kind regards 
Guarantee Bank HessenGmbH 
 
Schwarz  Kadau 
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Appendix III: Screen shots web survey 
This appendix presents a screenshot of the web page of the guarantee bank Hessen 
showing the link to the web survey and a screenshot of the following page that 
required the input of the password.  
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Appendix IV: Follow-up letter 
This appendix consists of the follow-up letter that was sent out in June 2011 to all 
potential respondents of the web survey. A rough Translation is attached. 
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Dear Sir or Madam, 
We contacted you in May to ask for your assistance with a very interesting research 
project conducted by the Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen in cooperation with 
the guarantee bank Hessen. You may have not yet found the time to answer the 
questionnaire. Therefore, we would like to introduce the research project, which is of 
special interest for SMEs, again. 
As part of her PhD thesis, Anke Valentin is evaluating the impact of the guarantee 
bank on SME access to bank finance. The aim is to find out to what extent the 
guarantee bank can facilitate the access to bank finance for SMEs. The main part of 
the research is the empirical evaluation of the experiences of SMEs. Therefore, we 
would like to ask all firms that have received a guarantee from guarantee bank Hessn 
between 2003 and 2008 to answer an online questionnaire. Your experiences as a 
customer of the guarantee bank Hesse are of great importance for this research 
project. For this reason, we sincerely ask you to spend ten minutes of your time to 
complete the questionnaire which is available online at our webpage.  
You can find the link directly in the header of our webpage http://www.bb-h.de/. To 
get access to the questionnaire, please insert the password Umfrage_THM. We 
ensure your anonymity; all answers will be treated confidentially. Please fill in the 
questionnaire before 22 June 2011. The first 30 respondents will participate in a 
lottery for 10 vouchers for Amazon.de each worth 25.00 euros. To take part in the 
lottery, please send an email to Susanne.Weber@w.thm.de after completing the 
questionnaire. If you have already answered the questionnaire, you are also invited to 
take part in the lottery.  
We thank you in advance for your support.  
 
With kind regards 
Guarantee bank Hesse GmbH 
 
Schwarz  Kadau 
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Appendix V: Results of the non-response bias tests 
This appendix consists of the results of the chi-square tests for each question of the 
web survey for testing significant differences of the early and late respondents.  
P I, Q 1 Access to bank loans  
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    156 2.811 4 0.590  - 
       P II, Q 1 Purpose of the loan           
  Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
 
Investment 157 0.001 1 1.000  - 
 
Working capital 157 0.164 1 0.715  - 
 
Start-up 157 1.409 1 0.307  - 
  Other 157 2.013 1 0.222  - 
       P II, Q 2 P II, Q 2: Initiative for including guarantee 
     Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 4.061 3 0.255  - 
       P II, Q 3a Knowledge bank about guarantee bank (multiple selection allowed) 
   Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 3.530 4 0.473  - 
       P II, Q 3b Requirements guarantee bank 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 1.392 4 0.846  - 
       P II, Q 3c Amount information provided 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    147 2.760 3 0.430  - 
       P II, Q 3d Regularity information provided 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    145 2.336 3 0.506  - 
       P II, Q 3e Meaning guarantee 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    147 5.052 3 0.168  - 
 
 
      P II, Q 3f Relationship after receiving guarantee 
     Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    147 1.224 3 0.747  - 
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       P II, Q 4 Need for follow-up loan 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    152 0.382 1 0.529  - 
       P II, Q 5 Need for follow-up guarantee 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    61 3.494 1 0.069 <0.1 
       P III, Q 1 Duration relationship bank when applying for the loan 
    Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    152 3.589 3 0.309  - 
       P III, Q 2 Contact frequency with bank 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    152 0.736 3 0.865  - 
       P III, Q 3 Changes of the contact person in the past 
     Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    149 3.977 3 0.264  - 
       P III, Q 4 Provision of information  
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
 
Annual accounts 157 1.657 4 0.798  - 
 
Business assessment 157 1.247 5 0.940  - 
 
Liquidity planning 157 0.976 5 0.964  - 
 
Investment planning 157 4.781 5 0.443  - 
 
Capital budgeting 157 0.984 5 0.964  - 
 
Business strategy  157 1.184 5 0.946  - 
 
Risk management 157 6.463 5 0.264  - 
 
HRM 157 6.635 5 0.249  - 
  Order of succession 157 0.535 3 0.911   
       P III, Q 5 Bank type 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 1.963 4 0.743  - 
       P IV, Q 1 Legal form 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 1.100 6 0.982  - 
       P IV, Q 2 Age of the firm 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 4.641 4 0.326  - 
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P IV, Q 3 Industrial sector 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 7.482 8 0.486  - 
       P IV, Q 4 Development turnover within the past three years 
     Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    151 10.043 5 0.074 <0.1 
       P IV, Q 5 Headcount 
       Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 3.003 4 0.557  - 
       P IV, Q 6 Position within the firm 
      Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
    157 12.960 5 0.024 <0.05 
       P IV, Q 7 Qualification (multiple selection allowed) 
     Chi-square test N χ 2 df p Sig. 
 
Technical training 157 2.890 1 0.111  - 
 
Business management training 157 0.087 1 0.864  - 
 
Technical studies 157 0.028 1 1.000  - 
 
Business studies 157 1.887 1 0.183  - 
  No qualification 157 1.887 1 0.183  - 
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Appendix VI: Variables and scales 
This appendix presents the variables used for statistical analysis and its 
corresponding question within the online questionnaire as well as its scales. 
Question Scale 
Part I: How severe are the difficulties for SMEs to obtain bank loans according to your 
estimation? 
Interval 
Part II, Q 1: For which purpose did you apply for a bank loan? Nominal 
Part II, Q 2: Why have a guarantee been integrated in the loan? Nominal 
Part II, Q 3a: My bank officer was comprehensively informed about the business activities of the 
guarantee bank and the application process. 
Interval 
Part II, Q 3b: The guarantee bank required more resp. more detailed information about my firm 
than the bank. 
Interval 
Part II. Q 3c: Since I have received the guaranteed loan I provide more information about my 
business to my bank. 
Interval 
Part II, Q 3d: Since I have received the guaranteed loan I provide more regular  information 
about my business to my bank. 
Interval 
Part II, Q 3e: The guarantee was crucial for obtaining the loan. Interval 
Part II, Q 3f: The relationship to my bank has intensified since I have received the guaranteed 
loan. 
Interval 
Part II, Q 4: Have you applied for another bank loan after receiving the guarantee of the 
guarantee bank? 
Nominal 
Part II, Q5: Did you need a guarantee of the guarantee bank for obtaining the loan again? Nominal 
Part III, Q1: How long did the relationship to your bank already exist  when you applied for the 
loan? 
Ordinal 
Part III, Q 2: How often have you been in touch with your bank within the past? Ordinal 
Part III, Q 3: How often did your contact person in the bank change in the past? Ordinal 
Part III, Q 4: How often do you provide the following information to your bank? Ordinal 
Part III, Q 5: Please state your bank. Nominal 
Part IV, Q 1: Please state the legal form of your firm. Nominal 
Part IV, Q 2: How old is your company? Ordinal 
Part IV, Q 3: To which industrial sector does your firm belong? Nominal 
Part IV, Q 4: Please classify the average turnover of your firm within the last three years. Ordinal 
Part IV, Q 5: How many employees does your firm have? Ordinal 
Part IV, Q 6: Please state your own position within the firm. Nominal 
Part IV, Q 7: Please state your qualification. Nominal 
The distances of the variables of P III, Q 3 a – f were considered to be equal. Therefore, these 
variables were treated as interval variables (Porst, 2009). 
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Appendix VII: Interview guide 
This appendix consists of the guideline for the semi-structured interviews that have 
been conducted with bank managers. 
Part A: Rationales for insisting on a guarantee 
1. When do you insist on the inclusion of a guarantee from the guarantee bank? 
 
2. Why facilitates the guarantee the provision of the loan?  
 
3. Why do sometimes even existing customers and established firms need a 
guarantee from a guarantee bank? How does the duration of the existing 
lending relationship influence the access to bank loans?  
 
4. What happens if the guarantee bank rejects the provision of the guarantee? 
Will the loan be provided anyway? Under which conditions?  
 
5. Are there any exclusion criteria that impede the provision of a loan to a SME 
even when a guarantee from the guarantee bank is included? Which?  
Part B: Information  
6. Which information are particularly important for the loan decision? 
7. Does the bank receive more information or more regular information about 
the borrower due to the provision of the guarantee? Which? Why? How 
valuable are these information?  
8. Is it possible to collect additional information about the borrower or firm in 
the course of the credit period? (If not: Why do some SMES state that they 
have provided  more information or more regular information?) 
9. What can you tell me about the credit scoring of SMEs? 
Part C: Lending Relationship 
10. Can long-lasting bank-borrower relationships be established due to the 
provision of the guarantee which haven´t been established otherwise?  
11. Does the lending relationship become more intense due to the provision of 
the guarantee?  
12. Is there a difference in the contact frequency between borrowers that received 
a guarantee from the guarantee bank and those that did not receive a 
guarantee?  
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Part D: Credit restrictions 
13. Can credit restrictions be mitigated by the existence of guarantee banks? 
14. Facilitates the provision of a guarantee from a guarantee bank the provision 
of a follow-up loan?  
Part E: Costs 
15. How would you explain the influence of the inclusion of a guarantee from the 
guarantee bank on the overall profit of a SME loan? 
 
16. What is about the potential reduction of equity requirements related to the 
inclusion of a guarantee? Is this decisive for making the decision to include a 
guarantee? 
 
17. How important is the cross-selling potential in respect of the inclusion of a 
guarantee? 
 
18. How important is the support of the region in respect of the inclusion of a 
guarantee? 
19. How many loans with guarantee of a guarantee bank are in default (compared 
to loans without guarantee)?  
 
According to your opinion and experience, are there any important aspects that 
should be considered additionally?  
 
 
 
Notes: 
Position if the interviewee (years of working experiences?): 
Bank: 
Amount of customers: 
Duration of the interview: 
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Appendix VIII: Frequency distribution of variables 
This appendix consists of frequency distributions of the answers to those questions 
that have not been illustrated in the sections of the statistical analysis. 
Part II, Q 2: Why have a guarantee been integrated in the loan? 
  No statement 7 4.5% 
Bank required guarantee 98 62.4% 
SME received a guarantee in advance 19 12.1% 
SME asked about including guarantee 33 21.0% 
Total 157 100.0% 
 
Filter Question: Where did you know the services of the guarantee bank from? 
 (Multiple selection allowed) 
  Internet 10 12.7% 
Newspaper/Radio/TV 2 2.5% 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce 11 13.9% 
Chamber of Trade 7 8.9% 
Management Consultant 18 22.8% 
Tax accountant 11 13.9% 
Friends 14 17.7% 
Other 6 7.6% 
Total 79 100.0% 
 
Part II, Q 3a: My bank officer was comprehensively informed about the 
business activities of the guarantee bank and the application process. 
No statement 7 4.5% 
I absolutely agree 69 43.9% 
I rather agree 52 33.1% 
I rather not agree 26 16.6% 
I absolutely not agree 3 1.9% 
Total 157 100.0% 
 
P II, Q 3b: The guarantee bank required more resp. more detailed information 
about my firm than the bank. 
No statement 8 5.1% 
I absolutely agree 35 22.3% 
I rather agree 45 28.7% 
I rather not agree 59 37.6% 
I absolutely not agree 10 6.7% 
Total 157 100.0% 
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P IV, Q 4: Please classify the average turnover of your firm within the last three 
years: 
No statement 6 3.8% 
Heavily increased (more than +8%) 46 29.3% 
Increased (between +5% and +8%) 39 24.8% 
Slightly increased (0% to +5%) 35 22.3% 
Slightly decreased (0% to -5%) 15 9.6% 
Decreased (between -5% and -8%) 8 5.1% 
Heavily decreased (more than -8%) 8 5.1% 
Total 157 100.0% 
 
 
Part IV, Q 6: Please state your own position within the firm: 
  Executive board 136 86.6% 
Assistant executive board 2 1.3% 
Executive employee 4 2.5% 
Employee financial department 2 1.3% 
Other 10 6.4% 
Total 154 100.0% 
 
P IV, Q 6: Please classify the average turnover of your firm within the last three 
years: 
Heavily increased (more than +8%) 46 29.3% 
Increased (between +5% and +8%) 39 24.8% 
Slightly increased (0% to +5%) 35 22.3% 
Slightly decreased (0% to -5%) 15 9.6% 
Decreased (between -5% and -8%) 8 5.1% 
Heavily decreased (more than -8%) 8 5.1% 
Total 157 100.0% 
 
 
Part IV, Q 7: Please state your qualification: 
(Multiple selection allowed) 
  Technical qualification 37 19.7% 
Business management training 66 35.1% 
Technical studies  16 8.5% 
Business studies 27 14.3% 
Other 36 19.1% 
No qualification 6 3.2% 
Total 188 100.0% 
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Appendix IX: Further analyses of the need for a follow-up guarantee  
This appendix consists of the contingency tables and chi-square tests conducted to 
analyse the relationships between the variable about the need for a follow-up 
guarantee and some demographic variables. No clear relationship was found. 
Interestingly, only firms of a legal sector worse than the overall economy needed a 
follow-up loan. This might be an indicator that banks tend to require an additional 
security for these sectors. Moreover, especially SMEs from co-operative banks 
needed a follow-up loan. However, due to the small sample size, no general 
assumptions can be made out of these results. 
Need for a follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. number of employees (PIV, Q5) 
    Employees     
  ≤ 9 employees > 9 employees Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 3 9.7% 3 10.3% 6 10.0% 
No 28 90.3% 26 89.7% 54 90.0% 
Total 31 100.0% 29 100.0% 60 100.0% 
χ² =0.007; df=1; p=0.931; Sig. ≥0.1          
 
 
Need for a follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. legal form (PIV, Q1) 
  Legal form 
  Unlimited liability Limited liability Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 2 8.0% 4 11.8% 6 10.2% 
No 23 92.0% 30 88.2% 53 89.8% 
Total 25 100.0% 34 100.0% 59 100.0% 
χ² = .224; df = 1; p = 0.636; Sig.  ≥ 0.1         
 
 
Need for a follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. industrial sector (PIV, Q 3) 
  Industrial sector 
  Worse solvency Better solvency Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
     Yes 6 12.2% 0 0.0% 6 9.8% 
No 43 87.8% 12 100.0% 55 90.2% 
Total 49 100.0% 12 100.0% 61 100.0% 
χ² = 1.630; df = 1; p = 0.202; Sig. ≥ 0.1         
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Need for a follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. age of the firm (PIV, Q2) 
  Age of the firm     
  
0-3  
years 
4-9  
years 
More than 9 
years Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
 
    
    Yes 1 20.0% 2 7.7% 3 10.3% 6 9.8% 
No 4 80.0% 24 92.3% 26 89.7% 54 90.2% 
Total 5 100.0% 26 100.0% 29 100.0% 60 100.0% 
χ² = 0.713; df = 2; p = 0.700; Sig. ≥ 0.1              
  
 
Need for a follow-up guarantee (PII, Q5) vs. bank (PIII, Q5) 
  Bank 
  
Savings  
bank 
Co-operative  
bank 
Private  
bank Total 
Follow-up guarantee 
       Yes  1 4.3% 5 15.2% 0 0.0% 6 10.2% 
No 22 95.7% 28 84.8% 3 100.0% 53 89.8% 
Total 23 100.0% 33 100.0% 3 100.0% 59 100.0% 
χ² = 2.090; df = 2; p = 0.351; Sig. ≥ 0.1             
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Appendix X: Hierarchical clustering results 
This appendix contains the dendrogram of the hierarchical clustering results.  
 
 
 
  
Dendrogram of cases using Ward´s method 
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